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Abstract 
 
Much has been written about the side effects of automation in complex safety-critical 
domains, such as air traffic management, aviation, nuclear power generation, and 
healthcare. Here, human factors and safety researchers have long acknowledged that the 
potential of automation to increase cost-effectiveness, quality of service and safety, is 
accompanied by undesired side effects or issues in human automation interaction (HAI). 
Such HAI issues may introduce the potential for increased confusion, uncertainty, and 
frustration amongst sharp end operators, i.e. the users of automation. These conditions 
may result in operators to refuse to use the automation, in impaired ability of operators 
to control the hazardous processes for which they are responsible, and in new, 
unintended paths to safety failure.  
The present thesis develops a qualitative framework of the organisational precursors to 
HAI issues (OPHAII) that can be found in safety-critical domains. Organisational precursors 
denote those organisational and managerial conditions that, although distant in time and 
space from the operational environment, may actually influence the quality of HAI found 
there.  Such precursors have been extensively investigated by organisational safety (OS) 
scholars in relation to the occurrence of accidents and disasters—although not HAI issues. 
Thus, the framework’s development is motivated by the intent to explore the theoretical 
gap lying at the intersection between the OS area and the current perspectives on the 
problem—the human computer interaction (HCI) and the system lifecycle ones. While 
considering HAI issues as a design problem or a failure in human factors integration and/or 
safety assurance respectively, both perspectives, in fact, ignore, the organisational roots 
of the problem. 
The OPHAII framework was incrementally developed based on three qualitative studies: 
two successive, historical, case studies coupled with a third corroboratory expert study. 
The first two studies explored the organisational precursors to a known HAI issue: the 
nuisance alert problem relative to an automated alarm system from the air traffic 
management domain. In particular, the first case study investigated retrospectively the 
organisational response to the nuisance alert problem in the context of the alarm’s 
implementation and improvement in the US between 1977 and 2006. The second case 
study has a more contemporary focus, and examined at the organisational response to 
the same problem within two European Air Navigation Service Providers between 1990 
 iv 
and 2010. The first two studies produced a preliminary version of the framework. The 
third study corroborated and refined this version by subjecting it to the criticism from a 
panel of 11 subject matter experts. 
The resulting framework identifies three classes of organisational precursors: (i) the 
organisational assumptions driving automation adoption and improvement; (2) the 
availability of specific organisational capabilities for handling HAI issues; and (3) the 
control of implementation quality at the boundary between the service provider and the 
software manufacturer. These precursors advance current understanding of the 
organisational factors involved in the (successful and problematic) handling of HAI issues 
within safety-critical service provider organisations. Its dimensions support the view that 
HAI issues can be seen as and organisational phenomenon—an organisational problem 
that can be the target of analysis and improvements complementary to those identified 
by the HCI and the system lifecycle perspectives. 
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Chapter 1. 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Human automation interaction (HAI) can typically be found in safety-critical domains such 
as aviation, air traffic management, railways, and healthcare. Here, as part of their daily 
tasks, practitioners are provided with and are requested to use a variety of automated 
systems, such as information displays, decision support systems, and automated alarms. 
These systems augment human operators’ ability to control the safety-critical processes 
for which they are responsible. This augmentation can occur in various ways, from 
registering data so that it is easily retrievable when needed; to analysing complex and 
dynamic information in order to support real time decision-making and action selection, 
or, in some cases, implementing autonomous system responses (Parasuraman, Sheridan, 
& Wickens, 2000). Ultimately, automation is an important asset for organisations 
operating in safety-critical domains, which can allow them to achieve increased 
productivity, quality of service, and safety.  
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However, although automation may succeed in realising these benefits, it can also have 
undesirable consequences at the human automation interface (Jones et al., 2011; Strong 
& Volkoff, 2010; Dekker, 2011; Woods, 2010; Degani, 2004). Automation may require 
operators to perform extra interaction tasks whose added value is not immediately clear 
to the practitioner. It may be accompanied with cluttered displays that make it difficult 
for practitioners to extract the salient information. Or, automation may flood the 
operational environment with nuisance alerts, i.e. alerts that, although generated by a 
system that works according to specifications, are perceived as irrelevant and distracting 
by the human operator. Overall, such undesirable consequences of automation, i.e., 
issues in human automation interaction (HAI), pose a relevant problem to the managers 
and administrators of complex, safety-critical organisations. Not only they may expose 
sharp end operators to confusion, uncertainty and frustration (Degani, 2004, p. 2); most 
importantly, they may compromise end-user acceptance, may increase costs, and may 
even lead to disastrous outcomes—such as harm, loss of life and of equipment. 
For instance, the three recent commercial aviation accidents of Turkish Airlines Flight 
1951 (Dutch Safety Board, 2010), Air France 447 (BEA, 2012), and Asana Airlines Flight 214 
(NTSB, 2014) had as a common precursor the “automation paradox”, i.e., the tendency 
for pilots to become more and more reliant on complex automation to the extent that 
they lose their manual flying skills, a process that may result in the ineffective handling of 
emergencies when the automation fails and returns control to them. Other aviation 
accidents have been associated with other HAI issues, such as forgetting whether the 
autopilot is on or off, being confused about which localiser or beacon is in use, or about 
which way to measure altitude is in service (Perrow, 2011). By all means, the safety 
implications of HAI issues are not limited to aviation. In the marine domain, for instance, 
the introduction of the radar initially enabled vessels to move faster and more safely at 
night and during dense fog or storms; however, radar’s wide spread adoption has been 
linked to a rise in the so-called “radar-assisted” collisions—i.e., collisions caused by the 
tendency for multiple vessels to increase speed and perform sudden changes in direction 
whilst ignoring the possibility that other vessels can do the same, because provided with 
the same technology (Perrow, 2011). In the healthcare domain, issues with information 
presentation in systems such as computerised physician order entry may actually 
heighten—rather than reduce—the risk of medication error and resultant harm to 
patients (Koppel et al., 2005; Nebeker, Hoffman, Weir, Bennett, & Hurdle, 2005). Overall, 
these instances show that that while automation has the ability to bring safety and 
efficiency improvements in virtually any domain, its potential to negatively impact system 
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safety should not be neglected. HAI issues, if not adequately handled, can make complex 
safety-critical systems vulnerable in new and unintended ways (Woods, 2010; Perry, 
Wears, & Cook, 2005).  
 RESEARCH GAP 
HAI issues are not a recent problem. There are least two perspectives, or areas of study, 
that are relevant to these issues. The first is human computer interaction (HCI). As it will 
be discussed in chapter 2, HCI scholars have extensively problematized the interaction 
that may unfold between the human and the machine during the use of the latter. 
Theoretical perspectives such as human information processing, activity theory, 
distributed cognition, computer supported collaborative work, and cognitive system 
engineering have produced profound insights into the cognitive, social and contextual 
dimensions that may influence HAI. In particular, they have provided theoretical models 
useful to characterise HAI, either in laboratory settings and/or in complex dynamic 
environments; to identify what may go wrong in the use of technology, namely how and 
what HAI issues may occur; and to understand how such issues can be removed by means 
of corrective design changes. The second perspective, here named as the system lifecycle 
perspective, includes process models aimed at improving the fit between automation and 
the intended user. User centred design is perhaps the most notorious of these models, 
and it has been developed in order to ensure that the needs of the end user are 
adequately considered during the system development process. Other relevant 
approaches are human factors integration and system safety. When applied to the 
development of automation, these approaches provide a useful means to properly 
capture, identify HAI issues, and translate them into implemented user, human factors, 
or safety requirements. 
However, while both the HCI and the system lifecycle perspectives have provided useful 
insights into HAI issues, they neglect the organisational sources of the problem. Yet this is 
an important question to address, for at least two reasons: a pragmatic, and a theoretical 
one. First, the increasing pervasiveness of HAI in safety critical domains is paralleled by 
the occurrence of accidents in which HAI issues play a contributory role, as mentioned 
earlier. This urges researchers to deepen our understanding of the sources of these issues, 
and develop additional explanations to those provided by the current HCI and the lifecycle 
perspectives.   
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Second, organisational precursors have been extensively investigated in the 
organisational safety (OS) area. There, it has been noted that complex, safety-critical 
domains can be seen as a wedge, which consists of a sharp end, i.e. the level at which 
automation is used by the human operator; and a blunt end, the level at which relevant 
decision makers such as engineers, management, regulators, manufacturers and the like 
can be found (e.g. Dekker, 2012; Flin, 2008; Reason, 1997).  
OS scholars have long highlighted that there exist specific organisational precursors found 
at the latter level that can predispose an organisation to successful safety performances, 
or on the contrary, can lead to major accidents and disasters (e.g., Leveson, 2012; Perrow, 
2011; Woods, 2005; Hollnagel, 2004; Reason, 1997; Snook, 2002; Rasmussen & Svedung, 
2000; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997; Vaughan, 1997). Such precursors include for instance blind 
spots in organisational decision making; presence of strong managerial pressures for cost 
effectiveness and productivity, rather than safety; failure to enforce safety constraints at 
various organisational levels, from government and regulators, down to company 
management and operations; tendency to gradually tolerate more and more level of risks, 
thus resulting on the organisation accepting more risks that it can safely handle. These 
precursors are known to predispose the organisation to an incremental descent into 
failure, a pattern also known as organisational drift into failure (e.g., Dekker, 2012; 
Farjoun, 2005; Woods, 2005).  
Other scholars have highlighted the precursors that can resists this drift (Roe & Schulman, 
2008; Schulman, Roe, Eeten, & Bruijne, 2004; Porte & Consolini, 1998; LaPorte, 1988). 
These include, for instance, the availability of a top management committed to safety; of 
an organisational environment that promotes organisational safety learning; of 
organisation members committed to continuously challenge existing beliefs about the 
safety of the organisation. 
Overall, the identification of these organisational precursors has proved immensely 
helpful for understanding the organisational sources of failure, and for devising safety 
improvement measures targeting organisational and managerial levels, rather than the 
level of operations (the sharp-end). (This is in fact the level targeted by classic safety 
approaches, which notably focus on human error and technical malfunctions.) However, 
OS scholars have investigated organisational precursors in relation to accidents and 
disasters, and not problematic human automation interaction. Therefore, it remains to be 
explored whether similar types of precursors exist in relation to HAI issues. 
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 AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
The aim of the present research is to advance current knowledge of how organisations 
operating in safety-critical domains manage (or mismanage) the HAI issues accompanying 
the automated systems they provide to their sharp end operators. The specific objective 
is to explore and identify the organisational precursors to HAI issues found at the blunt 
end of safety-critical domains. In particular, the objective is to develop a qualitative 
framework of the organisational precursors to HAI issues (OPHAII).  Consistently with the 
contributions from the OS area, organisational precursors include those organizational 
dynamics and conditions that, although distant in time and space from operations, may 
actually influence the way in which HAI issues are successfully addressed and mitigated, 
or remain unaddressed in the organisation—thus remaining visible to the user of the 
technology.  
It is anticipated that this research has a strong qualitative (or interpretive) orientation. In 
particular, the OPHAII framework is developed in a bottom-up manner from the data 
collected across three successive qualitative studies: two qualitative, historical case 
studies followed by a third subject matter expert study. Study 1 delivers the first 
theoretical category of organisational precursor of the framework. While identifying 
added support for this category, Study 2 identifies two more theoretical categories. Study 
3 expands and refines these three categories in order to deliver the final version of the 
OPHAII framework. The focus of the research is mainly on the organisational context of 
implementation and improvement of an automated system from the air traffic 
management domain, the Minimum Safe Altitude Warning system, or MSAW. For this 
reason, the research design can be considered as a derivative of the single case study 
design, frequently used in the OS area. The data considered along the OPHAII framework’s 
development includes qualitative data such as documentary data; semi-structured 
interviews; field notes and observations; and a qualitative questionnaire.  
 THESIS STRUCTURE 
The following two chapters review literature that establishes the context of and the 
theoretical motivation for this research. Chapter 2 reviews the two main current 
theoretical perspectives on HAI issues, namely the HCI and the system lifecycle 
perspectives. Chapter 3 introduces the third, alternative theoretical perspective, namely 
the OS perspective. The end of the chapter relates this perspective to the HCI and the 
system lifecycle perspectives reviewed in chapter 2 in order to consolidate the research 
gap the present study addresses. 
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Chapter 4 describes the research strategy. More specifically, this chapter describes the 
overall research plan by which the research objective is achieved, and the lower-level 
methodological aspects of data collection and analysis used within each study.  
Chapters 5 to 7 present the results of the three qualitative studies. Chapter 6 describes 
the results of Study 1; chapter 7 describes those of Study 2; and chapter 8 describes those 
of Study 3. Before reading these chapters, the reader should note that only minimal 
reference is made to existing literature in each study. It is the task of the final chapter, 
chapter 8, to discuss the results of this thesis in relation to existing relevant literature. The 
chapter also concludes the thesis by listing the theoretical, pragmatic, and methodological 
contributions it makes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
Chapter 2.  
HAI ISSUES: CURRENT 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews the main current theoretical perspectives used to understand and 
deal with issues in human automation interaction (HAI). These perspectives have been 
grouped into two major clusters:  
 Perspectives looking at the analysis of the human machine system unit. This 
cluster includes classic models from the Human Computer Interaction area that 
have been used to understand human technology interaction in safety-critical 
domains, such as human information processing, distributed cognition, activity 
theory, computer supported collaborative work, and cognitive system 
engineering. 
 System lifecycle perspectives. This cluster includes process models and 
frameworks that promote the integration of user, human factors and safety 
requirements along the lifecycle of automated systems. Three main perspectives 
have been included in the review: user centred design, human factors integration, 
and system safety. 
The objective of the chapter is to highlight the contribution that each perspective has 
brought to the problem of HAI issues, and, in particular, to understand how such 
perspectives consider the organisational precursors to such issues. 
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 THE HUMAN COMPUTER INTERACTION PERSPECTIVE 
Human Computer Interaction (HCI) is the classic perspective to bring over the problem of 
HAI issues. It is common among Human Factors and Human Computer Interaction 
scientists and practitioners with an interest in automation and the problems of poor fit 
which can arise from the use of automated systems. This perspective includes those 
theoretical approaches that have defined their unit of analysis as composed of (i) the 
human (be it a single operator or a team), (ii) its (or their) automated system(s), and (iii) 
the interaction that develops between (i) and (ii). As it will be described later on this 
chapter, differences can be observed across these perspectives depending on their 
consideration of the context surrounding the human machine unit; however, the 
fundamental idea remains that a proper conceptualisation of this human-machine system 
unit is what supports the identification of potential interaction design flaws and 
mismatches, which in turn can be designed out—hence achieving an increased human-
centeredness. Conversely, a limited conceptualisation of this unit would lead to a poor fit 
between the human and the system. 
The remainder of this section will review the most notable works belonging to the HCI 
perspective, and it will conclude with a critique of the perspective regarding its ability to 
consider the organisational precursors that this research is set to examine. 
2.2.1. Human information processing  
From a human information processing perspective, HAI issues reflect a basic mismatch 
between the features of a tool and the cognitive processing abilities of individuals. The 
human information processing paradigm includes theoretical models that are grounded 
on the metaphor of the human operator as an information processing system. From this 
angle, human cognition is seen as composed of different processing structures which 
process incoming information before a response is formulated (Harris, 2012, p. 20). 
Human information processing (HIP) has the merit of having stimulated useful laboratory 
research addressing relevant constructs useful for characterising HAI issues. For instance, 
HAI issues may be characterised in terms of an excessive trust in automation. Notably, as 
their trust in automation grows, human operators tend to delegate an increasing amount 
of tasks to their automated systems (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). The side effects of such 
increased trust in automation is that they spend less time on manual control during 
normal operations; consequently, their control and problem solving skills deteriorate over 
time because they are not used as continuously as they would in situations with manual 
control. As a result, the skill degradation associated with the prolonged reliance on 
automation during normal operations may result in a decreased ability to respond to 
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abnormal situations. In these situations control might shift back to human operator who 
might lack the expertise to execute a timely and appropriate response. Actually, lacking 
critical knowledge, human operators might even aggravate the situation by committing a 
fatal error (Bainbridge, 1983). 
In an opposing case, trust can be compromised by automated systems that are found to 
work unreliably, so that operators may start to ignore them or switch them off. This is the 
classic problem when practitioners are exposed to an excessive rate of false or nuisance 
alerts, i.e., alarms that do not correspond to the presence of a real danger. Usually 
generated by automated alarms, nuisance alerts are annoying and distracting to human 
operators as they produce frequent interruptions in the flow of activity. As a 
consequence, operators might become increasingly desensitised as they lose trust in their 
alarms (Keller, Diefes, Graham, Meyers, & Pelczarski, 2011), something that may lead to 
slow reactions to true alarms, or even to  disregard alarms entirely (Grounds & Ensing, 
2000).  
While trust is just one useful construct that arises from the use of the HIP paradigm, others 
exist too—e.g., cognitive workload, situation awareness, fatigue, and reliance in 
automation (Harris, 2012). These constructs are valuable as they provide scholars with a 
language to describe HAI issues in terms of cause effects relationships, to develop 
predictions about user behaviour, and to carry our laboratory evaluations of different 
interactive systems, to investigate their adequacy for supporting various cognitive tasks 
(Rogers, 2012, p. 25). However, one of the main limitation of the human information 
processing paradigm lies essentially on its experimental nature: it assumes that human 
cognition can be abstracted and investigated in laboratory settings, in isolation from the 
naturalistic context where HAIs occur (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005). As a reaction to this 
position, other alternative approaches have been developed by scholars who took the use 
of technology in context as their focal concern. These alternative approaches are 
reviewed in the next sections. 
2.2.2. Distributed cognition 
Still a theory of cognition, distributed cognition (Hollan, Hutchins, & Kirsh, 2000) differs 
from the human information processing paradigm because it sees cognitive activities as 
not limited to the individual, but as a property of humans and the context in which they 
are located. Distributed cognition (DC) sees cognitive processes as distributed across 
individuals, artefacts (both paper-based and computer-based) and the environment. 
These are, according to DC, the components of distributed cognitive systems. 
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A classic example of a distributed cognitive system is the aircraft cockpit. In analysing this 
kind of system, distributed cognition is mainly concerned with information and its 
propagation through the components of the distributed cognitive system. More 
specifically, DC analyses the creation, transformation, and propagation of 
representational states in the system in order to find possible breakdowns. Breakdowns 
may occur because information does not propagate effectively from one representational 
state to another (Rogers, 2012, p. 39). For instance, this may be due to a mismatch 
between the information that is provided by an information artefact and the expectations 
of the human about that information. 
Distributed Cognition has not highlighted new types of HAI issues specifically. It has mainly 
provided practitioners with a framework useful for describing in depth the normal 
functioning of a work situation, and identify possible sources of breakdowns within it (e.g., 
Rajkomar & Blandford, 2012).  
2.2.3. Activity theory 
An alternative perspective to DC is Activity theory (AT). Similar to the former, AT also  
looks beyond individual cognitive processing. However, while DC focuses on distributed 
cognitive systems, AT has drawn its unit of analysis around the concept of object-oriented, 
collective, and culturally mediated human activity. Notably, such an unit of analysis has 
found expression in the popular Engestrom’s model of AT, a model whose components 
include the set of goals, motivations, communities, rules, division of labour, artefacts and 
computer systems that accompany situated human practice (Engestrom, 2000). AT 
promotes the analysis of the multiple and unfolding relationships between these 
components in order to find contradictions, or inconsistencies between them. For 
instance, contradictions may arise when the highly hierarchical division of labour of a 
given work setting is not supported by the model of work that has been built into a new 
device that has to be used in that setting (Bonneau, 2013). 
AT, similar to DC, has the merit of having provided a qualitative framework for developing 
contextual analysis of human activity in complex socio-technical systems, making 
inferences across interactions, findings patterns, and describing them. Similarly to DC, this 
approach forces the analyst to consider the broader context in which human activity is 
located and the technology used, although it arguably promotes a deeper understanding 
of such a context, considering its strong emphasis on the motivational and historical 
components of human activity.  
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2.2.4. Computer supported collaborative work 
Computer supported collaborative work (CSCW) is an area of study that has focused on 
investigating how technology supports collaborative work in context. Thus CSCW focuses 
on the study of local collaborative practices found across the members of both co-located 
and (massively) distributed teams.  
Usually grounded on ethnographic studies of work, CSCW has highlighted different 
dynamics that are involved in the collaborative activities of operators of complex settings. 
One important dynamic is that of shared interpretation (Bannon, 2000; Bannon & Bødker, 
1997; Reddy, Dourish, & Pratt, 2001)—i.e., how different operators can maintain a 
sufficiently coherent interpretation of the activity of other co-workers, either co-located, 
or dislocated, functional to do the work. Such a shared interpretation provides the context 
for own activity, in fact. An essential means in sustaining such an interpretation is 
provided, for instance, by coordination artefacts—digital and physical artefacts that are 
used to keep operators up-to-date about key information, and to simplify coordination 
among individuals (e.g., Redaelli & Carassa, 2015; Bardram & Bossen, 2005). For instance, 
the rack of flight progress strips—the classic example of a coordination artefact from the 
air traffic control domain (Hughes et al., 1992; Harper and Hughes, 1993; Fields et al., 
1998; Berndtsson and Normark, 1999)—provides controllers  with a very compact and at-
a-glance representation on the status of traffic flow in a sector, something that supports 
individuals when carrying out their tasks, but it also supports essential cooperative work 
among different controllers (Fields, Amaldi, & Tassi, 2005).  
Also, other components of cooperation involve glancing at what others are doing, 
overhearing on-going conversations of other co-workers, and establishing conditions for 
tacit coordination. Subtle, ingenious, and practical strategies such as these have been 
highlighted since the 90s by a the ethnographies of work of  a group of British sociologists 
from Lancaster University, who studied in depth the collaborative work as found in air 
traffic control (Harper, Hughes, & Shapiro, 1991, 1989) and ambulance control centres, 
and the London underground (Heath & Luff, 1991).  
Overall, CSCW works are important because they warn that technology, if not carefully 
fitted to the context of use, might inadvertently affect not just individual practices, but 
also collaborative ones. In fact, the failure to comprehend a situated context of work may 
result in the technology constraining the existing collaborative practice in unintended 
ways. 
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2.2.5. Cognitive system engineering 
Cognitive system engineering (CSE) is a multidisciplinary approach to the analysis, design, 
and evaluation of complex human machine systems (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005; 
Rasmussen, Pejtersen, & Goodstein, 1994). Influenced by many disciplines, such as system 
engineering, human factors, cognitive and ecological psychology, this approach is mainly 
concerned with supporting cognitive performances in complex safety-critical domains 
such as healthcare, aviation, air traffic control, and nuclear power plant. One of the main 
differences compared to HIP is the system theory foundation of CSE: rather than viewing 
human-machine interaction as a decomposable in a mechanistic sense, this approach 
maintains a primary concern with the synergistic functioning of joint cognitive systems—
i.e., interactive teams of human and technology (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005) –that are in 
control of safety critical systems. 
Works from CSE have been effective in identifying severe HAI issues that have led to 
safety-critical outcomes across different domains. For instance, automation surprises 
(Sarter, Woods, & Billings, 1997; Woods & Sarter, 2000)  capture those situations where 
human operators are surprised by a system that is operating in a mode that is different 
from the one expected by the user. This problem arises (i) because automation has 
multiple operating modes and (ii) because it makes it possible to program long and 
complex sequences of actions whose execution might not be entirely intelligible to the 
humans who are in control (Norman, 1990). As a result, human operators might lose track 
of automation operating modes and develop a set of expectations that is inconsistent with 
what the automation has actually been set up to do (Woods, 2010, p. 148).  
The severity of automation surprises can be appreciated, for instance, in relation to the 
flight management system (FMS) available on commercial airliners. Incidents and 
accidents relating to FMS use have shown that pilots might be surprised when they realise 
that their aircraft’s behaviour does not match their expectations (Woods, 2010, p. 148). 
Another classic HAI issue is the problem of clumsy automation. First noted by Wiener 
(1989), this issue captures the fact that automation, while reducing workload during the 
longest and less demanding phases of flight, i.e., en route, actually increases operator 
load during the most demanding phases of the flight, i.e., take-off and landing. Here, the 
pilots might be exposed to additional attentional, communicative, and coordinative 
demands—demands that in turn may create opportunities for novel types of errors and 
novel paths to system failure (Woods, 1996, p. 2). 
Also, automation may come with additional knowledge demands, as operators may be 
required to learn and familiarise themselves with a large set of (novel) functions and know 
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when to activate them. This requires operators to dedicate more time to remember 
“input models, understanding display readings, setting up and initializing devices, 
configuration controls and operating sequences” (Woods, 2010, p. 145). So, the 
complexity of automation might lead operators to alter or dismiss some of the system’s 
functionalities to achieve a level of simplicity and ease of use that is more adequate to 
their operations.  
Woods et al. (2010) have reported an example where clinicians set up their devices in 
order to minimise their need to interact with the new technology during high-tempo 
periods. This occurred despite the fact that the practitioners’ configurations neutralised 
many of the new systems’ expected advantages—e.g., the flexibility to perform a wider 
range of different kinds of data manipulation (Woods et al. 2010, p. 192).  
Adjustments such as these are not surprising considering the adaptive nature of human 
behaviour in safety-critical systems. Humans are not passive receivers of automated tools. 
HAI is situated within an operational context where humans constantly trade-off between 
alternative courses of action in order to meet the multiple and conflicting demands of 
their job in a cost-effective way, considering available (scarce) resources, existing 
institutional objectives, severe productivity and temporal pressures (Hollnagel, 2012b; 
Woods, Dekker, Cook, Johannesen, & Sarter, 2010). As a consequence, it is not surprising 
that the constant search for improved cost-effectiveness pushes operators systematically 
to turn to informal usages (Wright & McCarthy, 2003), i.e., usages that differ from that 
prescribed by system developers, management and regulators. Note that informal usages 
do not necessarily lead to adverse consequences, provided that an organisation 
establishes appropriate controls to detects them and coordinate them across their 
different units. Otherwise, the risk is that of having local adaptations that while looking 
perfectly reasonable from the perspective of the local user, may actually compromise the 
integrity of overall operations (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000). 
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2.2.6. Critique of the HCI perspective 
The previous sections have reviewed various theoretical models that belong to the HCI 
perspective in order to see the value that these models have brought to the 
understanding of HAI issues. From the review, it is evident that these approaches provide 
both researchers and practitioners with a set of concepts and a language that are useful 
for characterising different types of HAI issues. In particular, the main value of these 
perspectives lies in their diagnostic power: they can help researchers and practitioners to 
trigger diagnostic questions about a given human machine system—e.g., is the system 
reliable enough to enable users to trust it? Does the system provide sufficient feedback 
to its user to inform her/him about its behaviour? Is there a risk of mode confusion?—
and about the environment that shapes the usage of the system—e.g., is the temporal 
demand compatible with the time frame that is required to operate a system? Are existing 
collaborative patterns adequately supported by automation? Questions such as these are 
immensely helpful when analysing HAI problems, as they lay the foundations for further 
formal and informal evaluations, as well as corrective design changes.  
However, the HCI perspective alone has a limited explanatory power with regards to the 
appreciation of the organisational precursors to HAI issues. In fact, this perspective does 
not conceptualise the organisational sources of the problem. For instance questions such 
as how biased regulator, managerial or engineering decisions may lead to HAI issues, or 
how organisations may actually (mis) handle HAI issues cannot be addressed by the HCI 
perspective alone, as these kinds of questions do not pertain to the unit of analysis of this 
perspective.  
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 SYSTEM LIFECYCLE PERSPECTIVE 
While the perspectives reviewed in the previous section focus on the interaction between 
humans and automation, this section reviews works that draw the boundaries of their 
unit of analysis around the broader engineering lifecycle of an automated system. 
Analogously to the human lifecycle phases of birth, childhood, death, and burial the 
lifecycle process of an automated system includes five major phases at least (Ericson, 
2005): concept definition; development; implementation; operation; and 
decommissioning. These phases correspond to subsequent system transformations that 
are linked by predefined input output relationships. They are considered to apply to both 
hardware and software systems, except that for the latter the development and test 
phase exists in many variations, such as the Waterfall model, the Spiral Model, the IEEE V 
model and the like. 
Within such an engineering lifecycle or process, HAI issues can be seen as process failures. 
They are seen, in fact, as a reflection of the inability of development teams to properly 
capture human factors and safety requirements and realise them into the implemented 
system. This view of failure originates from a comparison of development practices that 
happened in real life with prescriptive process views as mandated by the user centred 
design, human factors integration or safety perspectives. Notably, these approaches 
prescribe the use of different principles and methods along the system development 
lifecycle to ensure that user, human factors, and safety requirements are actually 
identified and built into the final system. These three approaches are reviewed hereafter. 
2.3.1. User centred design 
User centred design (UCD) is a design philosophy that emphasises the continuous 
involvement of end-users throughout the different phases of the system development 
lifecycle. Such continuous involvement aims to ensure that the design of novel systems is 
actually driven by end-user expectations, desires and needs as captured in user 
requirements—ultimately enhancing human-system interaction. The User Centred Design 
process may come in different variations, and usually it involves, along the system 
development lifecycle, the use of different methodologies and techniques such as 
ethnographic studies, contextual inquiry, prototype testing, and affinity diagrams.  One 
useful UCD reference has been provided by the International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO) (2010), which has codified the six principles that allow the 
verification of whether a design process is user centred: (1) the design should be based 
on the explicit understanding of the users, tasks, and environments; (2) the users should 
be involved throughout design and development; (3) the design should be driven and 
refined by user centred evaluations; (4) the process should be iterative; (5) the design 
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should address the whole user experience; (6) the design teams should include 
multidisciplinary teams and perspectives.  
2.3.2. Human factors integration 
A framework adopted by defence and hazardous industries, human factors integration 
(HFI) is aimed at coordinating and assuring the integration of human factors methods 
within the engineering lifecycle of a system. Classic areas targeted by HFI include interface 
design and workplace layout, trust and acceptance of the system, longer term planning 
and staffing, skill changes and training, human error and recovery, and so on (e.g., 
Shorrock, Woldring, & Hughes, 2004; Widdowson & Carr, 2002). Specific HFI methods 
useful during the development and evaluation of automated system include hierarchical 
task analysis, cognitive task analysis, human reliability assessment, cognitive 
walkthroughs, and human-in-the-loop simulations (Lowe, 2008). Note that none of these 
methods has been defined for addressing HAI issues specifically, as human factors 
integration is concerned with all of the human issues that may originate from the 
introduction of a novel system—such as manpower, personnel, training, and health and 
hazard—hence it is not limited to HAI issues.  
2.3.3. System safety 
System safety can be defined as the process of managing the safety risks that arise along 
the lifecycle of a new system. At its core the approach holds the idea that safety is a 
system property that can be built into the system since the early conception phase. 
Indeed, the experience with complex system failures has shown that this approach is 
much more cost effective than adding safety improvements in the aftermath of accidents 
and disasters. The ideal objective of this approach would be to eliminate any potential 
hazard that could be introduced by a new system; however, this is not always feasible, 
especially when dealing with complex systems such as nuclear power plants, weapon 
systems, and aircraft (Ericson, 2005). Therefore, system safety strives to reduce risk to an 
acceptable level. It does so by focusing on the systematic, forward looking identification 
and elimination or mitigation of safety hazards throughout the system lifecycle (Roland & 
Moriarty, 1990). For instance, this is achieved by carrying out specific safety assurance 
tasks along system lifecycle phases, such as a functional hazard assessment during the 
initial system definition phase, preliminary safety assessment during the system design 
phase, and system safety assessment during implementation and transfer to operation 
(Kirwan, 2007; EUROCONTROL, 2001).  
Usually this process can be complemented by the use of a safety case, and it is executed 
in the context of a safety management system. The former identifies a formal document 
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that contains a structured safety argument that documents the evidences, intermediate 
conclusions, and assumptions to demonstrate that a given design solution meets the 
agreed safety levels. The latter usually identifies a coherent managerial framework that is 
aimed at establishing different safety functions within an organisation—such as risk 
assessment, incident reporting and investigation, safety monitoring—and an overall 
culture functional to the achievement of good safety performances (ICAO, 2013; Stolzer, 
Halford, & Goglia, 2008). Essentially, the safety case and the safety management system 
respond to the regulatory requirement to demonstrate that a system is safe to operate. 
Also, system safety, similar to human factors integration, has the capability to address 
various kinds of safety issues, rather than just HAI issues alone. It usually applies to 
different kinds of systems and contexts, not necessarily human controlled, and, compared 
to human factors integration, it also addresses technical and engineering issues rather 
than solely human-related ones. In fact, the focus of system safety is not, on improving 
the overall fit between the human and the system, but to achieve an acceptable level of 
overall system safety. Regardless of these considerations, the two approaches are not 
mutually exclusive but have the potential for complementation (Lowe, 2008). 
2.3.4. Critique of the system lifecycle perspective 
Overall, UCD, HFI, and SMS provide useful means for improving the fit between the human 
and the technology. They can provide a process explanation of HAI issues: these models 
provide some useful potential references against which to carry out retrospective reviews 
of past and current development practices, identify process limitations in current human 
factors, and safety assurance practices.  
For instance, the misfit between human and their equipment has notably been associated 
to the late involvement of human factors specialists along the system development 
process—a late involvement that happens only when the most relevant design decisions 
have been taken already, and when there are limited margins for analysis and 
improvement (Cardosi, 1998; Kirwan, et al., 1997; Leveson et al., 2001). Other process 
limitations include, for instance, the failure to capture relevant safety issues; incomplete 
safety case evidence resulting from the limited time allocated to HMI evaluation; 
tendencies to rely on contractors who will sign off safety tasks without knowing how these 
will relate to other aspects of system safety; pressures when classifying safety issues, such 
as de-rating a safety issue as a workload issues (Humphreys, Kirwan, & Ternov, 2006). 
Others have added to this list the tendency for development teams to fail to include 
automated system in the scope of safety assurance activities, based on the biased 
assumption that such systems play a supportive, advisory role only—but cannot cause or 
contribute to an accident (Sandom, 2009; Sujan, 2001).  
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These types of insights are useful because they allow researchers and practitioners to 
remove bottlenecks and limitations in current or/and past user centred design, human 
factors, and safety assurance practices from forthcoming development practices. At the 
same time, it can be noted that the same types of insights fail to reach the deeper 
managerial and organisational sources of the problem. For instance, linking HAI issues to 
the late involvement of human factors personnel does not shed light on the organisational 
sources of the problem: how and why do organisations that operate safety-critical 
systems may come to tolerate poor human factors integration or safety assurance 
practices when introducing safety-critical automation? Or, how do organisations direct 
their resources and efforts towards the adoption of the three approaches discussed in this 
section in order to ensure that there is an adequate fit between automation and its users?  
Overall, questions such as these point at the need to consider the wider organisational 
context in which automation is deployed and used. Being able to shed light on this context 
would provide an understanding of the possible organisational sources of HAI issues, 
organisational sources that in turn could become targets for improvements that are 
complementary to those that have been identified within the HCI and the system lifecycle 
perspectives.  
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 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has reviewed the two main perspectives that are available today to deal with 
the problem of HAI issues: the HCI and the system lifecycle perspectives. The chapter has 
concluded that while both perspectives have brought important insights into the problem 
of HAI issues, they also neglect the organisational precursors to these issues. In fact, these 
precursors fall outside of the scope of such perspectives.  
The classic theoretical models available under the HCI perspective have the merit of 
providing a means to conceptualise and identify HAI issues, which in turn can be removed 
from the system by corrective design changes. By electing the human machine unit (and 
its situated context in some cases) as its unit of analysis, this perspective ignores the 
organisational factors that influence how HAI issues, which occur within such a unit, are 
managed.  
Compared to the HCI perspective, the system lifecycle perspective provides a somehow 
enlarged view. This perspective includes process models that mandate, along the 
engineering lifecycle of a system, the forward looking consideration of the end-user, 
human factors and system safety aspects—a consideration that can increase the human 
centeredness, efficiency and safety of human machine systems. Therefore, such 
perspective can trace the occurrence of HAI issues to process failure—the failure to 
implement basic user centred design, human factors integration and system safety 
processes and principles along the system development lifecycle of a system. By doing so, 
this perspective can shed light on process aspects that are not touched by the human 
machine system perspective; however, it still fails to reach the higher-level organisational 
precursors of HAI issues. The engineering lifecycle of a system does not happen in a 
vacuum, in fact, but it is located into a specific organisational context. 
These considerations call for a third, enlarged, theoretical perspective—a perspective 
able to appreciate the organisational precursors to HAI issues. Arguably, appreciating such 
precursors would provide opportunities for improvements that current perspectives are 
unable to identify. Such a third perspective is introduced in the next chapter. 
 
    
 
Chapter 3.  
THE ORGANISATIONAL SAFETY 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter suggested that current approaches to human automation 
interaction (HAI) issues do not necessarily consider the deeper organisational and 
managerial sources of the problem. This chapter outlines a third perspective, namely the 
organisational safety (OS) perspective, which incorporates the organisational precursors 
to accidents and system safety.  
Section 3.2 provides an introduction into the OS perspective and the major pattern of 
failure it contemplates, i.e., organisational drift into failure. Subsequently, sections 3.3 
and 3.4 review fundamental theoretical models to respectively explain how and why 
organisations may drift into failure or how they may avoid this. Finally, section 3.5 links 
the OS perspective with the perspectives presented in the previous chapter, in order to 
define the research gap of this research. 
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 THE ORGANISATIONAL SAFETY PERSPECTIVE AND 
ORGANISATIONAL DRIFT INTO FAILURE 
At the core of the OS perspective lies the idea that complex safety-critical systems can be 
conceived as a wedge formed by a sharp end and a blunt end (e.g. Dekker, 2012; Flin, 
2008; Reason, 1997): 
1. The sharp end includes those operators, such as pilots, air traffic controllers, and 
healthcare professionals, who—while exploiting a variety of resources, including 
automated systems—are directly responsible for controlling the highly hazardous 
process they are responsible for, e.g., flying an aircraft, instructing aircraft in 
order to establish safe separations among them, or provide medical assistance to 
patients, respectively. Due to their proximity to such processes, the activity of 
these operators is usually characterised by the need to make real time decisions 
in a highly dynamic environment;  
2. The blunt end includes those organisational actors, such as engineers, managers, 
policy makers and regulators, who constrain, put pressures upon and ultimately 
influence the activity of the operators at the sharp end. Humans at the blunt end 
are not in contact with the hazardous process to be controlled. They lack, in fact, 
temporal and spatial proximity with the operational context, and because of this 
they have also been referred to as “behind-the-scenes” actors—behind the 
scenes in that their activity is not directly visible from the perspective of the 
operators at the sharp end (Balka, Doyle-Waters, Lecznarowicz, & FitzGerald, 
2007).   
Notably, while the sharp end has been the area of analysis and intervention in classical 
safety approaches, which notably have focused on addressing technical malfunctions and 
human errors, evidence from accidents occurring in complex safety-critical systems has 
suggested that the blunt end should also be considered a valuable area of analysis and 
safety improvement (e.g., Dekker, 2011; Catino, 2006). As it will be discussed throughout 
this chapter, accidents (here defined as any catastrophic occurrence, potentially leading 
to fatal or serious injuries, damage or loss of equipment) do not originate solely from 
individual errors or technical failures at the sharp end, but their roots can be traced to 
organisational conditions at the blunt end. 
This idea is not new. The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) (ICAO, 2013) 
explains that safety has evolved along three eras: the technical era, the human factors 
era, and the organisational era. Since the early 1900s, safety and its counter side—
accidents—were considered, essentially, as induced by technological failures. Therefore, 
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great emphasis was placed on diagnosing problems with technical systems. Starting in the 
early 1960s, the scope of safety science was extended to include consideration of the 
human contributors to accidents. This extended scope led to the consideration of aspects 
of human performance that were not considered during the earlier technical era. One 
limit of the human factors era was the predominant focus on the individual (and his/her 
errors), with limited consideration of the surrounding organisational context. It was only 
in the early 1990s, due to the seminal work of social and organisational scientists with an 
interest in safety, that attention was drawn to consideration of the surrounding 
organisational context in which humans operate and in which accidents develop. Since 
the beginning of the organisational era, accidents have also been viewed as the result of 
organisational dynamics and conditions at the blunt end, rather than purely human or 
technical failures at the sharp end. Accidents, in other words, have been considered to be 
an organisational phenomenon; for this reason, the notion of “organisational accident” 
was introduced.  
The notion of organisational accident reminds us that failure is rarely the result of isolated 
human or technical failures at the sharp end. In addition to operations, there is a 
surrounding organisational context that may provide the foundation for a catastrophic 
failure. The analysis of accidents such as Three Mile Island, Bhopal, Chernobyl, Challenger 
and Columbia has shown us that accidents can originate from organisational conditions 
such as biases and blind spots in organisational decision making, impaired organisational 
safety learning, and from strong political, managerial, and economic pressures for 
productivity in spite of safety objectives (Dekker, 2011, p. 122). Organisational conditions 
such as these, apparently unrelated to operations, may set the organisation on a slow 
descent into failure. This idea, of organisational drift into failure, receives support from a 
variety of models from the OS area. The remainder of this section will review the most 
important of these models, in order to highlight the specific traits of organisational drift. 
3.2.1. A by-product of normal organisational and administrative activity  
Patterns of organisational drift result from the “imperfect” or biased decisions made by 
various organisation members over time, while engaged in their daily work, rather than 
from something exceptional or extraordinary act. Biases in everyday decision-making in 
complex, safety-critical organisations have their foundations in the local rationality 
principle and the presence of tensions for cost-effectiveness. Elaborated by Herbert Simon 
(1957), the former suggests that organisation members or actors do not behave as 
perfectly rational decision makers, i.e., decision makers who choose the best course of 
action after having exhaustively enumerated all possible options. Rather than behaving in 
this way, members ground their behaviour on their local understanding, i.e., their 
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understanding of the work situation as seen from their unique “position” in the 
organisation hierarchy, given exiting information and attentional resources, demands, 
goals and context.  The presence of limited local rationalities can be seen as one of the 
side effect of the division of labour, which in large organisations usually produces complex 
organisational structures, characterised by several hierarchical levels and organisational 
boundaries. While functional to the achievement of the institutionally relevant objectives, 
these structures and boundaries may also obstruct the flow of information across 
different units, departments, and teams in ways that are dysfunctional to effective safety 
management. 
When translated to HAI issues, these considerations prompt exploration into whether it 
is possible to trace HAI issues to past imperfect managerial and engineering decisions—
decisions that, while appearing rationale at the time they were made, considering the 
specific situated perspective of a given actor, may have actually ignored the HAI issues 
accompanying a given automated system, or may have constrained effective responses 
to such issues. 
Furthermore, decisions are usually imperfect as they are made under strong pressures for 
cost-effectiveness. Complex, safety-critical organisations need to continuously balance 
efficiency versus safety goals (Hollnagel, 2012b; Vaughan, 2009; Cook, Nemeth, & Dekker, 
2008; Karen Marais & Saleh, 2008; Woods, 2005; Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000). 
Organisational efficiency implies directing organisational resources towards the 
achievement of (short term) economic goals. This may occur, for instance, by increasing 
production rates, capacity utilisation, minimising slack in the system, reducing personnel 
and trimming costs (Shrivastava, 1994). In contrast, organisational thoroughness implies 
directing organisational resources towards the achievement of (long term) quality and 
safety goals. This may occur, for instance, by conducting hazard analysis methods during 
system design and development, by performing root cause analysis to learn from past 
incidents and accidents, and by implementing safety case regimes, safety management 
system and safety culture programs to improve safety oversight. When regarding the 
management of HAI issues specifically, this implies for instance directing adequate 
resources towards the adoption of the already mentioned user centred design and human 
factors integration approaches (§ 2.3). 
The need to balance between efficiency and safety permeates through all organisational 
levels, from sharp end practitioners to top management. For instance, when facing a 
strong demand for productivity goals, sharp end operators will reduce thoroughness until 
productivity goals are met; conversely, when facing strong safety goals, operators will 
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reduce efficiency until safety goals are met (Hollnagel, 2012b). Similarly, top 
management, in the absence of accidents, may direct most of their resources—people, 
funds, expertise, attention and equipment—to attain productivity goals, thus meeting 
existing short term demands for cost effectiveness while sacrificing safety goals (Marais, 
Saleh, & Leveson, 2007). Conversely, in the aftermath of a disaster, the pressures from 
the media, the public and regulators may increase managerial drive towards the 
attainment of safety goals, thus relieving pressure for cost-effectiveness (Marais, Saleh, 
& Leveson, 2007). In this phase, regulators may even impose strong restorative measures 
to operators, such as suspending operations.  
These considerations highlight not only the constant tension for both safety and cost 
effectiveness that can be found in complex, safety-critical organisations, but also the 
difficulty in achieving a stable balance between the two over time. For instance, Farjoun 
(2005) suggested that organisations are normally biased towards cost effectiveness. This 
is the case for at least two reasons. First, productivity objectives can be easily tracked, as 
they are usually identified by a set of quantitative productivity-related key performance 
indicators. Second, the feedback resulting from productivity improvements can be 
appreciated in a relatively short period of time. In contrast, safety related objectives are 
not necessarily reflected in quantitative key performance indicators, as many safety issues 
are qualitative in nature. Furthermore, the time lag necessary to assess the result of safety 
improvements is usually longer than that required by productivity improvements. As a 
result, it is easier for an organisation to be biased towards the pursuit of productivity 
objectives, unless an accident occurs. Farjoun (2005) noted that in these cases there is an 
increased managerial concern to allocate further resources to attain safety goals, hence 
leading to a decreased number of near misses and close calls. However, as safety records 
improve, resources tend to be directed away from safety concerns towards the 
achievement of productivity goals. Consequently the organisation risks regressing to a 
state of increased vulnerability, hence allowing another disaster to occur and repeating 
the cycle. Farjoun’s ideas received support from the model of Marais et al. (Marais, Saleh, 
& Leveson, 2007), who, in an analogous manner, argued that organisations cycle 
systematically through phases of high efficiency and low thoroughness and vice-versa. 
It remains to be investigated whether similar ideas apply to the management of HAI issues 
in safety-critical domains. For instance, how does the repeated cycling of organisations 
between states of heightened safety and heightened efficiency affect the management of 
safety-critical automation? And, in particular, how does such a cycle affect the effective 
responses to the accompanying HAI issues? Addressing questions such as these requires 
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examining the problem of HAI issues from an OS perspective. 
3.2.2. Induced by decisions located at different levels of society at 
different points in time 
One idea implicit in the previous discussion is that the potential for organisational failure 
and success is actually a collective phenomenon: it reflects the aggregated result of 
multiple organisational decisions scattered across time and space. This link between 
(biased) organisational decisions at the blunt end and disaster has been effectively 
illustrated by Rasmussen and Svedung (2000) in relation to the disaster of the Herald of 
Free Enterprise, a ferryboat that capsized moments after leaving the Belgian harbour of 
Zeebrugge in March 1987, killing 193. In relation to this accident, Rasmussen and Svedung 
highlighted the network of multiple biased organisational decisions that resulted in the 
capsizing (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000). These decisions were scattered across various 
decision makers, belonging to separate departments, from harbour design to cargo 
management and vessel operations, and were made at different points in times 
independently of each other (see Figure 1). While each of these decisions was made under 
stress to meet the “local” demands for cost effectiveness, their aggregated effect 
gradually pushed the work system—ferry boat operations—into a heightened state of 
risk. 
 
Figure 1. The pattern in organisational decision making leading to the Zeebrugge accident (Rasmussen & 
Svedung, 2000). 
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Rasmussen and Svedung’s explanation of the Zebrugge accident is rooted into an 
expanded view of accident causation that embraces the entire socio-technical control 
system overseeing safety in a given domain (Cook & Rasmussen, 2005; Rasmussen & 
Svedung, 2000; Rasmussen, 1997). To Rasmussen, risk management is a societal control 
problem, in which the control system is composed of the ensemble of actors, located at 
different nested levels of society, whose decisions, made at different points in space and 
time, and independent of each other, might ultimately influence safety at the sharp end. 
As depicted in Figure 2, commencing at the bottom, these actors are usually found at the 
levels of operational staff, company management, regulators (national and sovra-
national) and associations, and government. Each of these levels needs to adapt to its 
own environmental and competitive pressures—such as the changing political climate 
and public awareness, changing market conditions and financial pressures, changing 
competency levels—which are normally found in a competitive and dynamic society 
(Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000). While “low risk operations depend on proper co-
ordination of decision making at all levels” (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000, p. 11), different 
actors might lose sight of how these local adaptations influence system safety. 
In particular, the model suggests that the higher in the hierarchy a given actor is located, 
the lower her/his proximity to the operational work system, and the lower the awareness 
of the consequences of her/his decisions on the work system. For people other than front-
end operators, it is very difficult to be fully cognizant of how their decisions eventually 
affect operations. The farther the distance from the operational level, the more expensive 
and time consuming it is to gather updated knowledge regarding this level.  
These ideas find support in the ethnographically-informed model of healthcare IT 
proposed  by Balka and Kahnamoui (2004). In particular, the two authors averred that the 
management of a healthcare information system should not be understood by focusing 
on the level of design alone; there are, in fact, other areas of organisational activities—
“social arenas”—which influence and constrain the degree of local intervention that 
designers can have on any given system. To Balka and Kahnamoui (2004), social arenas 
include the organisational levels of regulations, politics, international standard 
development bodies, manufacturers, and national health agencies. These levels, although 
distant in time and space from operations, my actually influence technology usage.  
Because of this enlarged perspective, Balka and Kahnamoui seem to extend the range of 
applicability of Rasmussen and Svedung’s model to also include the management of 
safety-critical technology; warning, in fact, that the understanding of the management of 
HAI problems requires understanding higher-level organisational activities.  
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Figure 2. The socio-technical control structure engaged in the control of risk (Source: Rasmussen & Svedung, 
2000). 
What Balka and Kahnamoui’s model seems to miss in comparison to Rasmussen and 
Svedung’s model is a commitment to system theory. Such a commitment is certainly 
retained and further emphasised in Leveson’s Systemic-Theoretic Accident Model and 
Processes (STAMP) model (2012). Grounded in Rasmussen’s socio-technical model of risk, 
STAMP provides a method to model complex socio-technical systems as controlled by a 
hierarchical control structure, a structure characterised by multiple organisational actors 
at different hierarchical levels, as well as controls, and of feedback loops across these 
levels. The model characterises failure as the inability of organisational actors at higher 
hierarchical levels in the hierarchical control structure (e.g., government and regulators) 
to enforce adequate safety constraints at lower-levels (e.g., operators and 
manufacturers). The hierarchical control structure involved in safety management is not 
fixed, but varies across safety domains; thus, STAMP provides a means to model and 
characterise this. Examples of STAMP have been applied to model the hierarchical control 
structure involved in the management of the US Air Traffic Control System, and of military 
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and space operations.  
An important aspect emphasised by Rasmussen’s, Balka and Kahnamoui’s, and Leveson’s 
models is that the control of risk is not the domain of individual organisations alone; 
rather, it is a societal problem concerning interactions across different hierarchical levels 
and boundaries in a socio-technical system. This expansive move challenges not only the 
scope of the current perspectives over HAI issues (reviewed in the previous chapter), but 
also the scope of many models of organisational safety; as bemoaned by Schulman et al., 
these tend to focus on single organisations, hence missing higher-level organisational 
dynamics  (Schulman, Roe, van Eeten, & Bruijne, 2004). 
Most importantly, Rasmussen and Svedung (2000) suggested avoiding the study of any 
given socio-technical system from a compartmentalized perspective. They averred that 
the different levels of the hierarchical control structure have been the objects of study of 
independent research disciplines. Commencing with the highest level, the government 
and regulatory activities have been the object of study of political science, economics and 
sociology; company behaviour has been the object of study of organisational sociology, 
economics and decision theory; management has been studied by industrial engineering, 
management and organisation theory; and the level of the sharp end operators has been 
studied by psychology, human factors, and human computer interaction. Finally, the 
lowest level,  that of the operations, has been the object of study of mechanical, chemical 
and electrical engineering. However, such a compartmentalised theoretical landscape 
implies that research disciplines, especially those at the higher-levels, have often omitted 
the consideration of how dynamics at one level may cascade down and influence safety 
at lower-levels. For this reason, Rasmussen and Svedung (2000) called for cross-sectional 
studies into the vertical integration of different hierarchical levels of a hierarchical control 
structure (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000). However, they did not accompany this 
suggestion with any methodological considerations regarding the conduit of such studies; 
they actually warned that they might require an intense effort, and that specific 
methodologies do not yet exist.  Unfortunately, no work was retrieved from the literature 
that addressed this gap. 
3.2.3. An incremental process 
A further important trait of organisational drift into failure is its incremental nature. 
Organisational drift is not something that happens overnight: accidents are usually 
preceded by a history of threats and anomalies being downplayed for an extended period 
of time by organisation members (e.g., Dekker, 2012; Vaughan, 2009; Woods, 2005; 
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Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). 
The idea of drift as an incremental process has its theoretical precursors in the seminal 
works of Barry Turner and Diane Vaughan. Grounded in the analysis of 87 industrial 
accidents that occurred in the UK, Turner’s Man Made Disaster theory (Turner & Pidgeon, 
1997; Turner, 1976) viewed accidents as preceded by a period during which the 
organisation—under existing (biased) set of beliefs—downplays emerging risks and near 
misses. This incubation period may last several years and is characterised by the 
systematic misinterpretation and disregarding of apparently unrelated hazardous events. 
Hence, such events accumulate in the work system unnoticed by organisation members; 
these events do not become a safety target, nor stimulate a revision of existing 
organisational models of hazards. In this phase, the organisation develops its failure of 
foresight: while resting on a myopic view of the world inconsistent with the way the world 
really is, it is unable to foresee the incoming failure.  
By introducing such an interpretation of disaster, Turner was arguably the first social 
scientist to show that accidents are not just a physical phenomenon in which an 
uncontrolled release of energy is involved (such an explosion, a derailment, a collision 
between two vehicles). Rather, accidents are preceded by a history of hazards being 
downplayed by the organisation, i.e., they follow the development of a breach, or cultural 
laceration, between the frames or worldviews maintained within by organisation 
members and the reality of the world (Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000). The organisation 
becomes myopic to signals of danger, and it is only in retrospect that the significance of 
those signals will be fully appreciated. Therefore, for Turner, the remedy against such 
situation is the development of a strong safety culture. 
The view of failure as an incremental process finds support in Reason’s model of resident 
pathogens (Reason, 1990, 1997). To Reason, the potential for failure in complex 
organisations follows a pattern similar to the accumulation of pathogens in the human 
body. Such pathogens may accumulate for years without necessarily causing sickness; it 
is only when they combine with local triggering factors, such as stress, exposure to toxic 
chemicals, that they may lead to disease. Similarly, faulty conditions in hardware, 
software, procedures, and the work environment—i.e., conditions which predispose the 
organisation to catastrophic failure—may accumulate unnoticed in the work system for 
years. It is only when such conditions combine with local conditions that they trigger the 
development of accidents and disasters. One of the merits of this vision is that it stresses 
the fact that sharp end operators often inherit the outcomes of bad decisions made at the 
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blunt end, decisions which may increase the potential for errors and mistakes. Therefore, 
from this perspective HAI issues themselves can be seen as a form of resident pathogens, 
or latent conditions (according to Reason’s terminology), in that their occurrence does not 
necessarily lead to an accident; however, when combined under specific conditions, e.g., 
high temporal demands or high uncertainty, they may induce human operators to commit 
fatal errors or make the recovery from emergency situations more difficult. One limitation 
of this view, however, is that while characterising the role of latent conditions, such as 
HAI issues, in accident causations, it does not provide guidance on how to investigate the 
organisational precursors that instilled such conditions in the first place. 
Further support for Turner’s man-made disaster theory comes from Diane Vaughan’ 
seminal investigation into the NASA Challenger and Columbia space shuttle disasters. An 
important explanatory concept formulated by Vaughan is the normalisation of deviance 
(Vaughan 2009, 2004, 1997). This phenomenon refers to the fact that, under some 
circumstances, it becomes routine for engineers and managers to take for granted 
technical conditions that deviate from expected design performances, instead of viewing 
them as warning signals (Vaughan, 2005, 1997). In the case of the Challenger, for instance, 
the anomaly of the O-ring erosion had a history dating back to many years prior to the 
occurrence of the accident. During this period, the anomaly was reinterpreted as an 
acceptable and non-deviant condition in the engineering analysis conducted prior to the 
launch (Vaughan, 2005). Vaughan found the very same organisational pattern repeating 
in the case of the Columbia. In both accidents, neither of the two respective anomalies 
became manifest in a clear or immediately understandable manner prior to the disaster. 
Instead, engineers were exposed to (i) mixed signals, i.e., signals indicating a potential 
danger that were followed by either less or no damage, reinforcing the belief that the 
system was safe to fly; (ii) weak signals, i.e., signals regarding risks that after analysis were 
deemed so unlikely that there was very low probability for them to recur; and (iii) routine 
signals, i.e., signals relating to events that, while being dangerous, recur routinely with no 
accident happening, thus reinforcing the idea that the system was operating as predicted. 
Ultimately, these dynamics contributed to generate the cultural belief that the system 
was operational and was safe to fly, hence leading the organisation to accept more risk 
than it realised.  
These considerations call into question the collective interpretations and views that guide 
organisational responses to HAI issues in safety-critical organisations. HAI issues may not 
be immediately clear to stakeholders at the blunt end of safety-critical organisations, at 
least not as clear as for those sharp end operators who use the technology on a daily basis.  
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Vaughan also deserves credit for shedding light onto some macro-dynamics inductive to 
the normalisation of deviance, namely a culture of production and structural secrecy. The 
former reflects cultural and decision-making processes not necessarily internal to the 
organisation. Both the Challenger and Columbia accidents reflect the broader NASA’s 
transition from (i) a culture of technology to (ii) a culture of production (Vaughan, 2005). 
The former marked the Apollo era, during which NASA was accustomed to receive a yearly 
blank cheque from Congress. This promoted a strong reliance on internal expertise and 
technical positivism. On the contrary, the culture of production was promoted by the fact 
that the annual budget for the Shuttle Program was allocated under the assumption that 
the shuttle was an operational vehicle and able to operate on a regular basis, therefore 
generating commercial return and repaying its costs. The pressure arising from such 
political accountability was reflected in an increasing focus on meeting schedules and 
deadlines, which prevented a thorough hazard analysis (Vaughan, 2005). Hence, the 
culture of production favoured the continuity of launches rather than halting or delaying 
operations. 
Also, the culture of production led to the external contracting of most technical activities. 
The result was a complex NASA/contractor system composed of several actors, 
transactions, and different technical languages. This required a burgeoning bureaucratic 
structure for the purposes of oversight (Vaughan, 1990; 1997), which increased the 
emphasis on the culture of adherence to hierarchy, procedures and protocols by NASA 
personnel, in turn reinforcing the belief that the shuttle was safe to fly simply because 
personnel had followed the rules. 
The idea of structural secrecy captures the fact that it is very hard for regulators to 
understand the internal operations of controlled organisations. Structural secrecy arises 
from factors such as the fragmentation of information, presence of organisational 
boundaries, limited access to relevant sites and resources, impossibility to observe 
behaviours or replicate independent testing. In relation to the two NASA disasters of 
Challenger and Columbia, Vaughan noted that structural secrecy obscured problem 
seriousness from both top administrators and regulators, so that the belief that it was 
safe to fly with the O-ring erosion and foam debris prevailed until the occurrence of the 
two tragedies.  
From a methodological perspective, it is noteworthy that Vaughan was able to draw on 
extensive (i) micro data regarding key decisions taken along the historical trajectory of an 
anomaly in the phases preceding the launch and the underlying mind-set as well as (ii) 
macro data regarding the broader institutional context, and to then link these two levels. 
This was a progression in the field forward compared to Turner, who did not have macro 
level data as he had relied mainly on official accident reports (Vaughan, 1997). Ultimately, 
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Vaughan’s resulting explanations of both NASA disasters is structural, in that it explains 
actions of the past as constructed, formed, or organized by major institutional forces, 
rather than by unconstrained individual choices (Parsons, 2007).  
Most importantly for the present thesis, both Vaughan and Turner were effective in 
showing that (i) the potential for organisational drift into failure is built several years in 
advance with respect to the final accident; and (ii) that in this process organisations tend 
to accept, incrementally, increasing deviations from the original norm, the basis for this 
being that  “[e]ach step away from the original norm that meets with empirical success 
[due to the absence of obvious signs of the violation of safety] is used as the next basis 
from which to depart just that little bit more.” (Dekker, p.6). These properties of 
organisational failure have been further corroborated by Snook’s investigation into the 
accidental shooting down of two U.S. Army Black Hawk Helicopters over Northern Iraq 
(Snook, 2002). Snook showed how the friendly fire was actually triggered by an accident-
prone context—an organisational and operational context resulting from a stream of 
different modifications made to the work system at different points in time. While each 
modification appeared sound according to the local rationality of the actor who made it, 
their aggregated detrimental effect became evident only when the accident occurred.  
It remains to be explored if and how decisions, which might appear reasonable according 
to the specific situational constraints, when combined might indeed lead to the 
introduction or poor mitigation of undesirable side effects of safety-critical automation.  
3.2.4. An interpretive phenomenon 
One further merit in both Turner’s and Vaughan’s models is that of having highlighted the 
interpretive nature of organisational drift into failure.  Anomalies may become manifest 
as ill-structured and poorly-defined problems, which are open to several interpretations 
by organisation members; interpretations that are regulated by the institutionally-
accepted interpretive frames (Morgan, 2006; Edmondson et al., 2005; Miliken et al., 2005; 
Weick, 2000; Turner & Pidgeon 1997). Such frames, or worldviews, regulate sense-making 
and causal attributions in organisations. They are composed of the set of assumptions, 
norms, and accepted rules (shared among colleagues) that distinguish what is acceptable 
and rationale within the organisation from what is not. 
These views have at least two major implications for the understanding of organisational 
failure. First, existing frames or sets of premises orient people towards which signals of 
dangers to consider, but also towards which signals to ignore, thus leaving potential for 
the construction of joint blind spots (Hutter, 2005). Therefore, one important implication 
is that improving safety requires organisations to reason within the accepted frames of 
         Chapter 3. The organisational safety perspective 
  
33 
reference, but also to step out of these, realising that blind spots exist, i.e., that certain 
hazards are not sensed under existing potentially obsolete assumptions, and to then 
update these frames in an effort to remain sensitive to the likelihood of failure (Woods, 
2005b; Woods & Hollnagel, 2006; Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000). 
Second, a lack of consensus about which appropriate frame to activate might develop 
when facing ambiguous issues. In these cases organisational decision makers need to 
select an interpretive frame from several (possibly) conflicting frames, in ways that may 
not necessarily be functional to safety. For instance Miliken et al. (2005) noted that in the 
years preceding the loss of the Columbia, management rejected repeated requests by 
engineers for additional images of lift-off, under the conviction that the risk of foam 
strikes could be minimised considering successful past flight history. In contrast, engineers 
advocated the need to acknowledge uncertainty and gather further data regarding the 
likelihood of foam strike. For both groups there was a signal of inadequacy in the 
established ways to deal with the problem (Milliken et al., 2005); for managers, it was the 
resurfacing of the request for additional imagery, for engineers, it was the repeated 
refusal to disclose the required images. Ultimately, since management did not believe a 
problem existed, the issue remained dormant in the system until the disaster occurred. 
To Milliken et al. (2005), this case indicated that powerful elites in organisations might 
resolve any lack of consensus regarding alternative interpretive views of a possible threat 
by imposing their dominant frames. In fact, informal and formal power relationships 
regulate sense-making efforts in organisations, by either blocking or favouring the 
advancement of selected information and perspectives (Milliken et al., 2005). Milliken et 
al. (2005) observed that these dynamics cannot be avoided; however, structured debate 
methodologies (e.g. Schweiger et al., 1989) can be adopted to make the various parties’ 
assumptions and viewpoints explicit, in order to take more informative safety related 
decisions. 
3.2.5. Induced by the intrinsic complexity of complex, safety-critical 
systems 
The potential for organisational failure can also be traced to the side effects related to the 
introduction of safety defences in support of safety, such as physical barriers, procedures, 
and alarms. These efforts tend to make systems more complex, and less open to external 
scrutiny (Dekker, 2011, p. 111). The more systems grow in size, in the number of functions 
they serve, and in the dependencies they establish with other systems, the higher the 
number of incomprehensible and unexpected interactions they will experience (Perrow, 
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1999, p. 72). Such interactions are non-linear and not immediately understandable by 
personnel and managers. Perrow notes, however, that such interactive complexity is not 
per se a sufficient system property to make catastrophic failure possible. Many 
organisations exhibit a high degree of interactive complexity, such as hospitals and 
universities, and also in these contexts many interactions that occur among human 
operators that are not directly observable. However, in these contexts, a failed activity 
does not lead irremediably to failure. To Perrow, it is the coupling of interactive 
complexity with a second system property, i.e., tight coupling, which creates the potential 
for catastrophic failure. Tight coupling relates to the degree of formality of system 
interdependence. It occurs when production sequences are rigidly defined and cannot be 
altered. Tight coupling is frequently found in safety-critical systems such as nuclear power 
plants, in aviation, and in air traffic control. Here, tight coupling creates conditions that 
allow small failures to propagate quickly across system components and escalate to an 
accident in unintended and unknown ways. Notably, these insights lie at the heart of 
Perrow’s Normal Accident Theory (NAT), a theory that views disaster as a normal 
condition of modern organisations, due to their tight coupling and interactive complexity.  
Although not designed for understanding HAI issues, NAT has been adopted by Tamuz  
and Harrison (2006) for analysing computerised physician order entry (CPOE) systems, 
normally used in the healthcare domain. In Tamuz and Harrison, NAT is effective in 
highlighting the increased coupling of the medication ordering process that resulted from 
the introduction of the CPOE. This creates the potential for infrequent but potentially 
harmful and fast travelling errors. For instance, flawed decision rules programmed into 
the CPOE may quickly affect several patients simultaneously. Based on these 
considerations, Tamuz and Harrison concluded that organisations should be aware of the 
trade-offs involved in making their practices more tightly coupled. One limitation that 
transpires from these considerations is the fact that NAT, although motivated by the 
intent to avoid to reduce explanations of failure to failures and human error occurring at 
the system sharp end, is essentially oriented towards the analysis of the operational work 
system: the dynamics that it characterises are those inherent in the systemic interactions 
between the technologies and people that can be found at the sharp end of the system, 
not at the blunt end. Such interactions have a broader and more distributed scope than 
the HCI models reviewed in the previous chapter (§ 2.2), as NAT does not focus on the 
unit of analysis as composed by the user and its technology. It is in fact able to consider 
the propagation of the side effect of technology across a work context. However, the 
theory does not consider the organisational precursors to failure such as pressures for 
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cost-effectiveness, poor safety practices, and lack of management support (Hopkins, 
2014).   
Nevertheless, it must be noted that one merit of the NAT is that of highlighting an 
important paradox in the management of complex safety-critical systems: a highly 
interactive system demands a decentralised form of control, as standardised practices 
cannot cover all of the non-routine situations faced by practitioners (ad hoc solutions 
need to be devised at the local level of authority). In contrast, effective tight coupling 
requires a centralised form of control, in order to maximise coordination among system 
components. One problem is that organisations, in principle, cannot simultaneously be 
highly centralised and decentralised. 
 AVOIDING ORGANISATIONAL DRIFT INTO FAILURE 
The theories discussed in the previous sections, the NAT in particular, may present 
organisational disasters as unavoidable, making one wonder why organisations do not 
experience catastrophic situations on a regular basis (Busby & Bennett, 2007). Countering 
this view is a body of literature focused on the study of the so called high reliability 
organisations (HROs).  La Porte and Consolini considered HROs as those organisations for 
which the cost of failure is greatly disproportional to the value of the lesson learned 
through experiencing the failure (La Porte & Consolini, 1991). These organisations are 
continuously exposed to significant safety risks, and cannot reduce these risks simply by 
decreasing external demand, nor can they act on the external socio-political environment. 
Thus, their ability to achieve a highly reliable performances reflects properties of their 
internal structure. 
Rather than focusing on explaining failure, HRO scholars address questions such as how 
are risks actually managed? How do organisations achieve a healthy safety record?  
HRO researchers have addressed these questions by conducting ethnographic oriented 
case studies of air carrier (Rochlin, 1989; Rochlin, La Porte, & Roberts, 1987) , air traffic 
control (La Porte, 1988), and nuclear power plant operations (P. R. Schulman, 1993).  
These cases showed that the ability to withstand organisational drift lies in a set of 
organisational practices which were exhibited by the studied organisations, such as: 
 Top management commitment to safety. This condition essentially concerns the 
sensitivity to safety objectives exhibited at the higher ranks of the organisation. If 
top management is sensitive to safety, it is far easier that lower-level staff will 
view safety as a priority. Furthermore, top managers sensitive to safety are able 
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to sacrifice productivity or efficiency goals in order to promote safety goals. This 
is not necessarily the case when top managers lack safety sensitivity and do not 
see the safety implications of their decisions; 
 Redundancy. Another characteristic of high reliability organisations is the 
redundancy of key operations. Usually achieved by means of the cross-checking 
of important decisions and redundant communication channels, redundancy 
ensures that relevant safety-critical decisions are better scrutinised, and that 
backup systems are in place in case of failure; 
 Adaptable organisational structures. High-reliability organisations usually enjoy 
an adaptable organisational structure. In other words, these organisations can 
maintain a functional organisational structure, i.e., a classic vertical command and 
control structure in which roles and responsibilities are clearly defined—during 
routine or normal situations. However, in the case of emergencies, these 
organisations can adopt a more flexible, decentralised structure—one in which 
decision making is delegated to the experts who are closer to the safety risk that 
is being managed, regardless of their rank in the functional structure;  
 Organisational learning. Organisational learning is another practice that is 
promoted in high-reliability organisations. This is interpreted as developing safety 
knowledge in an incremental and controlled way. This implies, for instance, 
investing in simulations, imaginative exercises, and the study of minor failures in 
order to envision potentially larger, more severe, ones.  
In addition to these developments, recent HRO work has emphasised the specific 
organisational routines that allow organisations to effectively anticipate the potential for 
future failures. High reliability organisations have, in fact, the ability to continually 
challenge their beliefs about the safety of the organisation (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2011). In 
particular, they do this by:  
 Maintaining a constant preoccupation with failure, i.e., by paying attention to 
small signs of danger, and by assuming that such signs may actually conceal larger 
patterns of failure; 
 Being reluctant to simplify. Reluctance to simplify refers to the tendency to 
dismiss simplistic explanations of failure, such as reducing explanations of failure 
to the occurrence of a human error. Instead, high-reliability organisations tend to 
favour explanations that consider the actual and specific task demand and 
contextual factors that lead an operator to commit an unsafe act. One important 
aspect of the reluctance to simplify is the intent to search for multiple viewpoints, 
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on the basis that the more viewpoints considered when facing ambiguous issues, 
the more thorough internal explanations of issues and risks will be;  
 Maintaining a deference to expertise. This implies ensuring that managerial 
decision making is not informed by administrative and managerial concerns only, 
but receives adequate expert input. In other words deference to expertise implies 
that the expert views of those closer to day to day operations are effectively 
channelled at the higher-levels of the organisation. 
Compared to the work discussed in the previous section (§ 3.2), HRO scholars have been 
effective in highlighting the sources of positive safety performances, thus suggesting that 
some effective safety-enhancing routines can be enacted within organisations in order to 
avoid disaster. It remains to be investigated whether similar routines may promote the 
effective mitigation and control of HAI issues accompanying the automated tools 
operated by these organisations. 
 DISCUSSION: OUTLINING THE RESEARCH GAP AND OBJECTIVE 
This chapter has reviewed foundational work in the OS area, and has shown the kinds of 
insights that the approach can project over the organisational sources of failure and 
successful safety management. OS’s theories provide a rich view of organisational 
potential for failure and disaster. These theories suggest that organisational failure can 
be characterised as: 
 A by-product of normal administrative processes, i.e., something that results from 
organisations doing their normal work, not something exceptional; 
 Induced by decisions at different hierarchical levels of the organisation; 
 An incremental process; 
 An interpretive phenomenon; and 
 The result of the intrinsic complexity of safety-critical systems. 
Additionally, and in contrast, HRO scholars have examined the organisational routines 
that characterise the organisation ability to maintain successful safety performances—
i.e., to avoid processes of drift into failure. These include dynamics such as top 
management commitment to safety, redundancy, and adaptable organisation structure, 
as well as specific routines that allow organisation members to continuously challenge 
their beliefs in the assumed safety of organisational performances.   
Overall, the OS perspective would appear to be a valuable approach to adopt to study the 
organisational precursors to HAI issues. Compared to the traditional approaches reviewed 
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in the previous chapter (in § 2.2 and § 2.3 respectively), the OS perspective draws its unit 
of analysis around the enlarged unit of the organisation (rather than the man machine 
unit and the automation system lifecycle). Thus, if applied to HAI issues, this perspective 
promotes the followings: 
(i) HAI issues can be seen as the symptoms of deeper organisational (and 
problematic) conditions, rather than purely issues in the design or in the lifecycle 
process of human machine systems. In other words, the OS perspective suggests 
to avoid to reduce explanation of HAI issues to problems found in the components 
of the human machine unit, and in problems in the implementation of specific 
user centred, human factors and safety assurance principles and practices along 
the system development lifecycle;  
(ii) HAI issues can be the starting point for investigations into deeper organisational 
dynamics. Assuming that HAI issues may reflect broader organisational issues 
calls for shedding light into such conditions. If such organisational precursors can 
be identified, they could provide a wider scope to safety managers, regulators, 
and policy makers for the mitigation of HAI issues—a wider scope for 
improvement able to address the organisational roots of the problem and 
complementary to the scope identified by the human machine system and 
lifecycle process perspectives. 
However, some limitations can be observed. First, the OS perspective has grown in order 
to allow the understanding of accidents and disasters, but not the problems of HAI issues 
specifically. Thus, its value has not been demonstrated in relation to the understanding of 
HAI issues. Furthermore, demonstrating this value is not an easy endeavour. Different 
models from the OS perspective not only identify different types of organisational 
precursors, but are also rooted in different conceptual metaphors. For instance, Reason’s 
model is rooted in a view of the organisation and failure as the human immune system; 
Turner’s man-made disaster theory, in a view of the organisation as a cognitive system; 
Rasmussen’s and Leveson’s models, in a system theory view of the organisation; Perrow’s 
NAT, in a complexity theory view of the organisation. While each of these theories 
captures some important facets of the organisational potential for failure and success, 
there appears to be no single overarching dominant theory that provides an all-purpose 
perspective (regarding accidents and safety) that can be directly applied to the study of 
HAI issues. None of the reviewed theories seems to capture the entirety of the intricacies 
of organisational drift; thus, drift into failure remains a useful conceptual metaphor 
grouping several theories of failure, each potentially limited in some respects with regard 
to their ability to capture the phenomenon of interest. 
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These considerations indicate a theoretical gap that exists at the intersection of the 
current perspectives, and the OS perspective, as shown by Figure 3. While the former 
clearly identifies different types of HAI issues and their design/contextual sources (HCI, § 
2.2), and their possible process precursors (System lifecycles perspectives, § 2.3), they 
ignore, however, the broader organisational sources of the problem. In contrast, such 
sources have been clearly investigated and theorised by the OS perspective—although in 
relation to accidents and disasters, not to HAI issues per se. Thus, the idea of 
organisational precursors to HAI issues is situated in between at least three distinct areas 
of research that do not necessarily appear to relate to each other, so that the theoretical 
landscape in between lies largely unchartered. This calls for an exploration of such a 
landscape.  
 
Figure 3. Theoretical gap addressed by this research. 
Based on the above considerations, the broader aim of this research was to explore the 
organisational gap existing between the HCI, system lifecycle and OS perspectives in order 
to contributing to advancing our understanding of how organisations operating in safety-
critical domains may manage (or mismanage) HAI issues. The specific research objective 
was to develop an emerging, theoretical framework of the organisational precursors to 
HAI issues that can be found in these organisations. 
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 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has reviewed fundamental works from the OS area. It has concluded that, 
compared to the HCI and the system lifecycle perspectives reviewed in chapter 2, the OS 
perspective has, in principle, the potential to address the deeper organisational 
precursors to HAI issues. The OS perspective is in fact directly concerned with the 
organisational sources of safety failure and success. It has provided a language and a set 
of concepts to characterise and discuss organisational precursors involved in the 
causation of accidents and disasters, and outstanding safety performances. Such 
precursors are outside the scope of the HCI and the system lifecycle perspectives. 
However, it should be noted that the value of the OS perspective for understanding HAI 
issues has not been demonstrated. The area has been developed to explain the precursors 
to accidents and disasters, in fact, not HAI issues per se. 
Thus, this research aimed to explore the theoretical gap existing between the current HCI 
and system lifecycle perspectives, and the enlarged OS perspective. The objective was to 
develop a framework of the organisational precursors to HAI issues that can be found in 
safety-critical domains. The next chapter will describe how this objective was pursued. 
 
    
 
Chapter 4.  
RESEARCH STRATEGY  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
The present chapter describes and justifies the research strategy chosen for developing 
the the organisational precursors to human automation interaction issues (OPHAII) 
framework. The chapter encompasses both the overall research plan by which the 
research objective is achieved, and the lower-level methodological aspects of data 
collection and analysis. 
The chapter is organised as follows: 
 Section 4.2 provides an overview of the research strategy; 
 Section 4.3 provides the rationale behind the chosen research strategy; 
 Sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 describe the type of data, the data collection and data 
analysis procedures used, and the qualitative validation strategies used within the 
three studies. 
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 OVERVIEW 
The research consists of three studies: two successive retrospective qualitative case 
studies followed by a third corroboratory subject matter expert (SME) study (as reported 
in Table 1). 
Table 1. Overview of the three studies. (Specific details about data, data collection and data analysis 
procedures are reported in § 4.4 and 4.5.) 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Type of 
study 
A retrospective case 
study focused on the 
institutional debate 
between the National 
Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) and the 
Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) 
regarding the human 
automation 
interaction issue (HAI) 
of the nuisance alerts 
related to the 
minimum safe altitude 
warning (MSAW) 
system. 
A retrospective dual-
case study focused 
on the experience of 
managing the MSAW-
related nuisance alert 
problem found within 
two European air 
navigation service 
providers (ANSPs). 
A subject matter 
expert (SME) study 
seeking feedback 
from safety net 
experts on the initial 
OPHAII version 
delivered by Study 1 
and Study 2. 
Period 
referred to 
by the 
data 
analysed 
1977-2006 1990-2007 1990 to present 
Type of 
data 
(more 
details on 
§ 4.4) 
-Documentary data 
sources 
-Interviews, field 
notes collected 
during site visits. 
-Documentary data 
source 
-Qualitative 
questionnaires filled 
in by 11 safety net 
experts 
Data 
Analysis 
(more 
details on 
§ 4.5) 
Framework analysis 
(Taxonomic and 
comparative coding) 
Framework analysis 
(Historical-
evidentiary coding) 
Framework analysis 
(Subsuming coding) 
 
The three studies pursued the research objective in an incremental, cumulative way: they 
all addressed the same research question, each covering aspects not addressed by the 
other studies. In particular, the first two cases developed an initial version of the OPHAII 
framework. The third study refined and extended the framework. 
This overall research strategy can be considered as a derivative of the case study method 
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(Yin, 2008). In fact, the three studies have a common context, i.e., the implementation 
and improvement of an automated alarm from the air traffic management (ATM) domain, 
the Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) system. Developed as a preventive measure 
against the risk of Controlled Flights into Terrain (CFIT), this alarm has been plagued by 
one specific HAI issue, namely the frequent generation of nuisance alerts. Thus, the first 
two studies focus on the organisational trajectory of this HAI issue in the US and the EU 
respectively. In particular: 
 Study 1 is more historical, because it considers the organisational response to the 
MSAW-related nuisance alert problem between 1977 and 2006. In particular, the case 
study focuses on the organisational response to the MSAW nuisance alert problem by 
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the US agency responsible for the 
investigation of transportation accidents. The data consist of documentary sources 
available in the public domain: the set of MSAW-related safety recommendations and 
safety recommendation letters issued by the NTSB to the US air navigation service 
provider and regulator, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the written 
responses of the latter. This study delivered the first category of the emerging 
framework of organisational precursors to HAI issues. 
 Study 2 is more contemporary. It considers the organisational response to the same 
problem—the MSAW-related nuisance alerts—as found within two European Air 
Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) between 1990 and 2010. This is the case 
because the MSAW was first introduced in the US in 1977 and then later in Europe in 
the 1990s. The data for this case study consisted of both data collected during site 
visits, i.e., semi-structured interviews, field notes, visit reports, internal company 
documents, as well as data collected from external sources, i.e., interviews with 
experts external to the organisations, and external documents, however relevant to 
understand the contexts under study. This study developed a more refined version of 
the emerging framework of organisational precursors. In particular, in addition to 
confirming the first category of precursor identified in the previous study, it identified 
two new precursors. 
Study 3 consists of a subject matter expert study (SME) (Marshall, 1996) that was included 
for the purpose of corroboration. The study sought feedback from a sample of 11 SMEs 
from the safety net domain. Safety nets are the class of air traffic management (ATM) 
alarms that the MSAW system belongs to (as it will be further explained in due course). 
Data were collected by means of a structured group discussion and a qualitative 
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questionnaire. This study allowed the categories of the framework to be refined and 
expanded so that it could be delivered in its final form. 
Data analysis in all the three studies was based on a common qualitative data analysis 
approach known as a framework analysis (Ritchie & Spencer, 2002). This approach was 
selected because it provides a high-level data analysis framework that, while specifying 
basic data analysis steps to be followed in qualitative research, it is flexible enough to be 
adapted to different research contexts. This flexibility is evidenced by the fact that the 
three studies used different coding strategies depending on the specific analytical 
challenge they posed (details about both data collection and data analysis are provided 
by § 4.4 and 4.5)  
While Study 1 relied on data available in the public domain, Studies 2 and 3 were possible 
thanks to the organisational access provided by the sponsor of this research:  
EUROCONTROL, the European Agency for the Safety of Air Navigation. EUROCONTROL 
funded and hosted the first three years of this PhD at its Experimental Centre in Brétigny-
sur-Orge, in southern Paris. In particular, years two and three of the PhD were carried out 
within the Safety Team of the agency. In addition to providing intellectual support for the 
work, the team was essential in gaining organisational access and supporting site visits in 
Study 2; and in providing access to the network of safety net experts, SPIN, which was 
relevant for studies 2 and 3 (as it will be explained further in due course).  
 RATIONALE 
This section describes the rationale behind the research strategy outlined in the previous 
section. 
4.3.1. Rationale for grounding the research on the case study approach 
The research strategy adopted in this research can be considered as a derivative of the 
case study approach. The case study approach is usually defined as a research strategy 
that allows a researcher to concentrate on a specific situation bounded in space and time, 
because it contains some elements worth discovering (Yin, 2008). During the 
investigation, these elements are closely explored in their natural setting, in the absence 
of control conditions, in order to provide a detailed multidimensional picture of the 
analysed situation. The case study approach has been applied extensively across a range 
of subject areas such as business and management, information system, innovation 
management, history and anthropology (Dubois & Gadde, 2014; Yin, 2004; Benbasat, 
Goldstein, & Mead, 1987). 
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Most importantly, the case study is an accepted approach for investigating processes of 
organisational drift. It can be found, in fact, in the work of many scholars from the 
organisational safety area (e.g., Roe & Schulman, 2008; Perin, 2006; Snook, 2002; 
Vaughan, 1997; Shrivastava, 1994; Weick, 1993; Roberts, 1990; Rochlin, La Porte, & 
Roberts, 1987)2. This tendency is understandable considering that these authors were 
usually driven by a quest for sense making and insight into a real life phenomenon—
organisational sources of failure and/or high reliability performances—that encompasses 
important contextual conditions that cannot be studied at distance, as they cannot be 
easily isolated from their context. This type of investigation requires an approach that is 
able to make sense of the multiple operational links and dependencies, and the cultural 
and structural features that pertain to a specific and complex organisational context. In 
fact, the emphasis of this kind of investigation is on the discovery and identification of the 
relevant conditions and dynamics involved in the specific problem situation, rather than 
on measuring frequencies and establishing generalisability to a wider population. 
The case study approach meets these demands because it provides a window into a 
portion of organisational life bounded in time and space that can be examined in great 
detail. By using this approach, the researcher can collect many profound insights about 
insiders’ interpretations, issues, relationships and processes at work which are related to 
the phenomenon of interest (Dalcher, 2004, 2009). The researcher can leverage on 
multiple data sources, ranging from archival records and internal company documents, to 
interviews with insiders and records of observations of those people directly involved in 
the problem situation (Yin, 2009). The data used can be both quantitative and qualitative. 
Ultimately, such flexibility in data collection usually results in a rich evidentiary base, 
which in turn maximises opportunities for insight and discovery. 
On these grounds, the case study approach was determined to be appropriate for the 
present inquiry into the organisational precursors to HAI issues. The flexibility of the 
approach and its focus on discovery were considered to be important properties that 
cohere with the exploratory purpose of the research. 
Note that a valid alternative to the case study approach is the Grounded Theory 
methodology (GTM) (Glaser & Strauss, 2009). This is a classic qualitative approach, which 
                                                          
2 Appendix A provides an extensive review of the methodological approaches used by these 
scholars. Despite the variations that can be found across different approaches, they can all be 
classified as case studies, because they focus on the in-depth analysis of one organisational 
context. The only exception is provided by Turner, described later in this section, who made use of  
GTM. 
   Chapter 4. Research strategy  
  
46 
Barry Turner (1981, 1983) brought into the OS area in order to develop its foundational 
man-made disaster theory (§ 3.2.3). However, GTM is extremely data-demanding, as it 
requires individual organisational cases to be available for comparative purposes. This is 
evident in the seminal work of Turner, who in applying the method could rely on the 
availability of a relatively large sample (>80) of official accident reports published by the 
British government between 1965 and 19753. Replicating the same approach in the 
present context was not feasible because similar kind of reports are usually not produced 
in relation to failed automation programmes or implementations. Unlike major 
transportation accidents, these failures are not the subject of official investigations by 
official independent bodies. For this reason the case study method was chosen over the 
GTM. 
4.3.2. Boundaries of the research 
In this research the boundaries have been drawn around the organisational trajectory (or 
history) of a selected HAI issue, the nuisance alert problem, related to an automated 
system from the Air Traffic Management (ATM) domain, the MSAW.  
This decision was motivated by the fact that processes of organisational drift develop over 
periods of years, or, in some cases decades, as illustrated by the case of Challenger and 
Columbia (§ 3.2.3). For this reason, the boundary of the case had to account for such a 
time period. 
In addition, the focus on the organisational trajectory of a selected HAI issue was inspired 
by Vaughan’s seminal investigations into the Challenger and the Columbia accidents. Both 
investigations are based on the central idea that the way an anomaly is defined, 
negotiated, and controlled is a reflection of the broader organisational context in which 
the anomaly is addressed. Therefore, by tracing the history of the organisational events 
and decisions related to an anomaly one can shed light on the broader organisational 
conditions in which the anomaly was “processed”. For instance, by looking at the history 
of the events and organisational decisions related to the O-ring erosion anomaly prior to 
the Challenger accident, Vaughan was able to identify the higher organisational and 
regulatory conditions that allowed the anomaly to become normalised despite its safety 
relevance, which in turn led to it remaining unaddressed in the operational system for 
years before the disaster unfolded (Vaughan, 2004) (§ 3.2.3). On this basis, it was 
                                                          
3 More details regarding Turner’s application of the GTM methodology are available in Appendix 
A. 
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determined that the same analytical focus could be replicated in the analysis of the 
organisational trajectory of a selected HAI issue—the nuisance alert problem related to 
the MSAW system. 
4.3.3. Selected application case: the MSAW 
The MSAW is a subsystem of the main radar system available within air traffic control 
centres to alert air traffic controllers of an aircraft’s close proximity to terrain. The system 
compares the current or projected aircraft altitude against a predefined terrain database. 
Whenever an aircraft descends or is about to descend below a predefined minimum 
altitude, the system generates a visual and aural warning. In Europe the controller has to 
inform the pilot of the imminent danger upon reception of the MSAW alert, so that the 
pilot can take corrective action if necessary. The MSAW is the ground equivalent of the 
perhaps more famous Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS), which is available in 
the cockpit and is intended to warn pilots of dangerous proximity to terrain.  
The MSAW is intended as a protection against Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) 
accidents, i.e., accidents occurring whenever an aircraft is flown into terrain, obstacles or 
water without any technical failure and with the crew being unaware of the imminent 
collision (Wiener, 1977). These accidents make up one of the leading categories of civil 
aviation accidents (Sumwalt, 2014). The likelihood of CFIT is considered to be higher 
during the landing and take-off phases of the flight, especially when in the presence of 
high terrain, and/or man-made obstacles, such as buildings or antennae. 
The MSAW was first developed and introduced in the 1970s in the US. In Europe, the tool 
has been introduced in the 1990s. Here, the MSAW is considered a member of a class of 
ground-based alarms called safety nets, which use primarily surveillance data, and provide 
warning times to controllers of up to two minutes (SKYbrary, 2014). In addition to CFIT, 
safety nets are intended to warn controllers of other potential risks, such as collisions with 
other aircraft (Short Term Conflict Alert or STCA), infringements of protected airspace 
volumes (Area Proximity Warning System or APW), and deviations from the final approach 
path (Approach Path Monitor or APM) (EUROCONTROL, No date; SKYbrary, 2014).  
Despite several decades of operational use, some aspects of MSAW operation have 
remained a concern (Howell, 2011). The most notorious problem with the use of the 
MSAW is its tendency to generate a high rate of false alarms, usually due to the difficulty 
of parameterizing the MSAW terrain database. In fact, the higher the mismatch between 
the database and the underlying terrain, the higher the number of nuisance alerts. 
Technically speaking, such matching requires fine-tuning of the terrain database. This is 
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more difficult in the presence of high and variable terrains, such as reefs, where the alert 
can play a more crucial role. Operational evidence has shown that the nuisance alert 
problem has resulted in the alarm being downplayed or ignored by air traffic controllers 
even in the presence of real danger; thus contributing, in some cases, to major 
commercial aviation accidents.  
The MSAW system was selected as an application case for the following three reasons: 
 First, it is a good revelatory case. The MSAW enjoys a relatively long operational 
history that has been troubled by HAI issues, (the most notorious being the issue 
of nuisance alerts), and that stretches across nearly three decades in the US and 
two decades in Europe. As discussed earlier, this temporal scale is large enough 
to exhibit the dynamics of organisational drift that are of interest here. On the 
contrary, novel, more recent, automation would not necessarily exhibit a similar 
history. 
 Second, it is an interesting case for the sponsor of the research.  At the time the 
research was conducted, EUROCONTROL was in the process of developing 
guidance material and specifications for safety nets. Therefore, the Safety Team 
considered the research to be an opportunity to gain useful insights into 
happenings at the organisational level that complement the on-going efforts in 
the area of safety nets (which primarily address the technical aspects of 
implementation and improvement).  
 Third, it is a societally relevant case. The successful management of the MSAW 
system directly affects the safety of air transport. Therefore, it makes sense to 
expand the knowledge base related to the management of this system, as this 
could be directly beneficial to organisations, manufacturers, standardisation 
bodies, and regulators involved in its development and overseeing. 
4.3.4. Validation and generalisability  
The research strategy employed in this study departs from the single case study approach 
in order to attain greater validity and generalisability for the emerging framework than 
could be achieved from a single case study. In particular, three strategies were used at 
the level of the overall research:  
1. Replication of the same type of case study design; 
2. Methodological triangulation; 
3. Consideration of different organisational contexts.  
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1. Replication of the same type of case study design.  Replication of the same type of case 
study design in two separate, sequential cases (Studies 1 and 2) ensured that the 
methodological insights and lessons of the first case (Study 1) could be carried forward 
and applied to the second case (Study 2)—which could in turn be executed in a more 
controlled way. Furthermore, replication was also functional in exploiting synergies 
between the two studies: the MSAW has been invented in the US and later deployed in 
Europe; therefore, it was envisaged that looking at the MSAW in both the US and the EU 
ATM systems would provide a more comprehensive view of the system’s historical 
background. Finally, the use of two case studies safeguarded against the risk of the failure 
of one case; a tangible risk in an exploratory investigation like the present study.  It is in 
fact acknowledged that although the exploratory mode of research involves “pushing the 
frontiers of knowledge” (Phillips & Derek, 2010, p. 59), it also does not guarantee that a 
particular research project will produce the desired outcome.  
2. Triangulation. Study 3 was executed to achieve triangulation at the level of the research 
design. This study made it possible to cross-check the quality and validity of the initial 
version of the OPHAII framework by using an alternative, independent approach than 
initially used in the first two cases. The chosen format of this study, a SME study, consists 
of getting information from key informants or experts whose opinions carry weight or 
plausibility in a given domain. Because of their unique knowledge and understanding, 
relevant experts can provide extensive insights into a specific topic in the form of 
additional supporting or disconfirming comments and/or examples. The use of this kind 
of study is adequate to the qualitative, or interpretive orientation, of this research4. In this 
type of research, the focus is usually on studying small numbers of subjects, often single 
individuals, single groups, or single organisations, so that truth and reliability are 
especially important in relation to the viewpoints of the people engaged in the context 
being studied5. Therefore, one important way in which one can achieve validity is by 
                                                          
4 The rationale for grounding this work in the interpretive mode of research is provided under 
Appendix B. 
5 This is not to say that generalisability is neglected in interpretive research. Indeed, generalisability 
can remain a desirable property also in this mode of research. However, rather than statistical 
generalisability, a more plausible way for interpretive research to achieve generalisability is to rest 
on the argumentative logic of the researcher—argumentative logic about the extent to which 
research results can be applied also to  contexts other than the  investigated one(s). Specifically to 
this research, such an argument for generalisability is initiated by the reminder of this section, 
and then is further consolidated by sections 7.3 and 8.5. 
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seeking confirmations, refutations, and reformulations of the interpretations that 
develop along the course of the research (Morgan, 2006, 1997). This corresponds to 
searching for interpretive validity, i.e. ensuring that the research adequately represents 
the viewpoints, thoughts, intentions and experiences of the study’s participants (Johnson, 
1994; Maxwell, 1992). Striving for interpretive validity implies protecting the research 
against the risk of misconstruction, i.e., the risk of failing to understand and/or 
misrepresent the meaning of events as understood from an insider’s perspective. It is in 
light of these considerations that the use of an SME study was considered appropriate for 
the present research. (Note that other strategies were used within each study to increase 
their validity, as it will be explained in § 4.6).  
3. Consideration of different organisational contexts. The cases studies found in the OS 
literature are usually based on the consideration of either single negative cases, i.e., 
accidents (e.g., Snook, 2002; Turner & Pidgeon 1997; Vaughan, 1997; Weick, 1993), or 
single successful cases, i.e., the HRO (e.g., La Porte, 1996; LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Roe 
& Schulman, 2008). Such a single case study approach would have encountered issues 
regarding the generalisability of its findings, as these would have been relevant only for 
the individual studied context. The chosen research methodology addresses this concern 
by maximising the number of organisational contexts included in the research. In 
particular, the first two case studies explicitly consider a total of three organisational 
contexts that have been analysed in depth. Two of these contexts (Study 2) addressed a 
successful and a less successful case. Finally, the third study is informed by the knowledge 
of different organisational contexts found in European ANSPs, as reflected in the 
professional backgrounds of the safety net experts involved in the study. 
Having covered the aspects of validity and generalisability, this section has completed the 
description of the strategic aspects of the research and has set the stage for the 
description of the lower-level, methodological aspects of the research, which will be 
addressed in the following two sections. 
 DATA AND DATA COLLECTION 
Considering the qualitative focus on the history of the MSAW, it was considered as 
appropriate data any key documents or insider accounts reporting on activities, decisions, 
and events influencing the adoption, implementation, management, human factors and 
safety assurance and use of the MSAW in the studied organisations. In investigations of 
organisational sources of failure it is normal to rely on a variety of data sources, such as: 
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official accident reports, internal company documents (e.g., Ocasio, 2005; Turner & 
Pidgeon, 1997); field notes from ethnographic observations of operators at work, and 
transcripts from single or group interviews (e.g., Rochlin, 2011, 1996; Roe & Schulman, 
2008; Roberts, 1990);  a combination of both official documentation and in-depth 
interviews (e.g., Snook, 2002; Vaughan, 1997); and, also, on secondary data sources (e.g., 
Weick, 1993). In exploratory research like the present thesis, flexibility in data collection 
is desirable because it maximises opportunities for discovery—i.e., it maximises 
opportunities for finding possible organisational precursors to HAI issues wherever they 
can be found. 
Furthermore, the data had to be representative of the viewpoints of both (i) the air traffic 
controllers at the sharp end, i.e., the users of the technology; and (ii) the other 
stakeholders at the blunt end, such as supervisors, managers, R&D directors, safety 
experts, and international and national regulators involved in the management of the 
MSAW. The former viewpoint provided insights into the actual use of the alarm in context, 
and the accompanying HAI issues. The latter viewpoint was instrumental to provide 
insights into the rationales, interests, and frames behind the (normal) decisions and 
conditions influencing alarm development, adoption, operation, and optimisation.  
Overall, these considerations justify the choice of the type of data that have been 
employed in this research. The data are described in the next sub-sections.  
4.4.1. Study 1  
The first empirical study of the research builds on the interpretive historical case study 
approach described in the previous section (§ 4.3.2). The case study focused on tracing 
the historical trajectory of the nuisance alert problem within the context of operation of 
the MSAW system’s operation in the US, from the introduction of the alarm in 1977 to 
2006. 
4.4.1.1. Data sources 
The data sources considered for Study 1 included the following documentary sources:  
 The set of NTSB safety recommendation letters (n=11) that reported problems 
identified by the NTSB with MSAW operations. These letters’ average length was 
six pages, with a minimum of two pages, and a maximum of 13 pages. Usually 
safety recommendation letter cover the following topics: a description of the 
evidence pointing to a given safety problem (a problem with MSAW operations in 
the present analysis); a description of the nature of the problem(s), as understood 
by the agency; and the presentation of the safety recommendations issued to the 
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FAA to fix the problem(s) identified. In this study, the analysed safety 
recommendation letters carried a total of 25 safety recommendations addressed 
to the MSAW. Appendix C provides an example of one of the NTSB safety 
recommendation letter and its safety recommendations considered in this study.  
The NTSB safety recommendation letters were retrieved from the NTSB safety 
recommendation database (described in the next section); and they covered the 
period 1977 (the year the alarm entered operational use) to 2006. No safety 
letters and recommendations were found after 2006. Appendix D provides the 
complete list of the NTSB safety recommendation letters and NTSB safety 
recommendations analysed in this study. 
 The correspondence exchanged between the NTSB and the FAA that addressed 
the implementation of the above safety recommendations. This included a total 
of 111 letters (see Appendix D for the list of the letters considered by the study), 
which were on average half a page long. These letters were exchanged as, upon 
reception of an NTSB safety recommendation, it is a standard administrative 
practice for the FAA to issue a response letter documenting the actions that it will 
undertake in response to the recommendation. This is usually followed by one or 
more correspondence exchanges between the two agencies. Such exchanges are 
usually triggered by NTSB letters that comment on the FAA’s response actions. 
These exchanges are terminated when the NTSB declares the safety 
recommendation close. This step can have three outcomes: (i) acceptable, when 
the FAA corrective actions satisfy the intent of the initial safety recommendation; 
(ii) acceptable alternative action, when the FAA implements corrective actions 
that are alternative to those demanded by the NTSB in a way that still satisfies 
the initial safety recommendation; and unacceptable action, when the FAA 
response does not satisfy the initial NTSB safety recommendation. Further 
background information about safety recommendations is provided in 5.2.2. 
It is important to anticipate that this data set was analysed three times in three different 
manners. The motivation for this lies in the relative uniqueness of the kind of data 
analysed. Only one study (Tasca, 1990) which made use of similar data was found, and 
this study did not use this data for research objectives comparable to those of the present 
research. Therefore, it was only after the first data analysis stage—data familiarisation—
that it became evident how the initial data set could be actually analysed. (Data analysis 
for Study 1 is described in § 4.5.1.) 
4.4.1.2. Data bases accessed 
The above data were retrieved from two publicly available on-line databases maintained 
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by the NTSB and the FAA. More specifically, the NTSB’s safety letters and 
recommendations were retrieved from the ‘NTSB Safety Recommendations and Safety 
Letters database’. During the study, the database has underwent some improvements. 
Thus, a first batch of data was downloaded from the older version of the database 
(available at: http://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/letters/letters.htm), and a second batch was 
downloaded from the latest version (available at: 
http://www.ntsb.gov/safetyrecs/private/QueryPage.aspx). The ensuing safety letters 
exchanged between the NTSB and the FAA were downloaded from the ‘NTSB Safety 
Recommendations to the FAA with FAA responses’ database (http://www.asias.faa.gov).  
Although the details of incidents and accidents detailed in most safety recommendations 
sufficed for the purposes of this study, in two cases it was necessary to access the original 
accident report to gain access to details not reported in the letters. These were 
downloaded from the ‘NTSB Accident Reports’ database 
(http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/reports.html).  
4.4.2. Study 2  
The second empirical study of the thesis study also builds on the interpretive historical 
case study approach described in the previous section (§ 4.3.2). The case study traced the 
historical trajectory of the MSAW-related nuisance alert problem within two European 
ANSPs. In this context, the study considers the perspective of the developers, engineers, 
managers, air traffic controllers and safety experts involved in the implementation of the 
MSAW and the management of the related nuisance alert problem.  
4.4.2.1. Sample of organisations 
The selection of the ANSPs involved in this study was made according to the following 
criteria. Firstly, ANSPs had to have experience with the introduction and operation of the 
MSAW system. Secondly, an effort was made to include at least a successful, or best 
practice, case as well as a less successful one. This would have in fact increased 
opportunities for insights than the analysis of a single organisational context—as carried 
out in Study 1. These two criteria led to the identification and inclusion in the study of two 
ANSPs, both henceforth referred to using fictional names: 
 ANSP1, here referred to as Alphasky, is a large European ANSP that is recognised 
as a leader of research and development of new automated systems for ATM. 
Specifically to MSAW, Alphasky was the first European ANSP to introduce the 
system and is recognised today as one of the best in class MSAW implementers 
in the industry;  
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 ANSP2, here referred to as Deltasky, is a small East European ANSP. It first 
introduced the MSAW system in 2004, and at the time of data collection it was in 
the process of improving its MSAW and other safety nets. 
Table 2 compares the size of the two organisations. 
Table 2. Profile of Alphasky and Deltasky 
 Alphasky Deltasky 
No. of employee >5000 <1000 
Traffic movements 
on peak days 
>9000 <3000 
 
4.4.2.2. Organisational access 
Among organisational researchers, gaining organisational access for the purpose of 
conducting field-work is usually acknowledged to be a main hurdle.   This is especially true 
when seeking access to high-risk organisations. As noted by Bourrier (2011) researchers 
are often discouraged from accessing these organisations due to factors such as the 
number of guarantees that the researcher is requested to provide; the requirement to be 
assisted by an internal surveillance team during the visits, which risks altering the setting 
under investigation, and the time needed to gain access. 
Because of these considerations, careful planning was undertaken to obtain access to 
Alphasky and Deltasky. In particular, access was obtained according to a two-step process: 
the first step consisted of seeking access to the EUROCONTROL SPIN network. This 
international network brings together operational, technical and safety experts from 
different ANSPs and industry that work together with EUROCONTROL in order to enhance 
safety net implementations in Europe (EUROCONTROL, No date). In particular, at the time 
of the study the network was working on defining guidance material and specifications 
for safety nets. Furthermore, the internal EUROCONTROL SPIN coordination team was 
active in providing assistance to the ANSPs that needed to optimise their safety nets.  
In February 2009, the EUROCONTROL Safety Team manager, the industrial mentor of this 
dissertation, established initial contact with the leaders of the SPIN network. During a 
dedicated meeting, these individuals were briefed about the objectives of the research. 
Access to the SPIN network was subsequently granted, and the researcher was invited to 
participate in subsequent SPIN meetings. In particular the researchers attended three of 
these meeting in 2009. Attendance of these meetings was instrumental in gaining initial 
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direct exposure to the safety net domain, and, most importantly, in establishing informal 
contact with relevant ANSPs’ representatives that could be interested in the research. 
The subsequent step consisted of approaching the interested representatives in order to 
request organisational access. Four representatives of four different ANSPs were sent an 
e-mail that specified (i) the aim and objectives of the research, (ii) the location and 
duration of the requested visits, (iii) the support needed, (iv) the data collection activities 
that needed to be carried out, and (vi) the background of individuals the research team 
wished to interview.  (This e-mail also specified that the names of people, companies, and 
facilities would remain strictly confidential.)  Access to Alphasky and Deltasky was 
obtained as a result of this process. The contacts of these organisations were very 
supportive with regard to the objective of the research. They granted the research team 
access to their operational and administrative facilities and permission to interview staff 
involved in MSAW introduction and operation.  
4.4.2.3. Data collection  
Fieldwork took place between February and November 2009. During this period the 
researcher visited two approach and two tower control centres of Alphasky and one 
approach and one tower control centre of Deltasky. The visit to the first Alphasky site was 
conducted together with a senior safety expert from the EUROCONTROL Safety Team, 
who was instrumental in facilitating access to the organisation, and stimulating 
discussions with participants. The same expert also facilitated an initial teleconference 
with a representative of Deltasky, although the visit to this organisation was conducted 
by the author of this research alone.  
Fieldwork was guided by the basic rule of interpretive research of trying “to get inside 
[the] situation to understand it as far as possible on its own terms” (Morgan, 1997, p. 
301). The research team approached the field from a learner’s perspective rather than 
from that of an expert, meaning that they focused on understanding the local experience 
with the MSAW and the management of nuisance alert problem, as seen from the 
viewpoint of the study participants. In doing so, an effort was made to leave 
preconceptions and hypotheses behind and to suspending judgment, in order to avoid 
premature closure and to create room for new hypotheses to emerge. 
Semi-structured interviews were an essential part of the field-work. Participants were 
prompted based on an initial list of open ended questions, allowing for deviations from 
this list whenever important issues emerged. The participants were encouraged to discuss 
in detail aspects that were relevant to the purpose of the research. During the interview 
process, the participant was invited to do most of the talking, while the researcher listen 
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carefully and took notes. Appendix D provides the interview guides employed for air 
traffic controllers and back end roles. 
The main concern driving the selection of participants was to identify and talk to people 
involved in MSAW-related activities within their organisations. The goal of the interviews 
was to understand (i) the viewpoints of relevant stakeholders at the blunt end who had 
been involved in the decisions to introduce, manage and improve the system and (ii) the 
viewpoints of the MSAW-users, i.e., operational controllers. Thus, prior to the site visits, 
a list of possible interviewees was provided by the organisations, and after each interview 
participants were asked to suggest names of other people that could be potentially 
interested in the research.  
4.4.2.4. Data sources 
The study made use of data sources both internal and external to the organisation. 
Internal data sources included the following: 
 Qualitative interviews. A total of 28 staff members across the three sites were 
interviewed (see Table 3). These included individuals both in back end and front 
end roles. Interviews were also conducted with 7 participants external to the two 
organisations. 5 of these belong to the SPIN network, while other 2, a 
EUROCONTROL policy maker and an EASA regulator, were external to both the 
SPIN and the studied organisations.  
 Field notes. In addition to conducting interviews, the researcher also carried out 
direct observations of air traffic controllers at work in their control rooms. This 
made it possible to identify their monitors and displays; to observe how the 
MSAW system fits into the actual operational environment; and, in particular, to 
understand how the system is used and how nuisance alerts may occur during its 
use.  
 Visit Reports. During the visits the research team wrote copious notes of what 
was said and what happened. Within three days of each site visit, a visit report 
that summarized the main findings of the visit was prepared, checked internally, 
and then sent back to the study participants in order to confirm the accuracy of 
the information gathered.  
 Documentation. Internal documentation included service notes, internal safety 
net requirements and guidance material, and MS Power Point presentations. The 
internal documentation was supplemented with external documentation such as 
regulations, EUROCONTROL European safety policies and safety net guidance 
material, and standards by the International Civil Aviation Organisation.  
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Table 3. Study 1: list of participants interviewed. 
Interview
ed staff 
Case 1: ALPHASKY Case 2: DELTASKY EXTERNAL EXPERTS 
Blunt end 
roles 
 
- Head of ATC (site 1); 
- Head of ATC (site 2); 
- Safety net expert; 
- MSAW engineer; 
- Former safety net 
engineer; 
- Quality of service 
specialist; 
- Project manager; 
- 2 IT engineers;  
- Training Expert; 
 
- 2 EUROCONTROL 
SPIN leaders;  
- 1 R&D director;  
- 1 safety net leader;  
- 1 safety net expert;  
- 1 EUROCONTROL 
policy maker (co-
author of the 
ESARR4 policy); 
- 1 EASA regulator. 
Sharp 
end roles 
- 10 controllers (site 1); 
- 5 controllers (site 2); 
- 1 supervisor (site 2). 
- 2 controllers Not applicable 
 Total 22 6 7 
 
4.4.3. Study 3  
Study 3 consisted of an SME study. In this study, feedback was collected from a group of 
11 experts in the domain of safety nets by means of an initial group discussion, and an 
individual qualitative questionnaire.  
4.4.3.1. Recruiting of experts 
In research using experts, the background of the individuals involved is a key component 
in ensuring the study’s validity. Thus, the driving concern was to have a sample of experts 
with first-hand experience in the safety nets domain. The experts were recruited from the 
EUROCONTROL SPIN network, because, based on their professional experience, these 
experts contribute periodically to the various initiatives undertaken by the network in the 
safety net domains. This ensured that the experts not only understood the organisational 
patterns for which corroboration was sought, but also that they were able to effectively 
express their thoughts, opinions and perspectives on these patterns.  
4.4.3.2. Data Collection  
In an SME study, there are many ways to engage with experts. In the present study, the 
following combination of method was sought: (i) the research was presented during an 
event attended by safety net experts; then data was collected by means of (ii) a group 
discussion and (iii) an individual semi-structured questionnaire returned to the researcher 
via e-mail. 
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The event in question was a two-day meeting of the SPIN community, which took place in 
May 2013 at the EUROCONTROL headquarters in Brussels. On that occasion, a one-hour 
slot, dedicated to this study, was included in the meeting’s agenda. 
 Presentation. During the allocated time-slot, an initial presentation lasting about 
twenty minutes was given. Here, the meeting participants were (i) briefed about 
the purpose of the study and the importance of their involvement; (ii) provided 
with a description of the initial version of the framework (as resulting from Studies 
1 and 2); and (iii) instructed about the kind of feedback that the researcher aimed 
to collect. It was also emphasised that confidentiality would have been 
preserved—in particular that no names of individuals, companies, sites or airports 
would have appeared in the research manuscript and the related publications.  
 Group discussion. The presentation was followed by a 40-minute group 
discussion, during which the interested participants asked clarificatory questions 
about the research, and provided their initial reactions to the categories of the 
initial version of the framework (resulting from studies 1 and 2). This mode of 
participant involvement is known to establish trust and rapport with study 
participants, which in turn increases the richness and validity of participant 
accounts (Meho, 2006). 
 Questionnaire. During the event, the experts were provided with a semi-
structured qualitative questionnaire, the structure of which is described in the 
following subsection. 11 experts participated actively in the initial group 
discussion and returned their completed questionnaires via e-mail between May 
and June 2013 via e-mail. Each returned questionnaire was usually followed by 
between one to four e-mail exchanges in order to elicit additional information 
and clarify relevant issues.  
4.4.3.3. Questionnaire 
The qualitative questionnaire used in this study included 10 open-ended items, organised 
into 5 sections. The first section included items aimed at collecting biographical data. The 
second, third, and fourth sections formed the core of the questionnaire. Each section 
presented a definition of one category of organisational precursor. The definition was 
followed by two questionnaire items, the first inviting the expert to comment on the 
definition provided, the second asking for recommendations for improvement (relevant 
to the organisational precursor just commented upon). The last section included two 
concluding items. Prior to the study, the questionnaire was designed and refined with the 
support of a supervisor knowledgeable about the ATM domain.  
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4.4.3.4. Profile of the SME group 
The average years of experience in the safety net domain of the group of experts was 
about 10 years, with a total cumulative experience of roughly 105 years (see Table 4). The 
group encompassed the perspectives of the different organisational actors that may be 
involved on a typical safety net implementation and/or improvement (see Figure 3). 
Figure 4 shows that the group of experts included individuals who had been involved in 
the implementation of safety nets (n=6), in the evaluation and improvement of existing 
safety nets implementations (n=5), and in the development and validation of safety net 
guidance material (n=5). Only one expert had no direct experience in the safety net 
domain. Regarding the type of safety nets the experts were familiar with, the majority of 
them were knowledgeable about the MSAW and the short term conflict alert or STCA 
(Figure 5). Three of them had also been involved in the requirement definition and the 
implementation of other automated systems in addition to safety nets. 
Table 4. Study 3: profile of the group of experts participating in the exercise. 
N. of participating experts 11 
Average experience in the safety net domain (years) ≈10 
Min* 
(*:excluding the experts with no experience in the safety net 
domain) 
5 
Max 14 
Total cumulative experience (years) 105 
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Figure 4. Study 3: organisational perspectives represented by the group of experts. 
 
 
Figure 5. Study 3: type of involvement of the participating experts in the safety net domain. 
 
2
3
3
2
1
Organisational perspectives represented by the group of experts
EUROCONTROL ANSP
Consultancy Manufacturers
EASA (European Regulator)
6
5 5 5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Implementations
of safety nets
Evaluation and
improvement of
existing safety net
implementations
Safety net
requirement
definition
Guidance material
development
Type of involvement in the safety net domain
N
o
. o
f
SM
Es
   Chapter 4. Research strategy  
  
61 
 
Figure 6. Type of safety nets the experts had direct experience with. 
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 DATA ANALYSIS 
Data analysis used in the three studies was based on framework analysis (Ritchie & 
Spencer, 2002). Originating in the area of policy research, framework analysis consists of 
a broad and adaptable high-level framework that can be used for qualitative data analysis 
across different situations and research problems. The phases of the approach include: 
1. Data familiarisation. This phases consists of immersing oneself in the (large) body of 
data that is usually collected in qualitative research. At the end of the familiarisation 
phase, the researcher should have gained (i) an understanding of the breadth and 
depth of the available data corpus and data set(s); (ii) an initial and rough feeling 
about (potential) key ideas expressed in the data; and, most importantly, (iii) an idea 
about which coding method can be used to analyse the data. 
2. Coding framework development. The second phase involves the development of one 
or more coding framework(s). A coding framework consists of a hierarchical set of 
codes and categories that synthesises the data in a way that is meaningful for the 
purpose of the research. According to Saldaña (2012), the development of a coding 
framework involves two related sub-phases, or, more specifically, two levels of 
coding: first-level and second-level coding. The former involves coding the raw data 
into first-level categories; the latter, involves coding the first-level categories, so as to 
deliver higher-level, and more theoretically-oriented categories. 
3. Data display. The third stage, data display, consists of arranging the data in a way that 
provides an integrative at a glance view of the emerging themes and/or patterns 
found in the data. Miles and Huberman (1994) provide a comprehensive review of the 
kind of data display methods that are useful in this phase of the analysis. 
These phases drove the data analysis in the three studies and are described in the 
following sections. Note that the studies differed from one another regarding the 
implementation of the core phase of the approach, namely phase 2, Coding framework 
development. This is due to the fact that each study used different data sources that 
required different coding methods, namely taxonomic coding (Spradley, 1980), 
comparative coding (Shreier, 2002), historical-evidentiary coding, and subsuming coding 
(Mayring, 2010). Table 5 (see next page) summarises the different coding frameworks 
developed in each study and the corresponding coding method(s). 
Indeed, coding framework development can be pursued using different coding methods. 
Coding methods frequently mentioned in the literature include open, axial, and selective 
coding—the three coding methods most typically associated with GTM (Glaser & Strauss, 
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2009). However, coding should not be restricted to these approaches. Other methods are 
available, and Saldaña’s comprehensive coding manual provides a review of more than 
thirty of them (Saldaña, 2012). He suggests that this variety can be attributed to the fact 
that coding methods should be fitted to the unique goal and demands of the research at 
hand. Thus, in the present research, different coding methods have been used depending 
on each study’s data set(s) and analytical goal.  
While each specific method is described in the following section, it is worth noting that 
Table 5 lists a total of five coding frameworks—and not just three. This is due to the fact 
that Study 1 delivered a total of three frameworks and not just one: as mentioned during 
the presentation of the data sources used in this study (§ 4.4.1), during the initial analysis 
phase it became evident that what was initially perceived as a unique data set in fact 
contained three separate homogeneous datasets (homogeneous in the sense that the 
type of data was consistent in each set). Studies 2 and 3, on the other hand, generated 
one coding framework each.  
Table 5. Summary of the coding methods used across the three studies. 
 Study 1 
(chapter 5) 
Study 2 
 (chapter 6) 
Study 3 
 (chapter 7) 
Coding 
Frame # 
1.1  1.2 1.3 2 3 
Analytical 
goal 
Code NTSB 
safety 
recommendation 
letters based on 
concerns 
regarding the use 
of the MSAW as 
identified by the 
NTSB.  
Code NTSB 
safety 
recommendation
s, targeting the 
“controllers’ lack 
of response” 
concern, based 
on the changes 
they demanded to 
the FAA. 
Code a subset of 
the NTSB and 
FAA letters, 
according to their 
motivation for 
mandating/rejecti
ng two of the 
NTSB-requested 
changes. 
Find evidences in 
a heterogeneous 
data set in order 
to (re)construct a 
specific 
organisational 
experience. 
Distil common 
themes from a 
homogeneous 
data set, and 
compare how 
they stand in 
comparison to the 
emerging 
framework. 
Coding 
method 
Taxonomic  
(see p. 65) 
Taxonomic  Comparative  
(see p.67) 
Historical-
evidentiary 
(see p.69) 
Subsuming  
(see p. 74) 
Codes 
stand for  
Types of 
concerns about 
the MSAW 
identified by the 
NTSB.  
Types of changes 
requested by the 
NTSB to address 
one of the 
previously 
identified types of 
concern (the 
“controllers’ lack 
of response” 
concern). 
NTSB’s and 
FAA’s respective 
motivations for 
mandating/rejecti
ng two of the 
NTSB requested 
changes. 
Organisational 
events, decisions, 
and conditions 
relevant to 
understanding 
MSAW set up and 
the management 
of MSAW-related 
nuisance alerts. 
Attitudes, 
critiques, and 
professional 
experiences of 
experts useful for 
refining and 
expanding the 
OPHAII 
framework. 
Outcome Typological/descr
iptive framework 
Typological/descr
iptive framework 
Comparative 
framework 
Conceptual 
framework  
Conceptual 
framework 
Data 
display 
Graph Matrix Matrix Matrix Matrix 
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4.5.1. Study 1 
As the first study of an exploratory research project, Study 1 turned out to be relatively 
challenging. Therefore, an introduction is needed before the description of the coding 
procedures is presented. The first analytical stage of Study 1 consisted of downloading 
and printing the initial data corpus—i.e., the set of NTSB’s safety recommendations, 
recommendation letters, and the FAA’s response letters (as described in § 4.4.1.1). This 
data corpus was read and re-read, while taking memos, asking clarification questions 
about the data, cross-checking the questions with colleagues and research supervisors, 
and supplemental documentation (mostly accident reports) when needed. This 
familiarisation phase was rather challenging: the originality of the data corpus resulted in 
a lack of immediate clarity about how to analyse it. Eventually, three distinct (but related) 
data sets were identified, namely: 
 Dataset 1:  This data set included the complete set of the MSAW-related 
NTSB safety recommendation letters and recommendations issued between 1977 
and 2006. The coding of this data set was necessary to distil the categories of 
problems or concerns with the operation of the MSAW system identified by the 
NTSB. One of the identified problems, the “controllers’ lack of response”, 
emerged as critical for the purpose of the study and was subjected to further 
analysis;   
 Dataset 2:  This data set contained two sets of data. The first subset included 
the retrieved NTSB safety recommendations targeting the “controllers’ lack of 
response” concern. The second subset included the correspondence exchanged 
between the two agencies that addressed the implementation of the 
recommendations targeting the “controllers’ lack of response” concern; 
 Dataset 3: This data set included the retrieved correspondence exchanges 
between the NTSB and the FAA addressing two requested changes that were 
refused by the FAA. 
The identification of three distinct datasets meant that the first-level coding of Study 1 
included three cycles—each cycle focusing on one data set. (Consequently, Study 1 first- 
level coding can in fact be viewed as three sequential sub-studies). The analysis of these 
data sets produced a total of three coding frameworks, which formed the basis of Study 
1 second-level coding.  
   Chapter 4. Research strategy  
  
65 
4.5.1.1. First-level coding for Study 1 
Coding methods for coding frameworks 1.1 and 1.2 
The first two data sets were coded by means of the same coding method: taxonomic 
coding (Spradley, 1980). Taxonomic coding originated in ethnographic research and aims 
to construct taxonomies of the concepts that are typical of a specific culture, or cultural 
domain. According to Spradley (1980), every culture has its own cultural domains, which 
consist of categorisation systems. One problem is that such domains are part of (local) 
tacit knowledge and hence are not immediately intelligible to external observers. It is the 
researcher’s task to extract these classification systems in order to make them visible to 
outsiders. In this study, taxonomic coding was used to identify (i) what the NTSB 
diagnosed as types of MSAW issues or concerns (coding framework 1.1); and (ii) what 
remedies the agency suggested to solve these issues (coding framework 1.2). 
Coding framework 1.1 
The set of MSAW-related NTSB safety recommendation letters that were retrieved 
(dataset 1) was coded for MSAW-related flaws. In particular, each letter (i) described one 
or more safety-critical events (civil aviation incidents and/or accidents); (ii) diagnosed the 
operational flaw(s) that lead to that event(s); and (iii) then provided a description of some 
desirable corrective change(s). An example of a safety recommendation letter (and its 
safety recommendations) is reported under Appendix C. In this phase, coding focused on 
understanding what flaws the NTSB identified for the MSAW—what aspects of the alarm 
chain did not work as intended and hence contributed, according to the NTSB, to the 
occurrence of a particular (set of) accident(s) and/or incident(s). When identified, relevant 
passages were assigned an initial In Vivo code. An example of a text passage coded as a 
type of NTSB diagnosed problem with the MSAW—lack of alarm activation—is reported 
in the table below. 
Table 6. Coding framework 1.1: example of a code. 
Original text 
(Portion of an NTSB safety recommendation letter)  
Code label 
(Concern identified by the 
NTSB) 
“Because USAair 105’s premature descent…was inside the inhibit 
area designed to minimise the number of false alerts of low 
[altitude] aircraft that are maintaining a proper descent, the MSAW 
did not activate. The Safety Board believes that MSAW 
parameters can be adjusted provide for increased protection in 
areas where MSAW warnings are currently inhibited” (NTSB 
safety Recommendation Letter 28 sept 1990, p. 4). 
 
 Lack of MSAW activation 
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After all the material had been read, the codes were listed onto a separate MS Word file. 
Once the list had been assembled, the coded text segments were systematically 
compared, checked for similarities and differences, sorted and re-arranged—the ultimate 
purpose being that of clustering them into higher-order categories that could stand for 
these segments. This process involved several iterations with the data. It was repeated 
until a stable definition of the categories of the framework was defined. The resulting 
framework consists of a relatively flat classification scheme made of descriptive 
categories. Each category crystallised types of identified NTSB concerns. The framework 
is reported in section 5.3.1. 
Coding framework 1.2 
The same taxonomic coding approach was also applied to the second data set: the set of 
MSAW-related safety recommendations addressing the “controllers’ lack of response” 
concern. These recommendations were coded according to the nature of the specific 
corrective actions that the NTSB requested the FAA to implement in order to address this 
concern. 
This analytical stage was necessary to build more precision and integrity into the 
analysis—that is, to distil the specific corrective changes embedded in the safety 
recommendations addressing the concern in question. In fact, some of these 
recommendations, although issued at subsequent points in time, essentially 
recommended the same corrective action. In other words, they repeated a request for a 
change that was already made in an earlier recommendation. Other recommendations, 
on the other hand, incorporated more than one corrective action. In other words the text 
of the recommendation contained requests for multiple changes. For instance, safety 
recommendation A-81-134 in Table 7 contains two design changes: a request to 
distinguish between the aural alarms of the MSAW and those of another alarm, the 
conflict alert; and a request to direct the MSAW aural alert only to the controller 
concerned. 
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Table 7. Framework 1.2: example of two codes. 
Quotation 
(NTSB Safety Recommendation) 
Code labels 
(Requested changes) 
“Redesign the low altitude/conflict alert at ARTS III facilities so that the 
audio signal associated with the low altitude alert is readily 
distinguishable from that associated with the conflict alert and  
heard only by controller immediately concerned with the involved 
aircraft.” (A-81-134) 
 Distinguish between the 
MSAW and CA aural alert 
 
 Direct alert only to the 
concerned controller 
The safety recommendation analysis replicated the steps already described for coding 
framework 1.1, and resulted in a two-level descriptive coding framework. This includes 
eight types of requested changes (RC) (the lower-level categories), which were grouped 
under three types of areas of change (AOC) (the higher-level categories). Note that 
compared to coding framework 1.1, another analytical step was included in the 
development of coding framework 1.2. The data was assembled on a matrix in order to 
organise the identified requested changes over time. In particular, the matrix distributed 
the NTSB-requested changes according to the safety recommendation letters in which 
these changes were recommended. This analysis made it possible to trace the requests 
issued by the NTSB across the period studied. (The resulting matrix is reported under 
section 5.3.2.) 
Coding method for coding frameworks 1.3 and 1.4 
The first-level coding of Study 1 was concluded with an analysis of two of the requested 
changes identified in the previous coding phase, regarding which the two agencies held 
contrasting perspectives. On the one hand the NTSB requested and justified these 
changes; on the other, the FAA opposed them and presented a non-implementation 
rationale. Thus the development of coding frameworks 1.3 and 1.4 served the purpose of 
eliciting the contrasting rationales presented by the two agencies regarding the changes 
in question. 
The data informing this analysis included (i) the NTSB safety recommendation letters in 
which the changes in question were presented; (ii) the initial FAA response; and (iii) the 
ensuing correspondence, in which the implementation of the changes was debated by the 
NTSB and the FAA. (The list of the specific data informing this phase of the analysis 
appears in Tables 11 (§ 5.3.3.1), and 13 (§ 5.3.3.2). 
This analysis was based on the comparative coding method (Schreier, 2012). This 
approach allowed the construction of a comparative coding frame—i.e., a frame that 
   Chapter 4. Research strategy  
  
68 
compares and illustrates the differences contained in two data sources. These can be 
distinguished based on any dividing criterion relevant to the study, such as different time 
periods, different stakeholder groups, and, as in this case, different official organisational 
views. Comparative coding was implemented in three steps: 
1. Identifying relevant passages in the first sources. The relevant NTSB safety 
recommendation letter and the follow-up letters were read line-by-line in order to 
identify passages in which the NTSB justified the change in question. 
2. Identifying relevant data segments in the second sources. The FAA response letters to 
the first NTSB safety recommendation letter and to the subsequent NTSB-follow up 
letters were read in order to identify the parts of the text in which the FAA reported 
its non-implementation rationale. 
3. Identifying differences between the two sources. This step examined the categories 
identified in the previous two phases with the aim of understanding the differences 
between the NTSB and the FAA letters. The goal was to develop a coding framework 
that allows these differences to be represented as clearly as possible. The result 
consists of two summary matrices that detail the implementation and non-
implementation rationales of the agencies regarding the two changes in question. 
These matrices are presented and explained in Table 12 (§ 5.3.3.1) and Table 14 (§ 
5.3.3.2).   
4.5.1.2. Second-level coding for Study 1 
The final part of the analysis consisted of linking the results of the three sub-studies to the 
original research objective, namely the development of a qualitative framework of 
organisational precursors to HAI issues. This step involved a comparison and integration 
of the insights generated by the three frameworks of Study 1. This process lead to the 
identification of the first category of organisational precursor of the OPHAII.  The outcome 
of this phase is summarized in Table 15  (§ 5.4.2).  
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4.5.2. Study 2 
4.5.2.1. First-level coding for Study 2 
Study 2’s data analysis had a strong investigative focus: the analytical challenge was that 
of examining a heterogeneous body of data in order to reconstruct the most salient traits 
of a whole organisational experience, namely the experience of introducing and managing 
the MSAW and the associated nuisance alert problem. 
Because of this orientation, this study did not mirror the basic coding approach commonly 
found in sociological studies: the objective of the analysis was not to search the data for 
similar types of events, or incidents, across a homogeneous data set, consisting of, for 
example, interviews or, as already discussed in the context of Study 1, documentary data. 
Rather, data analysis in Study 2 was analogous to the investigative work of historians, 
forensic experts, and accident investigators. Notably, these investigators share a common 
analytical challenge: that of analysing multiple present-day evidentiary sources in order 
to reconstruct or infer some events of the past. For this reason the coding approach used 
in this study can be characterised as historical-evidentiary. 
Data were read in a line-by-line fashion in order to identify passages which captured 
aspects relevant to the purpose of the research: organisational facts, conditions and 
decisions that were relevant to understand how the organisations under study (mis) 
managed the MSAW-related nuisance alert problem (see Table 8). Whenever such 
passages were found, they were marked using the same approach described in Study 1 (§ 
4.5.1.1).  
Table 8. Coding framework 2: example of the lower-level codes. 
 Data Initial codes 
 “At the beginning of **** our system was dying, it was a 
rudimentary monochromatic monitor. We needed a 
more stable and reliable system, as we were 
experiencing breakdown on a daily basis. So the main 
focus was on the implementation of the new system to 
get a higher-level of Flight data Processing capability. 
We knew pretty well the level of automation that was 
needed. On the other hand safety nets were a side dish, 
we had very little knowledge on them, and they were just 
a little feature that was offered as part of a larger system”  
 Legacy system in need of 
replacement 
 System breakdown experienced 
on daily basis 
 Main focus during adoption was on 
the radar processing system 
 Limited knowledge of safety nets 
 
After all the data was read, the codes were listed in two separate MS Word files, one for 
Alphasky and one for Deltasky. This is the stage in which code comparison, checking for 
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similarities and differences, and subsuming began. This process allowed to filter out the 
most relevant codes and to distil the most relevant case-specific categories—i.e., 
categories of events, conditions, and processes relevant to the understanding of how the 
nuisance alert problem was handled within the two organisations. The resulting coding 
framework is reported in the table on the next page, and is presented in section 6.3. 
4.5.2.2. Second-level coding for Study 2 
The final stage of the analysis consisted of a within-case comparison: a comparison of the 
case-specific categories that emerged from the previous coding phase, with the aim of 
checking for similarities, differences, and potentially relevant dimensions across the two 
cases. This phase allowed the case-specific categories to be subsumed under three more 
abstract and theoretically-oriented categories, i.e., categories expressed at a level of 
abstraction that makes them potentially relevant also to organisational contexts other 
than the ones under study. This phase of the analysis led to the development of the matrix 
reported under section 0The final analytical step consisted of comparing the emerging 
categories of the OPHAII framework (identified by Study 2) with the category identified in 
Study 1.  
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Table 9. Coding framework 2: example of case-categories (and related lower-level codes) for Alphasky and Deltasky. 
Case-Categories Low-level codes Quotations 
ALPHASKY (Success case)   
A1. Having an operational need 
for introducing the MSAW 
 Implementing the alarm in response to a CFIT 
 
 
 MSAW implementation perceived as  high 
priority issue 
“...a particular effort [has] to be made as soon as possible [by Alphasky] to complete the design 
and implementation by air traffic control services of a ground based system for detection of an 
aircraft in dangerous proximity to terrain, whenever technically possible” (Safety recommendation) 
“In ***[year omitted] there was a CFIT in *** [crash site omitted]. At that point the incorporation of a 
ground proximity alert function into the approaches became a high priority action.” (Head of ATC, 
site 1) 
A2. Clarifying the operational role 
of the MSAW 
 First studies into the MSAW began prior to 
adoption 
 
 Considering the MSAW role of “attention 
grabber” 
 
 Choosing to develop the MSAW as “hazard 
resolver” 
“It was necessary to wait until the mid-eighties for the first studies by [Alphasky] into the development of 
a real-time ground based proximity detection system. In 1988, the [internal R&D centre] made the first 
survey of requirements expressed by the operational personnel and the [office of accident 
investigation]...Opinions differ from county to another regarding the nature of the MSAW function and the 
service it should provide. Even if everyone agrees about what an MSAW is and should only be a control 
aid, some feel that the alerts it generates should simply attract the controller’s attention, it then being up 
to him to analyses the situation and make the necessary decision...This viewpoint is not shared by ***, 
which has chosen to develop a reliable system in which all alerts are justified, and which should entail no 
situational analysis work by the controller, but rather a reflex action informing the aircraft concerned.” 
(Alphasky documentary source) 
A3.  Recognizing the problem of 
nuisance alerts 
 Acknowledging the detrimental problem of  
overexposure to frequent nuisance alerts 
“The appearance of a large number of false alerts and undesirable alerts can be a factor in a certain 
dilution of controller vigilance and reduced confidence in the system, which in the end means that 
the controller-system structure no longer correctly provides the collision avoidance alert service.” 
(Alphasky documentary source) 
A4. Parameterisation process  Recording a sample of live air traffic data 
 Installation on local sites 
 Feeding the alarm with real data 
 Operational on-site testing 
 Final approval 
“I think [parameterisation] comes from recounting of real traffic and analyzing real traffic is and 
counting the number of alerts and deciding which one is useful which one is not. So they've taken 
a sample traffic studying the number of alerts, deciding this is useful this one is very useful, this 
one is nuisance. This is the way the system is parameterized.” (Alphasky safety net expert) 
“[when tuning the alarm] we collect traffic with a period of 1 month, 2 months…. Having real traffic 
data is key. Sometimes there are some days in which I do not have the recordings for doing the 
tuning. For ***[airport name omitted] I collect traffic for just one month, because the higher the 
traffic, the larger the sample of recorded traffic” (MSAW engineer) 
A5. Positive attitude towards air 
traffic controllers’ involvement 
 
 Having experts controllers permanently 
allocated to MSAW parameterisation 
 Engineers-Controller consultation 
 
“We have at least two controllers in ***(site name omitted) who get involved in the set up the  
MSAW. They are expert controllers yes, they have operational experience, but they also are 
knowledgeable about how to work with the safety net engineers. Usually what they do is...well, they 
work with a plot like this one, for instance this one shows all the alerts generated by the system at 
[***airport name omitted] over a day [...] [the expert controller] tell the engineer which one is good 
and which is bad” (Alphasky safety net expert) 
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A6.  Supporting software tools 
and organisational roles  
 
 Supporting software tools 
 
 
 Supporting organizational roles 
 
“To evaluate the real environment of the MSAW algorithms, the [Alphasky R&D centre] produced 
a demonstrator to visualise the alerts on a radar picture and tools for recording, flight path analysis 
and statistics. The demonstrator was installed within [the R&D facilities] (in 1993) and in ***[sites 
name omitted] (1994 and early 1995). The purpose of the evaluations was to improve the MSAW 
algorithms and to check their reliability, their efficiency, and to optimise the operating parameters”. 
(Alphasky documentary source)  
“Currently the parameterisation and improvement of the system involves two safety net experts, 
the validation team, and a committee that reunites once or twice a month...plus there is national 
leader, since it has been nominated things have improved a lot, as the issues with the system get 
addressed sooner.” (Alphasky safety net expert) 
A7.  Specifying the requirements 
to the manufacturer 
 
 Having established a long lasting, R&D, 
relationships with the manufacturer 
 
 
 
 
 Specifying requirements to the manufacturer 
 
 
 
 Software modifications done by the design and 
validation team 
 
 The design and validation team acting as a point 
of contact with the manufacturer 
“Concerning MSAW...[Alphasky] did most of the work. They did the concept development, the high-
level and the low level design. They have a very competent organisation which can cover the entire 
lifecycle. In this particular case, they took the MSAW of ***[manufacturer name omitted] apart, 
modified it, and improved for a few years, and then give it back to industry a few years later. Today 
the MSAW sold by ***[manufacturer name omitted] is a best in class.” (EUROCONTROL Spin 
leader) 
“[the specification of MSAW requirements] was to be followed by the development – using a 
software developed by ***[manufacturer name omitted]...of a software incorporating the MSAW 
and the AIW functions, and improving the initial software by two major changes which are on the 
one hand the incorporation of [design detail omitted] with a very fine mesh, thereby improving alert 
precision and quality, and on the other the detailed parameter configuration of the airport areas” 
(Alphasky documentary source) 
“All software modifications are done in ***[site name omitted] by the Design and Validation team. 
When something with the MSAW does not works, a report is sent to this team, which processes all 
reports from [Alphasky] sites, and then generates the requirements. These are then passed to [the 
manufacturer] for implementation. Once this is process is done, a CD with the update is sent to us, 
where the technician install the software on the local radar. No modification is made by the local 
facility, and no code is written/modified locally – this is actually forbidden for us. This stuff is  done 
by the Design and Validation Team, which also is the single point of contact with the manufacturer”( 
Alphasky safety nets expert) 
DELTASKY (Less successful case)   
D1. Lacking clarity about the 
operational need for introducing 
the MSAW 
 
 The original radar  processing system was dying 
 Initiated modernization effort in 2003 
 
 
 
 
“By 2003 ***’s previous system (deployed in early 80’s) was way over its lifecycle and an immediate 
replacement was needed. In 2003 [Deltasky] entered a contract with ***[manufacturer name omitted] for 
a new Data Processing System (Integrated FDPS and RDPS) to serve as an interim solution, while the 
work of specifying operational requirements for an overall modernization programme was kicked off 
simultaneously. The work with ***[manufacturer name omitted] was carried out under the 
***[modernization programme name omitted] [...which provides] for STCA, MSAW and APW (or RAI – 
Restricted Area Intrusion Warning, as referred to by [the manufacturer], and has been operational in ACC 
***[name of te omitted] since 2004, and still is.”(Deltasky project manager)  
“Our burning issues was to have a stable [radar processing and flight data] system. The old one was 
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 Main priority was to has a stable system in place 
 Knowing the required functionalities of the new 
system 
 
 Purchasing the MSAW as a COTS 
unstable, dying in our hands virtually…So our burning issue was to have stable system based on new pc 
platform and flat displays, good flight plan processing…We did not have any external driver for 
implementing MSAW and other safety nets; we needed to catch up with industry standards.” (Deltasky 
project manager) 
“MSAW came in a package of safety nets in ***[manufacturer name and the supplied system 
omitted]...Brought into operations on *** May 2004.” (Deltasky power point presentation) 
D2. Lacking clarity about the 
operational role of the MSAW 
 
 MSAW seen as a minor technical system 
 
 Lacking awareness about MSAW 
 
 Learning the operational purpose of MSAW after 
implementation 
“On the other hand safety nets were a side dish, we had very little knowledge on them, and they were 
just a little feature that was offered by ***[manufacturer’s name omitted] as a part of a larger system. Also 
we were not aware of the necessity of having safety nets. This is reflected in the way we parameterize 
safety nets later on” (Deltasky project manager) 
“Lesson learned from SPIN [after implementation]: Prevention of CFIT [is] the sole purpose of MSAW” 
(Deltasky power point presentation) 
D3. Purchasing the system in the 
absence of specified requirements 
 Lack of MSAW requirements 
 Trusting the manufacturer  
 Relying on the manufacturer for the system 
parameterisation 
 
“Well, you may consider that only the MSAW acronym appeared in the contract, with no dedicated 
requirement for this system. We accepted to implement it after they told us they could implement also 
this system [...] We trusted the manufacturer very much, we selected it among one of the best in the 
industry, we knew they had implemented the same systems on another ANSP (I know because I visited 
them), so we assumed we could rely on them also for the setup of the MSAW and safety nets... ” (Deltasky 
project manager) 
D4. Manufacturer providing a sub-
optimal alarm 
 
 Manufacturer considering the supplied grid 
adequate to the local terrain 
 
 
 Grid too unrefined for the specific terrain 
“The engineers of ***[manufacturer name omitted] deemed the [specified] grid to be ok. However, when 
we started using it, we realised it was so unrefined. If you cannot refine your warning altitude to distinguish 
between an aircraft that is on a correct course of approach from one that is not, then you have a nuisance.” 
(Deltasky IT engineer) 
The grid supplied by the manufacturer consisted of a 10 by 10 square made by modules of 8x8NM, 
something that is far too broad for the MSAW set up  (Deltasky power point presentation) 
D5. Realising the nuisance alert 
problem after implementation  
 
 Alarm generating too many nuisance alerts  
 
 
 Alarm lacking a single click inhibition function 
“The alarm generated an alert for every single approaching aircraft” (Controller) 
“Feedback from operations [was] Turn it off!” (Deltasky power point presentation) 
“The alarm did not contain a single-click inhibition function. Including a single click for alert inhibition is 
part of the lessons learnt following the first MSAW implementation.” (Deltasky engineer) 
D6. Realising the need for 
importing parameterisation 
expertise 
 Lacking the skill set to parametrize the system 
 Seeking “help” outside the organisation 
 
“It was when the manufacturer had packed its suitcase and gone that we realised we did not have access 
to system functions, the knowledge, the tools, and the competence to do the remaining implementation 
process on our own [...] This is also the stage we realised we needed external help, so we turned to SPIN, 
this is where we really found a way to get to know these system, their purpose, and how they have to be 
set up.” (Deltasky project manager) 
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4.5.3. Study 3 
Study 3’s data analysis consisted of extracting, from a homogeneous data set made of 
expert account, facts and attitudes relevant for corroborating the categories of the 
emerging OPHAII framework, defined in Study 2. 
Subsumption (Mayring, 2010) was the coding approach adopted in this study. It consists 
of coding data with reference to an existing coding framework or classification system. 
This was in fact the first study of the present research in which data analysis was driven 
by an existing theoretical framework, namely the initial version of the emerging OPHAII 
framework. Coding proceeded by means of close reading of the text. Whenever a passage 
that was deemed to fall into one of the existing categories of the framework was found, 
this was marked by assigning it a code according to the theoretical category of the 
framework, i.e., OP1, OP2, and OP3. In this way, the codes assigned were instrumental to 
the conceptual subsumption of parts of the data to the three categories of identified 
precursors. The relevant coded text passages consisted of the SMEs’ past professional 
experiences, and personal attitudes towards the categories of the framework.  
Note that although code development was driven by an existing classification system, i.e., 
the initial version of the framework, parts of the text that did not fit into the original 
framework were not ignored. These passages were marked as well, as they also could 
contain useful ideas for the expansion or refinement of the initial framework. Most 
importantly, having code development driven by an existing classification system did not 
mean that coding proceeded mechanically in a strict top-down fashion. This is the case 
because the categories of the initial framework were conceptually-oriented: they allowed 
coded textual data to be sorted only into three high-level categories, which however did 
not account for lower-level differences present in the data in each category. Therefore, 
within each category, a lower-level classification scheme had to be developed in order to 
account for these differences. And developing such scheme required the researcher to 
work inductively from the bottom—beginning with the data—while considering the pre-
existing categories. 
After coding the data set, the coded segments were listed in a separate MS Word file. At 
this point, these segments were examined in terms of (i) their differences and similarities 
between the incidents and events they contained; and (ii) their relevance to the initial 
OPHAII’s categories—i.e., the extent to which the coded category supported/refuted each 
specific category. The resulting coding framework is presented in section 7.2. 
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 WITHIN-STUDY VALIDATION STRATEGIES 
In the context of this research it was not feasible to have the data coded by two different 
people because of resource constraints. Thus, in all the three studies, the coding process 
was done by the researcher alone. Therefore, to guard against the researcher’s own bias, 
the following strategies were used within each study (in addition to the validation 
strategies already described in § 4.3.4).  
1. Review of the coding framework at different points in time. The respective coding 
frameworks developed in the three studies were each reviewed for consistency at 
least three times, with no less than a month elapsing between reviews. During each 
review, the author qualitatively verified the ability of the framework’s categories to 
adequately represent the data for which the categories stood.  
2. Peer debriefing. This strategy consisted of checking the accuracy of intermediate and 
final results with individuals familiar with the research. This strategy was 
implemented in different ways for Studies 1 and 2. In Studies 1 and 2, the frameworks’ 
categories were constantly verified with a supervisor knowledgeable about the ATM 
domain and automation. In addition, intermediate results of both studies were 
presented to both research supervisors and members of the EUROCONTROL Safety 
Team that were familiar with the research. The results of these studies were also 
disseminated at two academic conferences (Studies 1 and 2) and in a journal article 
(Study 1). (See Appendix F for the list of work published in this research.) Also Study 
3 results were verified by one supervisor knowledgeable about automation and ATM. 
3. Member checking. In Study 2, visit reports following site visits were sent back to the 
research participants within three days for cross-checking purposes. In Study 3, 
collection of the qualitative questionnaires was usually followed up with further 
questions send via e-mail to research participants and aimed at verifying/expanding 
on some of the issues reported in the questionnaire.  
4. Data triangulation. Study 2 made use of different types of data sources. Thus, an 
important part of the analysis consisted of triangulating or cross-checking these 
sources.  
5. Prolonged engagement in the domain. This strategy was especially relevant for Study 
3. The attendance of three SPIN meetings during Study 2 facilitated access to Alphasky 
and Deltasky, and also ensured that by the time Study 3 was executed the researcher 
was known to members of the SPIN community. Notably, engagement with the 
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community of research participants usually creates trust, and establishes rapport thus 
making it easier for participants to disclose relevant information.  
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 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presented the research strategy adopted in the present thesis. The chapter 
initially provided an overview of the three studies used to develop the OPHAII framework: 
two historical qualitative case studies centred on the organisational trajectory of a known 
HAI issue, the MSAW-related nuisance alert, followed by a third corroboratory study. The 
chapter explained the theoretical foundations of this strategy. It also determined that 
such a strategy is adequate to the present research, as it is consistent with its exploratory 
purpose, it is feasible, and it mitigates satisfactorily the major validation issues typical of 
single case study designs. Furthermore, the chapter described the methodological aspects 
related to data collection and data analysis procedures, and the qualitative validation 
strategies that were used in the three studies. Having completed the description of the 
research’s strategic and methodological aspects, the following three chapters present the 
results of the three studies.  
 
    
 
Chapter 5.  
STUDY 1 Results 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reports on the first empirical study of this thesis: an explorative and 
retrospective case study that inquired into the implementation and improvement history 
of the MSAW in the US. In this context, the study aimed to explore what organisational 
conditions occurring at the blunt end of the system influenced the handling of the MSAW 
nuisance alarm problem. The case is based on the analysis of (i) safety recommendation 
letters and recommendations targeting the MSAW, as issued by the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); the 
analysis of (ii) the FAA’s initial response, and (iii) the ensuing correspondence letters in 
which the implementation of these recommendations was debated. The chapter is 
organized as follows: 
 Section 5.2. provides background information useful for understanding the case 
study: a brief overview of the US MSAW (§ 5.2.1), and a description of the 
institutional cycle through which the documents analysed in the study are usually 
developed, generated and debated between the NTSB and the FAA (§ 5.2.2). 
 Section 5.3. presents the results of Study 1 first-level coding, i.e., four coding 
frameworks; 
 Section 5.4. presents the results of Study 1 second-level coding, i.e., a coding 
framework that builds on the first-level frameworks in order to identify which 
organisational precursor/s was/were at play in the present case. In so doing, this 
section provides an initial version of the framework of the organisational 
precursors to human automation interaction issues (OPHAII).  
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 BACKGROUND 
5.2.1. US MSAW  
The specific call for introducing the MSAW system in the US occurred following the crash 
of Eastern Air Lines flight 401 while on approach to Miami International Airport in 
December 1972 (NTSB, 2000, 1973). Following this accident, the NTSB issued safety 
recommendation A-73-46, which demanded the FAA to equip their radars with a low 
altitude warning.   
in 1974, after an initial consultation phase, the FAA contracted Sperry Rand’s Univac 
Division to develop an add-on for the radar system then in use in terminal facilities, the 
ARTS III (FAA, No date). The first MSAW system was commissioned at Los Angeles airport 
in 1976, and by 1977 the alarm was operational at all 63 major US airports equipped with 
ARTS III (FAA, No date). In 1981, the FAA also introduced a version of the MSAW for en-
route control, called E-MSAW. This new feature was operational at 14 of the 22 air route 
traffic control centres by 1987 (FAA, No date).  
Despite its adoption by various FAA control centres, the MSAW has been the target of 
several safety recommendations issued by NTSB to the FAA that aimed at correcting some 
criticalities with the alarm. This study analyses (i) these MSAW-related safety 
recommendations; (ii) the safety letters conveying these recommendations; (iii) the 
corresponding FAA’s response; and (iv) the ensuing correspondence exchange letters by 
means of which the NTSB either monitored the implementation of a given 
recommendation, or reiterated the need for implementing one.  
5.2.2. The organisational context of analysis  
The investigation of aviation accidents by independent bodies is one of the most 
sophisticated forms of present-day safety learning and improvement. The core of this 
process consists of identifying the probable causes of a safety event, be it an accident or 
an incident, and producing safety recommendations aimed at preventing its re-
occurrence. In the US, the NTSB is the independent federal agency charged by the US 
Congress to investigate every civil aviation accident, as well as significant accidents 
occurred in other transportation modes—railroad, marine, and pipeline (NTSB, 2004a). 
Since its foundation in 1967, the NTSB has investigated more than 124,000 aviation 
accidents and issued more than 12,000 safety recommendations, both within and outside 
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aviation (NTSB, 2004a).  
NTSB safety recommendations are the most important part of the NTSB mandate (NTSB, 
2004c). They address the need for remedial actions that usually emerge during or upon 
the completion of an NTSB investigations. Safety recommendations can in fact be issued 
before the completion of an investigation, furthermore supporting evidence can also 
come from fact-finding reviews and safety studies. When a safety recommendation is 
defined, the NTSB defines its status as “open” and communicates it to the organisation 
best able to act on the problem, whether public or private (NTSB, 2004b), through a safety 
recommendation letter. Each letter can contain one or more safety recommendation(s) 
depending on the criticalities identified by the NTSB. These safety recommendations are 
issued without performing a cost-benefit analysis. An example of a safety 
recommendation letter and its safety recommendations can be found in Appendix C. 
5.2.2.1. FAA Response to NTSB Safety Recommendations 
On receipt of an NTSB safety recommendation letter, the FAA assigns the 
recommendation(s) contained in the letter to its Office of Accident Investigation (AAI). 
The AAI is the FAA body responsible for the processing, monitoring and management 
safety recommendations. First, it reviews the safety recommendation to verify its 
adequacy, accuracy and appropriateness in resolving the safety issue addressed. Second, 
it assesses the feasibility of implementing the safety recommendation or an alternative 
action (DOT/FAA, 1995). This is necessary because, as noted above, NTSB safety 
recommendations are developed without performing a cost-benefit analysis. Finally, after 
evaluation, the AAI prepares the initial official response to be issued to the NTSB, usually 
within 90 days of the receipt of the safety recommendation letter (DOT/FAA, 1995).  
5.2.2.2. Ensuing correspondence exchange   
After issuing the safety recommendation to the FAA, the NTSB defines the safety 
recommendation status as “open”. The FAA responds by presenting their position with 
regard to the recommended action, and their planned response, if any. The FAA may in 
fact decide not to implement any response action, regardless of how urgent the NTSB 
deems it to be, since the latter does not have any regulatory power, and can only reiterate 
its request(s) to adopt the recommendation (e.g., Danko, 2010; Carlisle, 2000). 
This first correspondence exchange may be followed by the NTSB issuing a second letter 
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to persuade the FAA to implement a given recommendation, or to demand an update 
about its implementation status. Several written exchanges between the two 
organisations may be necessary between the two organisations to debate about 
acceptance and implementation status of a given safety recommendation. This process 
ends with the closure of the safety recommendation by the NTSB, which can close the 
recommendation by assigning it the status of “Acceptable action”, “Acceptable, 
alternative action”, or “Unacceptable, action”. This completes he description of the 
context of analysis. The next section presents Study 1’s results.  
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 FIRST-LEVEL CODING RESULTS 
This section reports on the results of the first-level coding phase of Study 1. As described 
earlier (§ 4.4.1), because three distinct (though related) data sets were used, Study 1 first-
level coding consisted of three coding cycles. The three datasets are as follows: 
1. The set of the retrieved NTSB safety recommendation letters. These were 
analysed in order to identify the problems, or concerns, that the NTSB had found 
with the MSAW since the alarm entered into service; 
2. The set of the retrieved NTSB safety recommendations targeting a specific NTSB 
concern (the “controllers’ lack of response” concern). Resulting as the most 
problematic from the previous analysis, this concern was analysed to understand 
the remedial changes requested, by means of dedicated safety 
recommendations, by the NTSB; 
3. The set of the retrieved NTSB safety recommendation letters and the associated 
correspondence exchange letters between the NTSB and the FAA concerning two 
requested changes, regarding which the two agencies developed two opposing 
rationales. This dataset permitted investigation of the sources of disagreement 
between the two agencies.  
The analysis of these datasets produced a total of four coding frameworks, because the 
third dataset’s analysis involved two coding cycles: one for each change requested. These 
coding frameworks are described next.  
5.3.1. Coding framework 1.1: MSAW-related concerns identified by NTSB 
Study 1’s first (preliminary) analytical step consisted of coding the NTSB safety 
recommendation letters retrieved depending on the MSAW-related concern(s) they 
raised: in each letter the concern corresponds to passages of text that answer the 
question “Based on the evidence—i.e., accident(s) and/or incident(s)—reported in this 
specific letter, what main problem(s) does the NTSB sees in relation to the MSAW?”. 
These concerns capture the NTSB’s view about the ways in which, in the relevant 
accident(s) and/or incidents(s), the joint work unit composed of the MSAW and the 
controller failed to function in the intended way—i.e., failed to deliver a low altitude 
warning alert to the concerned aircrew. Essentially, concerns correspond to conditions 
(identified by the NTSB) that jeopardised the alarm’s protective potential. 
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The analysis revealed that the NTSB has identified nine categories of MSAW-related 
concerns over the period 1977–2006. These were: 
 1. Controllers’ lack of response. This category groups all of those safety letters 
reporting on the controllers’ tendency to ignore MSAW warnings, even in the 
presence of true, reliable alerts;  
 2. Inhibited MSAW processing. This concern emerged in one US airport where the 
radar system deactivated MSAW processing whenever it received low quality radar 
return signals, which were presumably due to reflection signals generated by tall 
buildings near the runway; 
 3. MSAW System not installed. This concern refers to the MSAW not being installed 
in remote sites where a particular accident/incident occurred. Because of this, the 
controllers of these sites, were unable to issue low altitude alerts; 
 4. Permanent inhibition for Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flights. MSAW inhibition for 
aircraft associated to VFR computer codes was a normal condition during routine 
operations to reduce nuisance alerts: VFR flights routinely typically fly lower than 
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flights. However, this permanent MSAW inhibition 
emerged as critical when VFR flights were in an emergency situation. The risk was that 
VFR went unnoticed or received little help from ATC; 
 5. Over-dimensioned inhibited area. Over-dimensioned inhibited areas resulted in 
the MSAW not detecting aircraft flying below the minimum safe altitude, because the 
descent would occur in areas where the alerting function was permanently inhibited 
to minimise unwanted alerts;  
 6. Misplaced capture box. This category refers to the mistaken misplacement of the 
MSAW capture box, or grid, with regard to its intended position. Such a misplacement 
resulted on the MSAW not detecting aircraft flying below the minimum safe altitude.  
 7. MSAW speaker not installed. The absence of the speaker in tower control centres 
was considered as critical by the NTSB, because in these settings controllers, in order 
to control traffic movement, spend most of their times looking out of the window at 
aircraft. Thus, controllers’ attention can be redirected more effectively by means of 
an aural warning; 
 8. Lack of alarm integrity overseeing. This concern emerged when an MSAW audio 
speaker was found covered with masking tape as a means to silence it. It refers to the 
(in)ability of the organisation to monitor the integrity of the system; 
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 9. Inconsistent alarm sensitivity across sectors. This category refers to the presence 
of inconsistent MSAW settings between approach and tower control centres, so that 
the same risk of Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) accidents was not consistently 
alarmed across different sectors. 
 
Figure 7. Categories of concerns regarding the MSAW as identified by the NTSB over the period of analysis. 
The graph in Figure 7 relates the concerns identified to the number of NTSB safety 
recommendation letters in which the concerns were mentioned. The graph indicates that 
the concern n. 1, the “controllers’ lack of response” concern, emerged as a long-standing 
issue: it was in fact repeatedly mentioned in five NTSB safety recommendation letters. 
Each of the other categories of NTSB concerns was addressed in one letter only. This 
difference is due to the fact that the solution to these latter concerns was more 
straightforward, as they primarily reflected relatively “simple” technological problems: all 
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had to be done to solve the problem was installing a missing technological component or 
modifying an existing one. On the other hand, the solution to the “controllers’ lack of 
response” concern was not so straightforward: the problem in this case was not solely 
technological, but also had a human component—the air traffic controller’s behaviour 
triggered in response to the MSAW alert. Another important observation to make at this 
point is the fact that the nuisance alert problem did not surfaced as an independent 
category of concern. As it will be discussed next, this problem was debated in the context 
of the “controllers’ lack of response” concern. 
5.3.2. Coding framework 1.2: Areas of changes requested by the NTSB to 
address the “controller lack-of-response” concern 
A subsequent analysis was conducted to identify which changes were asked by the NTSB 
to the FAA in order to address the “controller lack-of-response” concern. This analysis 
classified the NTSB safety recommendations that were issued in order to solve this 
concern depending on the nature of change they requested. The analysis identified three 
areas of change: (i) human machine interface design, (ii) procedure, and (iii) nuisance 
reduction.  
1. Human Machine Interface (HMI) design. This area of change includes 5 requested 
changes (RC), corresponding to 10 safety recommendations, which demanded 
changes to be made to the alarm design to improve its visual and audio presentation 
to air traffic controllers. In particular, the NTSB issued the following requested 
changes: 
 One requested change, RC1, aimed at improving the informativeness of the 
MSAW aural alert. This change was motivated by the fact that the MSAW aural 
alert was identical to that of another alarm, the conflict alert or CA—an alarm 
system intended to warn controllers of the risk of mid-air collisions6 (MACs). Thus, 
the same aural tone could signify the risk of a CFIT or that of a MAC. For this 
reason the NTSB wanted to differentiate the aural alerts of the two alarms; 
 One requested change, RC2, aimed at making the MSAW flashing rate more 
visually appealing compared to that of the data block—the block appearing on 
the radar display containing flight’s alphanumerical information—during transfer 
between different sectors; 
                                                          
6 The CA is in fact the US equivalent of the Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA), which is used in Europe. 
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 Two requested changes, RC3 and RC4, aimed at decreasing the exposure to alerts 
generated by other working positions in the same control room. In particular, RC3 
aimed to direct the alarm only to the controller with direct control of the aircraft 
that activated the MSAW; RC4 included the request to incorporate an alarm 
inhibition function, so to silence MSAW alerts activated by other working 
positons; 
 One final requested change, RC5, requesting the total redesign of the HMI to 
make the alert more attention capturing. In the fifth and final safety 
recommendation letter reporting on the lack-of-response concern, the NTSB 
questioned the ability of the entire MSAW alerting method to reliably capture the 
attention of air traffic controllers.  
2. Procedure. This area of change includes two corrective changes—RC6 and RC7, 
corresponding to two safety recommendations—that demanded the FAA changes to 
existing procedures to improve the controller’s response to the MSAW. RC6 asked the 
FAA to include the shift supervisor in the alerting loop, so as to ensure that whenever 
the MSAW was activated s/he could intervene to ensure that that the relevant 
controller responded appropriately. RC7 demanded regulatory changes to make it 
mandatory for air traffic controllers to transmit the MSAW alerts to the relevant pilot 
whenever the aural alert was heard. 
3. Nuisance alert reduction. This area of change consists of one requested change, RC8—
corresponding to one safety recommendation that asked the FAA to reduce the rate 
of unwarranted nuisance alerts in control centres, because the NTSB had noted that 
controllers were exposed to such alerts on a routine basis. 
The matrix reported in Table 10 provides a chronological overview of (i) the areas of 
change and (ii) the changes requested by the NTSB to address the lack-of-response 
problem. The matrix distributes the NTSB requested changes, grouped by area of change, 
across the five safety recommendation letters in which they were issued. The cells in the 
matrix show the identifier of the safety recommendation that carried a given change. 
Identifiers in bold signal safety recommendations that have triggered a non-
implementation rationale on the part of the FAA. 
The matrix shows that the first area of change, “HMI design”, is both (i) the older and (ii) 
the denser area of change. Safety recommendations belonging to this area were issued 
first in 1981 (n=2), then in 1984 (n=1), in 1990 (n=3), in 1997 (3), and lastly in 2006 (n=1). 
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This makes a total of 10 safety recommendations (=77% of the total) issued by the NTSB 
in relation to this area of change. The “HMI design” area is followed by the second 
improvement area, “Procedure”, which includes two corrective actions issued in 1984 and 
1997 by means of two safety recommendations (=15%). The third area, “nuisance alert 
reduction”, is instead the sparser and younger area, including only one requested change 
issued by means of one safety recommendation in 2006. As an intermediate conclusion, 
it can be said that, over the period 1981–2006, the NTSB viewed the “controller lack-of-
response” concern mostly as an issue of improving the HMI Design and the procedural 
response to the MSAW. It is in 2006, that the NTSB considered the importance of tackling 
the problem of nuisance alerts as a stand-alone problem. 
Table 10. Matrix of the changes requested by the NTSB to the FAA.  
NTSB Safety  
Recommendation Letters 
1rst,   
Oct 6,  
1981 
2nd,  
Aug 13, 
1984 
3rd,  
Sept 28, 
1990 
4th,  
Apr 16, 
1997 
5th, July 
12, 
2006 
Areas of 
Change 
Requested Change  
(RC) 
     
1. HMI 
Design 
 
 
 
1. Disambiguate 
between  MSAW and 
CA aural alerts 
A-81-134* A-84-83 A-90-161 - - 
2. Make MSAW 
flashing at a higher 
rate than the data 
block during transfer 
A-81-135 - A-90-163 A-97-25 - 
3. Direct MSAW aural 
alarm to the relevant 
controller only 
Included 
under 
A-81-134 
Included 
under  
A-84-83 
A-90-162 A-97-26 - 
4. Include possibility to 
inhibit the alarm 
- - - A-97-26 - 
5.  Completely 
redesign MSAW 
alerting method 
- - - - A-06-44 
2. Procedure 
 6. Include supervisor in 
the alerting loop 
- - - A-97-27 - 
7. Amend regulations  
to make mandatory the 
transmission of MSAW 
alert to pilots 
- A-84-84 - - - 
3. Nuisance 
Alert 
reduction 
8. Reduce exposure to 
nuisance alerts 
- - - - A-06-45 
LEGEND 
Identifiers in the cells correspond to safety recommendations; 
*= Safety recommendations in bold have been dismissed by the FAA. 
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Also, the matrix suggests that the first and second areas of change, i.e., “HMI design” and 
“Procedure”, include some changes that were resisted by the FAA. In particular, the FAA 
expressed a non-implementation rationale for RC1, “Disambiguate between the MSAW 
and the CA aural alert”, and RC7, “Amend regulations to mandate the transmission of 
MSAW alert to the pilot”. The different positions of the NTSB and the FAA regarding these 
changes are qualitatively analysed in the next section. They contain important insights for 
the understanding of the history of the nuisance alert problem. 
5.3.3. Coding Framework 1.3 and 1.4: analysis of the contrasted changes 
This section reports on the NTSB’s and FAA’s positions regarding the two contested 
changes, mandated by the NTSB to solve the “controllers’ lack of response” concern, that 
were not accepted by the FAA, namely RC1 and RC7. 
5.3.3.1. RC1: Disambiguate between the MSAW and CA aural alerts  
The NTSB issued three times a request to have two different aural alert tones to be used 
for the MSAW and the CA. Since 1981, the NTSB noted that the same aural alert was used 
for signalling two different risks, CFIT and MAC. This change was issued in 1981 as safety 
recommendation A-81-134; in 1984 as A-84-83; and then in 1990 as A-90-161 (see Table 
11).  Following each of these requests, a written exchange between the two agencies 
ensued, in which the FAA stated (and restated) its non-implementation rationale for the 
change in question, and the NTSB restated the importance of implementing it. The 
respective rationales of the two agencies identified in the analysis are summarised in 
Table 12 and explained in the following two sections.  
Table 11. Safety recommendations containing the request to differentiate between the MSAW and CA aural 
alerts: for each recommendation, the table reports the NTSB safety letter in which the recommendation was 
made, and the ensuing letters exchanged by the NTSB and FAA. 
Safety 
recommendation 
Issued in NTSB safety 
recommendation letter: 
Ensuing letters exchanged between the 
FAA and NTSB 
A-81-134 A-81-132 through -138, 
Oct 6, 1981 
(1)   FAA Letter Dec 21, 1981 
(2)   NTSB letter  July 8, 1982 
(3)  FAA Letter  Sept 1, 1982 
(4)  NTSB Letter March 8, 83 
A-84-83 A-84-82 through -84,  
Aug 13, 84 
(1)  FAA Letter Jan 18, 1985 
(2)  NTSB July 1, 1985 
(3)  FAA Letter Aug 26, 85 
(4)  NTSB Letter Jan 24, 1986 
A-90-161 A-90-161 through -163,  (1)  FAA letter Jan 18, 91 
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Oct 29, 1990 (2)  NTSB letter May 20, 1991 
(3)  FAA letter Dec 28, 1992 
(4)  NTSB letter April 16, 93 
 
Table 12. Coding framework 1.3: summary of the NTSB’s and FAA’s positions over NTSB Requested Change 1. 
NTSB 
Rationale 
FAA 
Non-implementation rationale 
1-Controllers are continually exposed to 
CA and MSAW nuisance alerts; 
2-This continued exposure conditions 
them to frequently dismiss the alarm; 
3-However, this may result in the 
controller ignoring a reliable MSAW 
alarm; 
4-A perceptual reinforcement of the 
alarm signal is needed to better attract 
the controller’s attention. 
1-There is no need to differentiate between 
the CA and MSAW aural alarms; 
2-The aural alarm serves as an attention 
getter or general warning: it means “scan the 
display”; 
3-The controller does not have to take a 
control action based on the aural alert alone; 
4-The visual alert serves as a specific 
warning. 
NTSB’s position: reinforcing the alarm’s ability to attract controllers’ attention 
The NTSB maintained that controllers’ response to the MSAW could be improved by 
differentiating the MSAW and CA aural tones: the two alarms used to have the same aural 
tone, in fact, and were presented in an operational environment filled with nuisance or 
unnecessary alarms, which conditioned controllers to ignore aural warnings; as a result, 
modifying the HMI design in order to disambiguate between MSAW and CA aural tones—
i.e., making them more representative of the specific hazard they denote—was seen as a 
necessary improvement to  increase the alarms’ potential to attract controllers’ attention. 
The NTSB’s acknowledgment of the over-exposure to nuisance alarms, the consequential 
controller’s habituation and desensitisation, and the need to change the MSAW design so 
as to make the aural alarm more informative can be found in several passages: 
“This situation and the others mentioned above [common tone and 
sources for LA and CA, and alarms which have their origin in another 
controller’s airspace] result in repetitive alerts which, in turn, 
condition the controller to dismiss the alarms or alerts! (i.e., “the cry” 
wolf syndrome).” (NTSB, 1981, p. 73) 
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“It is a basic precept of psychology and human engineering that the 
ability of a stimulus to elicit a response (in this case, the ability of a 
warning tone to get controllers’ attention) is reduced when the 
stimulus is habitually presented without a reinforcement.2/ 
Reinforcement for a controller would be the acquisition of useful 
information from an aural alarm. In other words, when a controller is 
continually subjected to nuisance alarms, i.e., those that are 
perceived as useless or distracting, he/she will pay progressively less 
attention to it.” (NTSB, 1984, p. 5). 
Both of these to passages emphasise the desensitization resulting from over-exposure to 
nuisance alerts; however, they both lack a clear indication of which system is responsible 
for generating nuisance alerts. It could in fact be the MSAW, the CA or even another 
system. A more specific reference to the nuisance-generating alarm can be found in other 
passages.  For instance in a letter issued in 1984, the system held responsible for the 
majority of nuisance alarm is the CA: 
“According to the supervisor, “a great majority of the time the thing 
goes off [the CA] and you really don’t pay attention to it 98 percent 
of the time.” Unfortunately, when a controller ignores the aural 
alarm, he may be ignoring a warning from the MSAW system, rather 
than a conflict alert.” (NTSB, 1984, p. 5) 
In this passage, the NTSB essentially attributes the occurrence of nuisance alerts to the 
CA. Furthermore, it concludes that, as both the CA and MSAW have the same generic aural 
alarm, desensitisation to the former means desensitization to the latter. In 1990, the 
problem of nuisance alerts is linked not just to the CA but to the MSAW also: 
“The Safety Broad believes that continued exposure to repetitive 
alerts was at least partially responsible for the delayed action to the 
conflict alert by the Washington F1 controller…Of all [low] altitude 
and conflict alerts received in a typical facility, very few actually 
require intervention by any one controller. As a result, controllers 
become conditioned by repetitive aural alarms, many of which are 
not critical.” (NTSB, 1990, p. 5) 
To summarise, the NTSB’s request to differentiate between the CA and MSAW aural tones 
seems to be justified by the need to enhance the presentation of the aural signal. Such an 
enhancement would increase the perceptual salience of both alerts. In other words, it 
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would have captured more effectively way the attention of controllers that were 
conditioned to ignore alerts due to their frequent exposure to nuisance alerts.  
Intrinsic in these considerations is the fact that the NTSB acknowledged the problem of 
nuisance alerts earlier than 2006—the year in which the first safety recommendation 
addressing this problem was issued (§ 5.3.2 ). However, before that year the problem is 
seen as a justification for a design change, i.e., disambiguating the MSAW and the CA aural 
alerts, rather than as the basis for a safety recommendation mandating the reduction of 
nuisance alerts.  
FAA’ position: audio alarm serving as attention getter only 
The FAA did not concur with the idea that separate aural alarms were needed for the 
MSAW and CA. All the three times it received this NTSB’s request, the FAA stated that the 
MSAW and CA aural alerts did not need to be differentiated because this would not 
improve air traffic controllers’ response to the alarm. By looking at the passages of FAA’s 
response letters to A-81-134, A-84-83, and A-90-161, the following to FAA’s reasons were 
identified. 
First, to the FAA the aural alert warning served as an attention getter only. In other words, 
the agency saw the alarm signal as serving the sole purpose of directing the controllers’ 
attention towards the radar display—rather than triggering a controller action, i.e., 
transmitting the alarm to the pilot. This is evident in the following passages: 
“We do not conclude that separate alarms are needed for the low 
altitude and conflict alerts. We believe that audio alarms represent a 
general warning or attention getter… The controller does not take 
control action based on the audio alarm… The alarm or the alarms 
mean the same thing, scan the display.” (FAA letter dated 21, 
December 1981) 
“As previously noted, the aural alarm represents a general warning 
or “attention getter” (statement repeated in FAA letters dated 18th 
January 1985 (FAA, 1985a) and 26 August 1985 (FAA, 1985c).)    
“The aural alert represents a general warning by identifying an 
aircraft involved in a potentially unsafe situation, and it requires 
controllers immediate attention.” (FAA letter dated 18 January 1991) 
Second, the FAA justifies the point above—limiting the function of the audio alert to that 
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of an “attention getter”—on the basis that it is the visual alert that shows the specific 
nature of the imminent threat, i.e., MAC or CFIT.  And, as the visual alert is available on 
the radar display, it is here that controllers have to look at, after hearing the aural alert, 
to check the actual nature of the hazard: 
“The blinking alphanumeric represents the specific warning. It 
identifies the aircraft involved and the nature of the problem.”(FAA 
letters dated 18th Jan 1985) 
“The blinking alphanumeric represents the specific warning. It 
identifies the aircraft involved and the nature of the problem, i.e., low 
altitude or alert or conflict alert. Either situation requires the 
controller’s immediate attention.” (FAA letters dated 26 August 1985) 
To summarise, the FAA did not see the need to disambiguate the MSAW and CA aural 
alarms. To the agency the aural alarm served the sole purpose of informing the controllers 
that an event of interest has occurred that requires immediate verification—on the radar 
display—of the  involved aircraft and of the type and extent of the hazard. No control 
action can be taken based on the aural alert alone. The FAA, in essence, saw the aural and 
visual alerts as occurring at two separate stages of a predefined alerting sequence: first, 
the aural alert attracts the controller’s attention; second, the visual alert informs the 
controller of the type and the nature of the danger. From this perspective, providing more 
information by means of the aural alert would have not improved controllers’ response 
to the alarm as they still had to check the nature of the problem on the radar display. 
Also, it can be noted that in maintaining this position the FAA seems not to address the 
nuisance alert problem: no-mention has been found in the reviewed FAA letters about 
this problem (see Table 11). The response letters of the FAA appear to address only the 
adequacy of the NTSB requested change—audio alarm differentiation—, but did not 
comment on the problem justifying this change. 
5.3.3.2. RC7: Amend existing regulations to make mandatory the 
transmission of MSAW alert to the pilot 
In 1984, by means of safety recommendation A-84-84, the NTSB requested the FAA to 
amend the procedure contained in air traffic control Handbook 7110.65C, paragraph 33 
to require that controllers transmit immediately a low altitude alert to any aircraft under 
their control that has activated the MSAW. This request was issued following the analysis 
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of a sequence of incidents in which nine aircraft—while approaching Washington National 
Airport, Washington, D.C—descended below the altitude expected for the approach. 
The recommendation letter carrying A-84-84 was followed by an exchange of 
correspondence letters between the FAA and the NTSB (see Table 13): on the one hand 
the FAA stated (and restated) its non-implementation rationale for the change demanded 
by A-84-84; on the other the NTSB restated the importance of implementing it. The 
respective rationales of the two agencies identified by the analysis are summarized in 
Table 14 and explained in the next two sections.  
Table 13. Safety recommendation requesting FAA to modify existing regulations to make MSAW alarm 
transmission obligatory for controllers. The table reports the related NTSB safety letter and the ensuing letters 
exchanged between NTSB and FAA. 
Safety 
Recommendation 
issued in NTSB safety 
recommendation letter: 
ensuing letters exchanged between 
FAA and NTSB 
A-84-84 A-84-82 through -84, 
Aug 13, 84 
(1)   FAA letter Jan 18, 85 
(2)   NTSB letter July 1, 1985 
(3)  FAA letter Aug 26, 85 
(4)  NTSB letter Jan 24, 1986 
 
Table 14. Summary of the NTSB’s and FAA’s positions over RC7. 
NTSB 
Rationale 
FAA 
Non-implementation rationale 
1-Under existing provisions (Handbook 
7110.65D), the controller has the 
authority to judge the reliability of the 
alarm; 
2-However, controllers may (mistakenly) 
fail to pass a reliable alert to pilots; 
3-MSAW activation is a definite indicator 
of unsafe proximity to the ground; 
4-As soon as the MSAW alert is 
triggered, controller should not be called 
to make a judgment to airplane safety, 
but transmit the alert to the concerned 
pilot; 
5-It the pilot who has the responsibility to 
establish safety, not the controller. 
1-Existing procedures were intently 
designed to let the controller to determine 
actual aircraft safety prior to issuing the 
alert; 
2-When alerted, the controller needs to 
glance at the visual display prior to 
delivering the alert; 
3-To issue an alert in an uncompromising 
situation could only desensitize pilots to 
MSAW alerts.  
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NTSB Position: the transmission of the alert should be mandatory for the air traffic 
controller 
The NTSB rationale for requesting A-84-84 is that controllers should not have the 
authority to assess the extent of the hazard and decide on whether the alarm had to be 
transmitted to the pilot—they should pass the alarm to the flying crew as soon as this was 
generated.  
In the text of the concerned safety recommendation letter NTSB observed that existing 
regulations give controllers the option to judge on the appropriateness of a low altitude 
alert before transmitting it to the pilots: 
“The FAA’s Air Traffic Control Handbook, 7110.65C, paragraph 33, 
provides guidance to air traffic controllers to: “issue a safety advisory 
to an aircraft if you are aware the aircraft is at an altitude which, in 
your judgment, places it in safe proximity to terrain, obstruction, or 
other aircraft”. Note 2 in paragraph 33 states in part, “recognition of 
situations of unsafe proximity may result from MSAW…” However, 
the Safety Board was given to understand that the phrase, “in your 
judgment,” gives the controller the option, once the airplane has been 
identified on the BRITE display, to look at the aircraft from the tower 
cab and form a judgment concerning the aircraft’s safety. If in the 
controller’s judgment the airplane is a safe distance from 
obstructions and terrain, the controller may elect not to issue a low 
altitude alert.” (NTSB, 1984, p. 6) 
To NTSB, this FAA’s provision could jeopardize the protective function of the MSAW: the 
controller may fail, in fact, to pass a reliable alert to the aircrew. Thus, to the NTSB 
controllers should not have the authority to judge on the validity of the alert, but, as soon 
as an alert is received, they should inform the pilot immediately: 
“The Safety Board is concerned that the provision of paragraph 33 
can lead a controller to nullifying the intent and objective of the 
MSAW system which is to alert a pilot then his airplane at an unsafe 
altitude……The NTSB believes [MSAW] activation parameters are 
definitive indications of unsafe proximity to terrain, and the controller 
should not be called upon to make a judgment with regard to an 
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airplane’s safety…The controller should immediately inform a flight 
crew of the activation of a low altitude alert, and any decisions 
concerning the airplane’s safety should be made in the cockpit.” 
(NTSB, 1984, p. 7) 
The ideas that (i) the authority to judge on MSAW reliability should stay with the pilot and 
that (ii) the controller should pass the alarm immediately to the concerned crew are 
further confirmed in the following two NTSB letters. In particular, the second letter 
confirms that the assessment of the extent of the hazard, and the need to take corrective 
actions, should stay with the pilot: 
“We note that the FAA disagrees with this recommendation 
…[Existing] procedures give the controller the authority to evaluate 
the extent of the hazard and to pass the warning to the pilot only if 
he thinks it is necessary. There is a danger of airplanes being 
inadvertently flown into ground obstructions…Pilots need to be 
warned when they fly below the minimum safe altitude and 
controllers, when prompted by the MSAW alerting device, should be 
required to inform the pilot of the undue proximity to the ground or 
an obstacle immediately.” (NTSB, 1985) 
“..FAA again has disagreed with this recommendation and is of the 
view that the procedures contained in the Revised Handbook 
7110.65D, Section 1, 2-6, adequately address appropriate controller 
action in issuing low altitude alerts. These procedures give the 
controller the authority to evaluate the extent of the hazard and to 
pass the warning to the pilot only if he thinks it is necessary. We 
maintain that the controller should be required to advise the pilot of 
the hazard, and that the pilot should then be responsible for assessing 
the situation and taking appropriate action.”(NTSB, 1986)  
To summarise, NTSB maintained that (1) the controller should not have the authority to 
judge on the appropriateness of the MSAW alarm; (2) alerts generated by the MSAW are 
reliable; (3) as soon as generated they should be passed readily to the pilot; and that (4) 
it is the pilot who has the responsibility to assess the extent of the hazard—and take 
corrective actions if necessary—and not the controller. 
It can be noted that this set of assumptions contrasts in part with the ideas expressed by 
the NTSB in relation to RC1. In particular the assert n. 2—the idea that alerts generated 
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by the MSAW are reliable—contradicts the assertion—discussed in relation to C1—that 
the MSAW generated several nuisance alarms. The alarm could not be reliable and 
unreliable at the same time. 
FAA Position: authority on the Controller 
The FAA did not concur with the request to make mandatory the transmission of the alert 
to aircrew for controllers. To the FAA controllers should retain the authority to judge 
whether to pass the alarm to the pilot. This is evident in the following passage, which 
appeared both in the first FAA response letter to A-84-84 (FAA, 1985b), and the second 
letter (FAA, 1985c): 
“PRESENT HANDBOOK PROCEDURES WERE DESIGNED TO ALLOW A 
CONTROLLER TO VISUALLY SCAN TO AN AIRCRAFT'S POSITION AND 
DETERMINE IF THE AIRCRAFT IS CLEAR OF OR SAFELY AVOIDING 
TERRAIN OR OBSTACLES. WHEN ALERTED, A CONTROLLER IN THE CAB 
NEEDS ONLY TO GLANCE AT THE POSITION OF AN AIRCRAFT TO MAKE 
A DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO ISSUE AN ALERT. WHEN THE 
POSITION OF THE AIRCRAFT CANNOT BE DETERMINED VISUALLY, AN 
ALERT IS BROADCAST TO THE AIRCRAFT. TO ISSUE AN ALERT TO AN 
AIRCRAFT IN A NONCOMPROMISING SITUATION COULD EFFECTIVELY 
DILUTE THE URGENCY OF THE MESSAGE.” (FAA, 1985b)(FAA, 1985d)  
Overall, the passage suggests that the FAA’s rationale against A-84-84 can be summarized 
by the following two points: 
 First, controllers’ judgment is needed to assess whether an MSAW alert has to be 
passed to the aircraft or not to the concerned aircraft. The first three rows of this 
passage make it clear that the regulation in question is intently designed so to 
ensure that controllers, when alerted, should first check the specific aircraft on 
the radar display, and then they should decide whether to transmit the alarm to 
pilots. In short, controllers should have the authority to decide whether to pass 
the alert to the pilot. 
 Second, doing otherwise—i.e., passing any alert unconditionally to the flying 
crew—, would risk desensitizing the flying crew to low altitude alerts provides by 
air traffic controllers. In other words, the FAA seems to imply that controllers 
should play a filtering role: their judgment is needed to prevent transmitting 
unreliable alerts to aircrew.  
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 SECOND-LEVEL CODING RESULTS:  ORGANISATIONAL 
PRECURSORS IDENTIFICATION  
It is now important to elaborate on what these findings mean for the objective of the 
research, i.e., the development of the theoretical framework of organisational precursors 
to HAI issues. In particular, the case seems to suggest that the management of a HAI issue 
appears to depend on the organisational assumptions driving automation improvement. 
By this, it is meant the assumptions held by the organisation about (i) the specific HAI 
issue and (ii) the role of the automated system in the operational environment—i.e., how 
the system is to be used by the intended user. These assumptions seems to drive the 
decisions about how the problems with the system in question can be addressed. The 
next two sections will justify this conclusion based on the evidence resulting from the first-
level coding cycles exposed in the previous section. In particular: 
 Section 5.4.1 will summarize the history of the nuisance alert, more specifically, 
how the nuisance alert problem was viewed by the NTSB over the analysed 
period;  
 Section 5.4.2 will describe the two underling and contrasting views of the alarm 
role held by the NTSB and FAA.  
5.4.1. History of the nuisance alert problem in the studied context 
The interpretation of even a relatively simple HAI issue like a nuisance alert is not 
straightforward in complex, high-consequence organisations. Organisations may develop 
different views about the specific hazard and develop their response accordingly. To 
support this point it is useful to review the main aspects of the history of the nuisance 
alert problem that have emerged from the analysis presented in the previous section. 
1. First, the evidence collected in this study shows that the MSAW-related nuisance alert 
problem could not be analysed as an individual problem, as expected at the beginning 
of the study: its trajectory was strictly related to what has been classified as the 
“controller lack-of-response” concern, i.e., the tendency by controllers to neglect a 
reliable alert generated by the MSAW. The first, initial analysis (§ 5.3.1) suggested this 
latter was the main concern that the NTSB noticed regarding the use of the alarm, as 
this concerned recurred across five safety letters. At the same time the issue of 
nuisance alerts appeared to be debated as a sub-item in the context of this concern. 
In particular, it was considered as a contributory cause to this concern together with 
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issues in the areas of alarm HMI design and response procedures, as shown by the 
evidence presented under section 5.3.2. 
2. Second, the first NTSB safety recommendation addressing the nuisance alert problem 
was issued in 2006, after nearly thirty years of operational life of the alarm (§ 5.3.2). 
Up to that year the majority of the NTSB efforts to address the lack-of-response 
problem focused on requesting changes directed (i) at modifying the MSAW HMI 
design (10 safety recommendations=77%) and (ii) the procedure defining the 
response to the alert (2 safety recommendations=15%)—both areas encountering 
some resistance by the FAA. It is in 2006 that the NTSB acknowledged the (primary) 
contributory role of the nuisance alert to the lack-of-response problem.  
3. From a safety perspective, this finding is somewhat surprising because it would 
suggest that the NTSB neglected the nuisance alert problem up to that year. However, 
the subsequent analysis of the specific changes contrasted by the FAA (§ 5.3.3) 
showed this was not the case:  
o NTSB’s mentions of the problem were found in 1981, 1984, and 1990; 
however, in these years the problem was not translated in a corresponding 
nuisance-alert specific safety recommendation. It was mentioned, instead, as 
a justification for another change to the FAA: disambiguating between the 
MSAW and CA aural alerts (i.e., RC1). This was the case because to the NTSB, 
this design change would have increased the ability of the aural alerts of both 
systems to attract the attention of controllers towards the specific risk the 
alarms were intended to avoid. The reason was that controllers were found 
to be exposed to nuisance alerts on continual basis, and a more salient aural 
alert would have been more attention capturing.  
o In turn RC1 received a negative response by the FAA. To the latter, 
differentiating the aural alerts would have not enhanced the alerting 
sequence envisaged for the MSAW (and the CA): both the MSAW and CA aural 
alerts functioned only as attention grabber; it was the visual alert—displayed 
on the radar display—that provided information about the type and the entity 
of the danger. In short, when hearing the aural alert (general alert), 
controllers had then to check the visual alert (informative alert). To the FAA 
this envisaged alerting sequence would have not been improved by a more 
informative aural alert: after hearing it, the controller’s check of the visual 
alert was still needed.  
Chapter 5. Study 1 results  
 99 
 
4. It has to be noted that the NTSB (i) recognition of existence of the nuisance alert 
problem, noted in relation to RC1 (mentioned here above), contrasts with the 
recognition of (ii) the MSAW as a reliable system, noted by the agency in relation to 
RC7. This latter assumption was used as part of the argument which justified the NTSB 
request to change existing regulations in order to make more mandatory for 
controllers the transmission of the alert to the pilot (§ 5.3.3.2). The two positions 
seems incompatible because the same system, in principle, cannot be both seen as 
reliable and an unreliable at the same time.  
To summarise, up to 2006 two main findings have emerged with the history of the 
nuisance alert: first, the problem of nuisance alert was known, however not seen as an 
individual target for improvement by the NTSB, but as a justification for a change—
disambiguating between the MSAW and CA aural alert alerts—aimed at solving another 
problem, the “controllers’ lack of response” concern. This was the main issue with the 
MSAW (according to the NTSB), not the nuisance alert. In turn, this change turned out to 
be highly contrasted by the FAA.  
Second, the NTSB seemed to maintain a contradicting position about the nuisance alert 
problem: while recognizing it as a justification for RC1, the agency appeared to neglect it 
in order to justify RC7. With the available data, it is not possible to explain this 
contradiction and why and how the NTSB came to realise the importance of treating the 
nuisance alert problem a standalone problem. However, for the broader objective of the 
thesis—the development of a framework of organisational precursors to HAI issues—the 
history of the nuisance alert problem in the US is important because it shows that 
interpreting the significance of a HAI issue is not necessarily an easy endeavour in safety-
critical service provider organisations. While the nature and the significance of the 
problem may be relatively simple when seen from the perspective of the front-end 
practitioners that uses the concerned automated system, for stakeholders at higher 
organisational levels the same problem may turn into an ambiguous (and contrasted) 
issue—as it happened in the case reported here.  
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5.4.2. Organisational assumptions about the role of the alarm 
It can be noted that the behaviours of the NTSB and the FAA analysed in the previous 
section are grounded on two different views of the alarm role, i.e., views about the way 
the alarm was intended to function and to be responded by the air traffic controller. The 
two agencies mandated (and resisted) some changes to the MSAW that were consistent 
with two diverse underlying views of alarm role. In particular, the NTSB viewed the alarm 
as a hazard resolver; the FAA, as an attention director. These two conflicting views are 
summarized in Table 15, and are described in the following sub-sections. 
Table 15. Contrasting views regarding the role of the MSAW held by the NTSB and the FAA. References 
(included in brackets) refer back to the tables of Study 1 in which the particular category was identified. 
 NTSB FAA 
Emerging 
views of the 
alarm 
 
Hazard resolver 
 
Attention director 
Reliability 
of the 
MSAW 
-The alarm is reliable, it is a 
definite indicator of an unsafe 
situation (Table 14, NTSB #3) 
-The alarm reliability needs to be 
verified by the controller (Table 14, 
FAA #1) 
The aural 
alarm 
means 
-Deliver the alert to pilot 
(Table 14, NTSB #4) 
-Avoiding doing so would risk 
failing to pass a reliable 
alarm (Table 14, NTSB #2) 
 
-Scan the visual display (to check 
involved aircraft, type and severity of 
the danger) (Table 12, FAA #2) 
-No control action can be taken 
based on the aural alert alone 
(Table 12, FAA #3)  
Authority -It is the pilot—not the 
controller—who has the 
authority to judge the 
reliability of the alarm 
(Table 14, NTSB #5) 
-The controller can judge whether 
the alert has to be passed or not to 
the pilot (Table 14, FAA #1) 
 
 
5.4.2.1. NTSB: viewing the MSAW as a “hazard resolver” 
The NTSB appeared to view the alarm as a hazard resolver—i.e., an alarm system whose 
purpose is to direct the controller’s attention towards the implementation of a prescribed 
response. This statement is grounded on the observation that the NTSB maintained that 
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upon presentations of the alert signal, there should be no assessment of the alarmed 
situation by the controller; the controller had to pass the alarm immediately to the pilot. 
This position finds support in the following evidence:  
 First, the analysis of the NTSB rationale behind RC7. That analysis showed that the 
idea of leaving no authority to the controllers was mentioned explicitly by the 
NTSB (§ 5.3.3.2);  
 Second, the observation of the intent of the two requested changes falling under 
the procedure area of change (§5.3.2). Both RC6 Amending regulations to 
mandate the transmission of MSAW alerts to pilot), and RC7 Include supervisors 
in the alerting loop, aimed at making more constraining for controllers the NTSB’s 
prescribed response to the alarm. In embedding this intent, both changes were 
consistent with the idea that no authority should be left to the controller in 
responding to the MSAW.  
5.4.2.2. FAA: viewing the alarm as an “attention director” 
The FAA opposed to the NTSB its own view of the MSAW role, i.e., that of an attention 
director. In other words the FAA viewed the MSAW as a system that directs the 
controller’s attention towards the assessment of a hazardous situation; if the situation is 
deemed to be hazardous then the response procedure can be activated. In this view of 
alarm, the controller has the authority to judge on the reliability of the alert. This position 
has emerged from the following evidence: 
 First, by the analysis of the FAA’s non-implementation rationale for RC1. This 
analysis concluded that to the FAA the aural and visual alarm had each a specific 
function: the former, warning the controller of a general hazard and informing 
her/him to scan the computer screen; the latter, providing information on the 
specific hazard (§ 5.3.3.1).  
 Second, by the analysis of the FAA’s non-implementation rationale for RC7. This 
analysis concluded that, according to the FAA, the judgment by the controllers on 
MSAW reliability is necessary in order to avoid passing unreliable alerts to pilots 
(§ 5.3.3.2).  
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 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has reported the first empirical study of this thesis, which has inquired into 
the history of the nuisance alert problem related to the MSAW system in the US. As a 
result of this process the study has identified one category of organisational precursor to 
HAI issues in complex, safety-critical service provider organisations: OP1: The 
organisational assumption driving automation improvement. This organisational 
precursor includes the views held by the organisation about the alarm role and the HAI 
issue itself. In identifying this precursor, the chapter has identified the first category of 
the emerging OPHAII framework, as shown in bold in Table 16. The same table also 
anticipates the precursors that will emerge in the next chapter (these are indicated in 
shaded grey). 
Table 16. The initial version of the OPHAII framework, as resulting from this study.  
OP1: ORGANISATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS DRIVING AUTOMATION 
IMPROVEMENT 
 - View of the alarm’s role 
 - View of the HAI issue  
OP2: ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITY FOR HANDLING HAI ISSUES 
 - Parameterisation process 
 - Positive attitude towards air traffic controller’s involvement  
 - Supporting software tools and organisational roles 
OP3: CONTROL OVER IMPLEMENTATION QUALITY AT THE BOUNDARY 
BETWEEN THE SERVICE PROVIDER AND THE SOFTWARE MANUFACTURER  
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 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION  
The case study reported in the previous chapter has provided the first step in the 
development of the emerging framework of organisational precursors to HAI issues that 
this thesis aims to deliver. The present chapter continues this development path by 
shifting the attention to the European context of MSAW implementation. The study 
consists of a retrospective investigation into the historical trajectory of the MSAW-related 
nuisance alert problem within the organisational and implementation contexts of two 
selected air navigation service providers, or ANSPs. The development of this dual-case 
study is based on interviews, observations and documentary sources. Compared with the 
previous chapter, the present study focuses more on the organisational dynamics, 
processes, and decisions internal to the organisation having direct command and control 
over the MSAW implementation and operation. The chapter is organized as follows: 
 Section 6.2 provides on background information useful for the understanding of 
the case; 
 Section 6.3 presents the case-specific findings, i.e., it reports on the categories 
identified within the two studied organisations, which capture organisational 
conditions and events relevant for the handling of the nuisance alert problem; 
 Section 6.4 links the previous section’s findings to the objective of the thesis—the 
development of a qualitative framework of the organisational precursors to HAI 
issues. In particular, this section compares these organisation specific findings for 
the purpose of integrating and subsuming them under the broader categories of 
organisational precursors these findings stand for. As a result of this process, the 
section provides an expanded and updated version of the emerging OPHAII 
framework. 
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 BACKGROUND 
The MSAW has been introduced in the European Air Traffic Management (ATM) system 
in the mid-1990s, nearly twenty years after its introduction in the US. As noted in section 
4.3.3, in the European ATM system the MSAW is considered as part of a class of 
applications called ground based safety nets. These are warning systems available to 
controllers to warn them about an imminent risk to flight safety.  
Together with other safety nets, the MSAW has become a safety priority in the EU ATM 
system following the occurrence of two accidents involving commercial airliners that 
happened in Europe in the early 2000. The first one involved a mid-air collision between 
a cargo jet and a civilian passenger aircraft occurred over the Lake Costanza in 2001 (BFU, 
2004). The second one, directly relevant for the MSAW, involved a CFIT in 2001, in which 
a civilian airliner impacted high terrain whilst attempting to perform a missed approach 
procedure at Zurich airport, in Switzerland (AAIB, 2001). These accidents highlighted 
problems with the effectiveness of ground based safety nets as implemented and 
operated by ANSPs at that time. For some of these ANSPs, the MSAW triggered too many 
alerts resulting from poor parameterisation of the terrain database, which translated into 
poor acceptance of the tool by air traffic controllers. To address this situation, 
EUROCONTROL, the European Agency for the Safety of Air Navigation, established a task 
force concerned with improving the efficacy of MSAW implementations in Europe. This 
group, called SPIN, launched in 2004 a fact findings reviews across Europe, and since 2005 
has promoted the development of specifications of guidance material for MSAW and 
other safety nets.  
It must be noted that, compared to the US, the European context of MSAW 
implementation is a highly fragmented one. Although required to comply with ICAO 
international standards and EASA regulations, different European countries have their 
own ANSP, their own civil aviation authority, and their own accident investigation agency. 
Furthermore ANSPs can purchase their systems from different software manufacturers. 
So local state MSAW implementations and safety management practices might differ 
greatly from country to country. This difference is further exacerbated considering the 
entrance in Europe of former Russian states since 2000. Overall, this highly fragmented 
institutional context appears to be a fertile ground in which to investigate organisational 
precursors to problematic HAI. This chapter investigates the organisational dynamics of 
two European ANSPs to explore how they handled the “nuisance alert problem” related 
to their MSAW system.  
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 FIRST-LEVEL CODING RESULTS: ORGANISATION  SPECIFIC 
FINDINGS  
This section reports the organisation or case specific findings of this study, which resulted 
from the first-level coding (see § 4.5.2.1). Such organisation specific findings consist of 
categories that capture organisational events and decisions that influenced the 
management of the MSAW and the problem of nuisance alert within Alphasky and 
Deltasky respectively. Table 17 offers a summary of these organisation specific categories. 
Alphasky related categories are identified by the letter “A”; Deltasky ones, by the letter 
“D”. The remainder of this section describes these categories; the next section compares 
and integrates them in order to extract broader theoretical categories of organisational 
precursors. 
Table 17. Summary of the categories identified in the Alphasky and Deltasky cases. (For examples of lower 
level codes and quotations see Table 9.) 
Case 1: Alphasky Case 2: Deltasky 
A1. Having an operational need for 
introducing the MSAW 
A2. Clarifying the operational role of the 
MSAW 
A3 Recognising the problem of Nuisance 
alert 
A4. Parameterisation process; 
A5. Valuing controllers involvement 
A6. Supporting software tool and 
structure of roles 
A7. Specifying MSAW requirements to 
the manufacturer 
D1. Lacking clarity about the operational 
need for having the MSAW implemented 
D2. Lacking clarity about the operational role 
of the MSAW 
D3. Purchasing the system in the absence of 
specified requirements 
D4. Manufacturer providing a sub-optimal 
alarm 
D5. Realising the nuisance alarm problem 
after implementation 
D6. Realising the need for importing 
parameterisation expertise 
6.3.1. Alphasky practices 
At Alphasky controllers reported to have a positive attitude towards the MSAW. They 
found it useful in detecting situations in which approaching pilots mistakenly understood 
to descent to a flight level lower than the one intended and communicated by the 
controller. Also, the alarm was reported to be useful in periods of high cognitive workload, 
when managing high levels of traffic. In these situations the MSAW can help the controller 
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to readily spot on a cluttered radar display an aircraft that is descending too low. The 
positive attitude of Alphasky controllers towards the MSAW can be explained by looking 
at the way the nuisance alert problem has been managed within this organisation. 
A1. Having an operational need for introducing the MSAW 
Alphasky had an explicit safety purpose for introducing the MSAW. Senior management 
decided to adopt the alarm in 1993 as CFIT mitigation measure. The driver for adoption 
was the need to respond to a safety recommendation issued by the national accident 
investigation agency (of the country in which Alphasky operates) following the 
investigation of a CFIT occurred in the early 1990s. In this instance, a civilian airliner, an 
Airbus A320, crashed into a mountain while performing the approach descent to its 
destination airport under low visibility conditions. This accident was the last in a series of 
three major aviation disasters involving commercial aviation aircraft impacting terrain 
during the final approach phase. The safety recommendation in question demanded that: 
“...a particular effort [has] to be made as soon as possible [by 
Alphasky] to complete the design and implementation by air traffic 
control services of a ground based system for detection of an aircraft 
in dangerous proximity to terrain, whenever technically possible.”  
From this point onwards, Alphasky senior management regarded the introduction of the 
MSAW as a high priority safety action. The initial plan was to have the system operational 
in approach control centres by the end of 1995.  
A2. Clarifying the operational role of the MSAW 
At the time the decision to introduce the MSAW was taken, the alarm was not novel to 
the organisation. Alphasky had initiated the development of MSAW operational 
requirements in 1988, based on a survey of operational personnel and consultation with 
accident investigators. Based on the consideration of the US experience with the alarm, it 
was noted that MSAW could be implemented either as either (i) a hazard resolver, with 
the MSAW signal transmitted readily to the pilot by the controller, without intermediate 
controller assessment of the severity of the situation and the reliability of the alarm; or as 
(ii) an attention director, with the warning signal to be assessed by the controller prior to 
being transmitted to the pilot. Eventually Alphasky opted to implement the system as a 
hazard resolver. This is reflected in the following passages taken from an Alphasky’s 
documentary source:  
 “[Alphasky] has chosen to develop a reliable system in which all 
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alerts are justified, and which should entail no situational analysis 
work by the controller, but rather a reflex action informing the 
aircraft concerned...” (Alphasky documentary source) 
In establishing this goal, also the organisation acknowledged that: 
“The appearance of a large number of false alerts and undesirable 
alerts can be a factor in a certain dilution of controller vigilance and 
reduced confidence in the system, which in the end means that he 
controller-system structure no longer correctly provides the collision 
avoidance alert service.” (Alphasky documentary source) 
A3. Recognizing the problem of nuisance Alert prior to implementation 
These passages reflect Alphasky’s intent to implement a MSAW alert that was reliable 
from an air traffic controller perspective, so that s/he could transmit it readily to the flying 
crew without any intermediate situation assessment. Alphasky seemed to recognise the 
threat posed by frequent nuisance alerts to the MSAW protective potential: if exposed to 
this condition controllers would have lost confidence on the MSAW signal. Such a view 
over the MSAW role lives in the organisational measures established within Alphasky to 
control and mitigate the nuisance alert problem. 
A4. Parameterisation process 
The presence of a formalized and repeatable MSAW parameterisation process is arguably 
the most visible organisational response developed by Alphasky against the MSAW 
nuisance alarm problem. Such a process is repeated every time MSAW implementation at 
a new site begins, and falls within the responsibility of the Alphasky internal Design and 
Validation team.  
This parameterisation process entails three main phases. In the first phase, a sample of 
live air traffic data from the selected site is recorded, and subsequently this is fed into an 
initial MSAW configuration. This first configuration usually generates a high number of 
nuisance alerts both for the final approach path in the proximity of the airport and in the 
terminal area. So, the MSAW engineer can play with MSAW algorithm and inhibit areas 
to maximise the warning time while reducing the nuisance alert rate. The use of a sample 
of recorded real traffic data, instead of automatically generated traffic, is deemed very 
important in ensuring tuning reliability—i.e., minimising the risk of missing relevant 
conflict points while reducing the rate of nuisance alerts. 
After a first MSAW configuration is defined, the MSAW is installed on the local site. This 
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system is then fed with real time air traffic data although it is not yet broadcast to 
controllers. This phase allows for further refinement of the initial MSAW parameters and 
inhibition area. Such refinements were not possible using the recorded data alone. This 
phase terminates when the rate of false alerts reaches the threshold of one-per-day.  
The third stage consists of operational on-site testing. Here, the MSAW is broadcast to air 
traffic controllers; however, the alert is not transmitted to the pilots until the system 
performance is considered acceptable from the perspective of the controllers involved in 
parameterisation. 
A5. Positive attitude towards air traffic controllers’ involvement 
The process makes use of input from selected controllers permanently allocated to the 
safety net domain, who have several years of operational experience combined with 
knowledge of the technical decisions involved in parameterizing the MSAW. Their 
judgment is needed to advise engineers about which MSAW alerts are relevant from an 
end-user perspective.  
In a typical engineer-expert controller consultation, the engineer and the controller sit 
together in front of a chart displaying the final approach segment, as well as the MSAW 
alerts generated by the aircraft tracks that have descended along this path over a given 
period of time. Some alerts might be on, some above, some below such path. The expert 
controller provides his/her best guess about which of these alerts are important from an 
operational perspective. This allows the engineer to classify which alert is (i) necessary, 
i.e., “the situation involves a serious deviation below the safety altitude”; is (ii) desirable, 
i.e., “although there was not a serious deviation below safe altitude, an alert would have 
been useful in drawing the attention of the controller to the situation”; or is (iii) 
unnecessary, i.e., “the alert is a genuine nuisance”. In turn, the engineer can further fine-
tune the shape of inhibition areas, the gradient of glide slopes, and the setup of MSAW 
parameters to ensure that unnecessary alerts do not get displayed to pilots.  
It can be noted that the frequency of these consultations and the length of the 
implementation process are not based on a fixed formula but depend on the terrain 
topography and the traffic volumes specific to the site where a new system has to be 
implemented. The more complex the terrain topography, the more the demand placed 
on the set up of the grid; the smaller the traffic flow, the longer the time needed to collect 
a statistically representative traffic sample of approaching aircraft. (For instance, these 
two conditions are typical of small airports located in mountainous regions, for which 
parameterisation might take up to two years.) 
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A6. Supporting software tools and organisational roles 
Since the decision to adopt the system was made, one of Alphasky priorities was to have 
in place a demonstrator able to visualize the alert on a radar display and tools for 
recording, flight path analysis and statistics. Such a demonstrator was installed at 
Alphasky R&D facilities in 1993, and in the first implementation site in 1995, to provide an 
infrastructure for checking and improving MSAW performances. By means of the 
demonstrator MSAW alerts could be checked for aspects such as their reliability, 
efficiency, and operational acceptability. 
In addition to the demonstrator, other supporting software tools are available at local site 
level to monitor/improve the MSAW performances. A software tool has been built that 
allows refinement of the MSAW inhibition areas. This tool allows the safety net engineer 
to specify the geographic coordinates and the height of the areas in proximity of the 
airport in which the MSAW alerts have to be inhibited. Such coordinates are then passed 
to the Validation and Design team that can approve and implement the required change. 
This passage is needed as local airport engineers do not have the authority to modify the 
operational MSAW. Other software for retrospective safety analysis has been found 
within the quality of service department. This application has a database of site-specific 
incidents, whenever an incident is selected, it shows a top and a side view of the traffic 
situation being analysed complete with recordings of the conversations between pilots 
and controllers. Although not specifically built for the MSAW, this application has been 
modified to permit the replay of MSAW warnings and other safety nets. This is particularly 
helpful to investigate those events in which aircraft lost separation from terrain, so as to 
understand why it happened, who were the responsible actors involved, and what was 
the role of the MSAW in that particular incident. 
According to the interviewed staff, organisational arrangements at national level ensure 
a focus on constant MSAW monitoring and improvement. In addition to the Design and 
Validation team, and the controllers involved in parameterisation, Alphasky has in fact 
created the role of a national safety net leader who ensures visibility of the safety nets 
issues to senior management and ensures that appropriate funding and staffing are 
allocated to MSAW and other safety nets.  
A7. Specifying requirements to the manufacturer 
The development and implementation effort of Alphasky MSAW involved a joint effort 
between Alphasky and its national manufacturer. Since the decision to adopt the system 
was taken, this manufacturer has supplied the earlier demonstrator and other tools 
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needed to parameterize the experimental MSAW. Also, the manufacturer has developed 
the operational MSAW based on the requirements specified by Alphasky’s Design and 
Validation team. Today, this manufacturer improves the system regularly based on the 
requirements specified by the Design and Validation team. These are based on the issues 
with the alarm and other safety nets collected from the different air traffic control centres 
in which the alarm is implemented. Having described the practices through which 
Alphasky handles the problem of the MSAW-related nuisance alerts, the next section will 
move to the description of the conditions found within the second organisation studied, 
Deltasky. 
6.3.2. Deltasky practices 
At the time of the site visits Deltasky was found to have no MSAW system installed. This 
ANSP implemented the alarm in 2004 and had to remove it due to the excessive rate of 
nuisance alerts it triggered. Controllers reported that the alarm used to go off for almost 
every single aircraft engaged in the final approach phase; therefore, the alarm was 
interfering with their ongoing practices and they requested senior management to turn it 
off. Within one month of operation, the MSAW was removed from operations. The 
following narrative reports on the organisational decisions and conditions that, while 
accompanying the first MSAW implementation in Deltasky, also seem to explain how the 
organisation inadvertently induced the nuisance alert problem. 
D1. Lacking clarity about the operational need for introducing the MSAW 
Deltasky acquired and installed the MSAW as a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) system 
in 2004. The driver for adoption was modernization, although not of the MSAW 
specifically but of the major software infrastructure and physical facilities. This ANSP 
operated legacy systems nearly ten years older compared to industry standards. The main 
problem was the lack of reliability of aging radar and flight data processing systems that 
caused breakage and interruptions of air traffic service on a nearly daily basis. As stated 
by the project manager managing the modernization programme:  
“Our burning issue was to have a stable [radar processing and flight 
data] system. The old one was unstable, dying in our hands virtually… 
So, our burning issue was to have stable system based on a new pc 
platform and flat displays, good flight plan processing… We did not 
have any external driver for implementing MSAW and other safety 
nets; we needed to catch up with industry standards.” (Deltasky 
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project manager) 
Because the replacement of the radar and flight data processing systems was the “burning 
issue”, Deltasky focused on specifying their requirements, selecting a software 
manufacturer that could supply them. At the same time, other top priority areas of change 
running in parallel included the refurbishing of the approach and en-route control room 
facilities, and the civil engineering work needed to build and furbish a new control tower. 
These were the priorities within Deltasky at the time the MSAW was adopted, rather than 
the adoption of the MSAW or other safety nets per se. This is reflected in the following 
passage: 
 “The main focus was on the implementation of the new systems to 
get a higher level of flight data processing capability. We knew pretty 
well the level of automation that was needed. On the other hand, 
safety nets were a side dish, we had very little knowledge of them, 
and they were just a little feature that was offered by 
***[manufacturer’s name omitted] as a part of a larger system. Also, 
we were not aware of the necessity of having safety nets. This is 
reflected in the way we parameterised safety nets later on.” (Deltasky 
project manager) 
D2. Lacking clarity about the operational role of the MSAW 
In addition to highlighting the areas receiving most of Deltasky attention, the third last 
row of the previous transcript (“Also we were not aware of the necessity of having safety 
nets”) captures the limited knowledge of safety net purpose and the need for having them 
implemented within the Deltasky at the time of MSAW adoption. This is indeed supported 
by other passages from the interviews conducted:  
“They were just new kids on the block, my knowledge of the MSAW 
was limited to what was specified in ICAO standards. It is through the 
participation in SPIN we learned that the sole purpose of MSAW was 
CFIT protection.” (Deltasky project manager) 
“We saw the MSAW just as a minor technical system, something like, 
something that controllers would have barely noticed. We did not 
imagine the mess lying ahead with all the nuisance alerts and the 
need to parameterize the system.” (Deltasky engineer) 
The expressions our participants used to describe the MSAW (and other safety nets)—i.e., 
Chapter 6. Study 2 results  
 
 112 
 
“side dish”, “little feature”, “new kids on the block”, “minor technical system”—render (i) 
the perceived uncertainty about the purpose of this system; (ii) the belief that this was 
nearly “transparent” to the air traffic controllers, i.e., its introduction brought no impact 
on the practices of the end-user; and (iii) the belief that it was a relatively simple system 
if compared to the larger software systems that were being purchased. 
D3. Purchasing the system in the absence of specified requirements 
The above mind-set is evident in the decision to adopt the MSAW, which was taken after 
the software manufacturer proposed to include the alarm as an added feature to the 
larger software package under acquisition. While accepting this system, it was reported 
that only the acronym of “MSAW” appeared in the contract signed with the 
manufacturer—no specification of system and parameterisation requirements were 
provided. In other words, the system was purchased as a commodity or black box. The 
underlying assumption was that the manufacturer possessed the competence needed to 
implement the alarm autonomously, i.e., with no input from the ANSP side. The 
manufacturer had been selected among one of the best in the industry, in fact, and its 
ability to implement a system of relatively low complexity was not questioned.  
D4. Manufacturer providing a sub-optimal alarm 
In retrospect, it emerged that neither the ANSP nor the manufacturer was fully aware of 
the trade-offs involved in setting up MSAW parameters and the terrain database. The 
manufacturer re-used a terrain database that Deltasky requested for another (weather-
related) function. This latter function was well-known within Deltasky, so that, at the time 
of purchasing, both the needed HMI features and, in particular, the terrain database were 
specified for this function. In turn, the manufacturer developed a digital version of this 
grid into the radar system based to the specifications provided by Deltasky; however, it 
also proposed to re-use the same grid also for the MSAW, assuming that this was 
appropriate. Eventually, while the specified grid served well its intended function, its units 
were far too large for the alarm: 
“The engineers of *** [manufacturer’s name omitted] deemed the 
[specified] grid to be okay. However, when we started using it we 
realised it was so unrefined. If you cannot refine your warning altitude 
to distinguish between an aircraft that is on a correct course of 
approach from one that is not, then you have a nuisance.” (Deltasky 
IT engineer) 
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D5. Realising the nuisance alert problem after implementation  
With no rationale and no requirements specified by the service provider for MSAW 
parameterisation, and the parameterisation process left to the manufacturer, the quality 
of the alarm appeared to reflect more the software vendor view than that of air traffic 
controller’s operational needs. When the system went operational it generated a high 
rate of nuisance alerts that most controllers considered disruptive. This was also the stage 
at which management realised the problem: 
“It was when the manufacturer had packed its suitcase and gone that 
we realised we did not have access to system functions, the 
knowledge, the tools, and the competence to do the remaining 
implementation process on our own.” (Deltasky project manager) 
D6. Realising the need for importing parameterisation expertise 
The passage above highlights the difficulty perceived within Deltasky about improving its 
MSAW after the “departure” of the manufacturer. After the manufacturer had fulfilled its 
contractual obligations, the ANSP did not have an in-house specific team or people with 
experience in MSAW parameterisation to improve the system. During the 
implementation, the ANSP personnel were not trained regarding the functionalities and 
the parameters of the implemented system as this was not part of the contract. Hence, 
internal ANSP’s engineers were just at the beginning of a steep learning curve. Facing 
these difficulties, Deltasky removed the alarm from operation after its first troubled 
implementation, and, at the time of data collection, was collaborating with another 
software manufacturer in order to implement a new set of safety nets.  
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 SECOND-LEVEL CODING RESULTS:  ORGANISATIONAL 
PRECURSORS IDENTIFICATION 
The previous section has reported the organisational experiences of implementing and 
managing the MSAW systems found in two European ANSPs: a successful case, Alphasky, 
and a less successful one, Deltasky. That section identified the components of these 
experiences, i.e., organisational events, dynamics, and interactions associated with the 
best-in-class and problematic management of the nuisance alert problem. The present 
section reports on the results of the cross-case analysis of these components (see also § 
4.5.2.2). This analysis has explored if and how the categories identified could be subsumed 
under broader theoretical categories of organisational precursors to HAI issues. As a result 
of this analytical step the following theoretical categories of organisational precursors 
have emerged: 
 OP1: Organisational assumptions driving implementation and improvement; 
 OP2: Organisational capabilities for handling HAI issues; 
 OP3: Control over implementation at the boundary between the service provider 
and the software manufacturer. 
The matrix in Table 18 shows how the case-specific categories connect to these three 
theoretical categories. These categories are presented in the remainder of this section.  
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Table 18. Organisational precursors to HAI issues resulting from the cross-case analysis. 
 Alphasky categories Deltasky categories 
OP1. Organisational assumptions driving automation implementation and 
improvement 
 A1. Having an explicit operational 
need for introducing the MSAW; 
A2. Clarifying the operational role of 
the MSAW;  
A3. Recognising the role of the 
nuisance alarm  problem prior to 
implementation; 
D1. Lacking clarity about the operational 
need for introducing the MSAW; 
D2. Lacking clarity about the operational 
role of the MSAW; 
D5. Realising the nuisance alert problem 
after implementation; 
OP2. Organisational capability for handling nuisance alarms 
 A4. Parameterisation process; 
A5. Positive attitude towards 
controllers’ involvement; 
A6. Supporting software tools & 
organisational roles; 
D6. Realising the need for importing 
parameterisation expertise; 
OP3. Control over implementation quality at the boundary between the service 
provider and the software manufacturer 
 A7. Specifying MSAW requirements 
to the manufacturer.  
D3. Purchasing the system in the absence 
of specified MSAW requirements. 
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6.4.1. OP1. Organisational assumptions driving implementation and 
improvement  
This theoretical category refers to the assumptions that organisational members hold 
with regard the automated system to be implemented, of how the system has to be used, 
and the range of potential accompanying HAI issues. In an ideal situation the organisation 
mobilizes resources to the clarification and specification of the role of the automated tool 
to be introduced, of why it is needed, of how it will be used by the human operator, of 
what are the (main) HAI issues. Specifically to Alphasky, three categories have emerged 
from the first-level coding in support of this precursor: 
 A1. Having an explicit operational need motivating the introduction of the MSAW; 
 A2. Clarifying the role of what an MSAW system is; 
 A3. Acknowledging the problem of the nuisance alerts.  
On the negative side, an organisation may commit to adoption of an automated system 
without exploring and defining the role of the system. In other words it may treat it as a 
relatively unproblematic “black box”. This mind set can blind the organisation to the 
intricacies of automation implementation; in particular it can blind the organisation to the 
range of undesirable HAI issues associated to the introduction of the automated system. 
In turn, these may become evident after the system has entered into service. Specifically 
to Deltasky the following dynamics have emerged in support of this pattern: 
 D1. Lacking an operational need for adopting the MSAW; 
 D2. Lacking clarity about the operational role of the MSAW; 
 D5. Realising the nuisance alert problem after implementation. 
Note that the definition of organisational assumptions formulated here relates to and 
expands the results of the previous chapter. Also in that case (the US MSAW) it was 
concluded that the organisational assumptions about the role of the automated alarm 
and the accompanying HAI issues seem a relevant organisational precursors to HAI issues, 
as it was the NTSB’s and the FAA’s organisational assumptions that drove the responses 
of the two agencies to the problems identified with the MSAW. Thus both studies appear 
to converge on the idea that the human-centeredness of technology operated by 
practitioners at the sharp-end may depend on the views that senior management and 
other stakeholders at the blunt end hold about the technology. This behind-the-scene 
view can influence the (lack of) mitigation of a HAI issue both before the automated 
system is introduced in the operational environment—i.e., at the time of implementation 
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(Study 2)—and after system introduction—i.e., during the post-implementation phase 
(Study 1).  
6.4.2. OP2. Organisational capability for handling HAI issues 
The handling of an HAI issue seems dependent on the availability of a specific 
organisational capability within the organisation introducing the automated system. By 
“organisational capability” it is meant the ensemble of the practices—i.e., what the 
organisation does—that allows the organisation to cope with the demands introduced by 
automation. The view of capabilities defined here builds on the notion of organisational 
capability found in the innovation and business literature. For instance, to Leonard-
Barton, an organisational capability includes “the system of activities, physical systems, 
skills, and knowledge bases, managerial systems of education and reward, and values that 
create a special advantage for a company or line of business." (Leonard-Barton, 1998). To 
Prahalad and Hamel, a capability encompasses the "bundle of skills and technologies that 
enable the company to provide a particular benefit to custumers" (Prahalad & Hamel, 
1990). To Leinwan and Mainardi, a capability identifies the organisation ability to “reliably 
and consistently deliver a predefined output, something that “is ensured through the 
combination of processes, tools, knowledge, skills, and organisation, all focused on 
meeting the desired result" (Leinwand & Mainardi, 2010). None of these definitions of 
organisational capability are defined in relation to HAI management in complex, high risk 
organisations. Regardless of their differences, these definitions capture the intrinsic 
systemic essence of an organisational a capability: a capability is something that the 
organisation does over time by means of distinct, although interrelated, components.  
In this specific study, the components of such a capability include the availability of a 
repeatable parameterisation process, of tools supporting this processes, of deference 
toward the involvement of the end-user, and of a dedicated supporting structure of roles. 
Such components seem important in order to ensure that a HAI issue receives appropriate 
mitigation and control actions by the concerned organisation. The case of Alphasky 
provides evidence in support of this idea. Consistently with its defined view of the alarm, 
Alphasky had directed resources towards the implementation of that view and the 
mitigation of the main threat to it, i.e., the frequent generation of nuisance alerts. In 
particular the following categories were identified within Alphasky: 
 A4. Parameterisation process;  
 A5. Positive attitude towards air traffic controllers’ involvement;  
 A6. Supporting software tools and organisational roles.  
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On the other hand, Deltasky was not found to possess such a handling capability when it 
adopted the MSAW alarm. Due to its lack of clarity about the role of MSAW in operation, 
this organisation appeared to lack sensitivity to the problem of parameterizing the alarm 
to its own terrain conditions at the time of adoption. It is only when the alarm became 
operational that senior management realised the need to import capabilities that were 
available outside of the organisation: during the purchasing and implementation of the 
system, no specific training was provided to Deltasky engineers for parameterizing the 
system (see D6. Realising the need for importing parameterisation expertise). To 
summarize, the findings of Study 2 suggest that the understanding of a specific HAI issue 
appears to require the consideration of the organisational capability which have been 
established for managing this issue. 
6.4.3. OP3. Control over implementation quality at the boundary 
between the service provider and the software manufacturer 
The two theoretical categories of organisational precursors previously identified, OP1 and 
OP2, point, essentially, at organisational dynamics that are internal to the organisation. 
The third category presented here, instead, points at the unfolding relationship between 
the software manufacturer and the organisation at the time the system is purchased and 
implemented. From the collected evidence, it emerged that neither Alphasky nor Deltasky 
developed the system in-house, but contracted out its implementation. They appeared to 
differ, however, in the way they managed the quality of the automated alarm 
implementation at the boundary between the service provider and the software 
manufacturer. By control over the implementation quality it is meant the type of 
mechanisms that the service provider adopts to ensure that the quality of the supplied 
system, as provided by the software manufacturer, is fit for its own, specific operational 
environment (Kern & Willcocks, 2001). As suggested by research on information system 
outsourcing, such controls may come in a variety of forms—e.g., project plans, contract 
forms, peer pressure, etc. (Kirsch, Sambamurthy, Ko, & Purvis, 2002)—and establishing 
appropriate controls is one of the main challenge for the purchasing organisations. In the 
present case two basic types of controls have emerged, which seems to influence the 
quality of the alarm implementation. 
 Requirement based. On the one hand a service provider can recur to the formal 
specification of the outcome, i.e., system requirements. The analysis of the 
Alphasky case, the best in class implementer, indicated that this service provider 
has an internal team responsible for the collection, the specification, and the 
transmission of the requirements to the software manufacturer (see A7. 
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Specifying system requirements to the manufacturer). By means of the specified 
requirements, the organisation is able to effectively being provided with the 
system they specify for their operational system; 
 Trust based. On the other hand, failing to see the complexity of system 
implementation while trusting the software manufacturer may result in leaving 
the quality of implementation to the latter. After deciding to implement the 
MSAW after this was proposed by the manufacturer, Deltasky did not specify the 
requirements of the alarm to the manufacturer in the initial contract, as the 
manufacturer was trusted because of its reputation (see D3. Purchasing the 
system in absence of specified MSAW requirements). However, it is generally 
acknowledged that in the absence of adequate outcome controls such as system 
requirements, other means need to be in place to ensure that the manufacturer, 
the controlee, will act in the best interest of the controller, the service provider. 
Failing to do so risks leaving the organisation purchasing the system with an 
implementation reflecting more the manufacturer view of implementation than 
the client side. The case of Deltasky seems to confirm this general pattern: the 
absence of formal controls over the alarm implementation at the service 
provider-software manufacture boundary resulted, in fact, on the provision of a 
suboptimal system—in that specific case a system with a terrain grid specified for 
another function (see case category D4. Manufacturer providing a sub-optimal 
alarm). 
Overall, the difference observed between Alphasky and Deltasky regarding their 
interaction with their respective manufacturers, and, in particular, the problematic 
outcome of the trust based approach observed in the Deltasky case suggest that the 
control over implementation quality at the service provider-software manufacturer 
boundary is an organisational dynamic that one has to consider to understand the quality 
of human automation interaction of an operational system. The broader implication is not 
that all trust based form of control necessarily result in the poor implementation of a 
supplied safety-critical alarm system. But, indeed, the collected evidence points at the 
potential risk associated with this approach—this approach may inadvertently result in a 
suboptimal implementation quality, something that is not realised by the purchasing 
company until the operational system is implemented and when the manufacturer has 
completed its contractual duties.  
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 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has presented the second empirical study of this thesis. The study examined  
the organisational experiences of (mis) managing the issue of the MSAW-related nuisance 
alerts during the implementation and operation of the MSAW within two European 
ANSPs. In particular the chapter has looked at how these two organisations have handled 
the problem of the MSAW-related nuisance alerts. The chapter has contributed to OPHAII 
development by: 
 Further supporting the importance of OP1: Organisational assumptions driving 
automation implementation and improvement as a precursor to the management 
of HAI issues. This theoretical category was already identified at the end of Study 
1 (chapter 5), and it has received further support by the evidence collected in this 
study;  
 Identifying two additional relevant theoretical categories of organisational 
precursors, namely: OP2: Organisational capability for handling HAI issues, and 
OP3: Control over implementation quality at the boundary between the service 
provider and the software manufacturer. 
The updated version of the OPHAII framework resulting from this study is presented in 
Table 19. What remains to be done is to assess the validity and generalisability of the 
framework. This is undertaken in the following chapter. 
Table 19. The updated version of OPHAII based on the findings of Study 2. While OP1 has remained unchanged, 
two more categories of precursors (OP2 and OP3) have been identified. 
OP1: ORGANISATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS DRIVING AUTOMATION 
IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPROVEMENT 
 - View of the alarm’s role 
 - View of the HAI issue 
OP2: ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITY FOR HANDLING HAI ISSUES 
 - Parameterisation process 
 - Positive attitude towards air traffic controllers’ involvement  
 - Supporting software tools and organisational roles 
OP3: CONTROL OF IMPLEMENTATION QUALITY AT THE BOUNDARY 
BETWEEN THE SERVICE PROVIDER AND THE SOFTWARE MANUFACTURER 
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 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
The present chapter reports the results of the third and final empirical study of the thesis: 
a subject matter expert (SME) study aimed at refining and expanding the initial version of 
the OPHAII framework, which emerged from the previous two studies. The study 
subjected the definitions of the theoretical categories of precursors identified to the 
criticism of a sample of 11 subject matter experts (SMEs), defined as individuals with 
professional experience in the implementation and management of the MSAW and other 
safety nets.  
The study aimed to explore the SMEs’reactions to the framework. It was anticipated that, 
if the categories of organisational precursors identified resonated with real life situations 
experienced by these experts, they would prompt triggered comments and criticism, 
which in turn would have clarified, refined and expanded the categories of the framework. 
The chapter is organised as follows: 
 Section 7.2 presents the results of the study; 
 Section 7.3 discusses the implications of the findings of this study for the 
emerging framework.  
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 RESULTS 
The SMEs’ feedback was collected by means of a group discussion and an individual 
questionnaire (see § 4.4.3). At the start of the group discussion, the participating experts 
were given an introductory presentation about the framework and its categories of 
precursors, as resulting from Studies 1 and 2. At the end of the presentation they were 
administered an individual questionnaire, which they were asked to return via e-mail after 
the meeting. These data were then coded to identify corroboratory categories, i.e., data 
segments that captured relevant ideas, opinions, attitudes, and analogous situations 
mentioned by the experts. This process (§ 4.5.3) led to the identification of 11 
corroboratory categories, as reported in Table 20. These are described in the following 
three sub-sections. 
Table 20. Study 3: list of the corroboratory categories emerged in relation to the three categories of 
organisational precursors of the OPHAII framework. 
 
CORROBORATORY CATEGORIES RELATIVE TO OP1 
- OP1.1: Senior management tendency to overlook safety nets intricacies 
- OP1.2: Missing conceptual link between safety and safety nets 
- OP1.3: Safety nets used for purposes other than the intended one 
- OP1.4: Developing a correct understanding of safety nets 
CORROBORATORY CATEGORIES RELATIVE TO OP2 
- OP2.1: Positive attitude towards air traffic controllers’ involvement 
o Establishing mechanisms for collecting controllers’ feedback  
o Failing to establish adequate mechanisms 
o Sources of lack of reporting 
- Report not triggering corrective actions 
- Inhibiting command and control culture 
- Blaming controllers for safety nets problem 
- OP2.2: Senior management support to the safety net domain 
o Important to ensure long term sustained organizational focus over the 
domain of safety nets and the accompanying problems 
o Promoting the development and retention of expertise 
o Promoting awareness of safety net’s role within the organisation 
- OP2.3: Safety nets team 
o Safety nets team components 
o Essential to ensure coordination 
o Small ANSPs lacking the resources to have a dedicated safety nets team 
- OP2.4: Safety nets specific performance framework 
o Useful for monitoring data 
o Important for defining reference values 
o Needs to be safety nets specific 
CORROBORATORY CATEGORIES RELATIVE TO OP3 
- OP3.1: Patterns common to other less successful implementation contexts 
- OP3.2: Patterns affecting also large ANSPs 
- OP3.3: Working closely with the manufacturer to avoid the problem 
o Formal requirements specification  
o Difficult for ANSPs to define safety nets requirements in absence of expertise 
o Framing implementation in the context of a continuous relationship 
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The three subsections follow the same structure in order to make it clear how the 
corroboratory categories impact each organisational precursor. Each section provides:  
1. A brief description of the initial definition of the organisational precursor, as 
resulting from the previous chapter; 
2. The presentation of the actual results of Study 3, namely the corroboratory 
categories that have emerged from the study; 
3. A discussion of the implications the corroboratory categories have for the 
organisational precursor. 
7.2.1. SME feedback on OP1: Organisational Assumptions Driving 
Automation Implementation And Improvement  
This precursor captures the fact that the management of HAI issues may depend on the 
assumptions that service provider personnel holds about the role of the alert and 
purpose, and the HAI issue itself (§ 6.4.1). The way these organisational members think 
about safety nets is important because it can shape the way they conceive and implement 
them. The following list reports the corroboratory categories emerged in relation to OP1: 
these capture the reactions of the SMEs that have been triggered by this initial definition 
of the framework. 
1. Senior management tendency to overlook safety nets intricacies. The SMEs 
confirmed to have experienced situations in which safety nets have been regarded by 
senior management and personal engaged in their implementation as relatively 
simple systems, essentially IT systems which require software expertise only for their 
implementation (SME3; SME7).  
“Also today, safety nets, despite their names, tend to be viewed as 
minor systems, as something that has to be dealt with by the IT 
engineer” (SME7).  
The consequence of this thinking is that the definitions and meaning of the system 
may not be elaborated by developers and management prior to its implementation 
(SME4; SME6). The organisation, in turn, may remain blind to the range of issues that 
the alarm may bring in the field of practice.  
2. Missing conceptual link between safety and safety nets. Further illustrating the 
vagueness that may accompany the introduction of safety nets, three experts (who 
have been involved in past safety nets implementation in five ANSPs) remarked that 
although the label of “safety nets” would suggest an intrinsic and very strong 
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conceptual link with safety, for some providers this link was not necessarily 
established, e.g.:  
“From our experience safety nets were unfortunately not that 
important in the past… one of the problem is that it was not even 
clear the relationship between safety nets and safety, (and also today 
this relationship is not [always] clear).” (SME4) 
“If you call a system ‘safety net’ it is normal to expect this system to 
bring some improvement in the area of safety; however, it is not 
uncommon to fail to associate safety nets to safety for ANSPs not 
familiar with these systems.” (SME6) 
Given the available data is not possible to further clarify the way in which this 
conceptual link can be (mis) construed by practitioners. Arguably, this may reflect the 
fact that service providers have as a mission the provision of air traffic services. The 
implementation of new systems is something that adds on the top of this mission; 
therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the organisation allocates relatively limited 
resources to exploring the meaning that the specific system may have in the 
organisational context. 
3. Safety nets used for purposes other than the intended one. To further stress the 
vagueness about safety nets role and purpose, it was reported that safety nets, in 
some service providers, were used for purposes different than the officially intended 
one. Two providers, for instance, were reported to have used the STCA not as a safety 
net but as a control aid or decision support tool: controllers used the alarm to check 
whether a possible change in flight level would have triggered an alert (SME2; SME5; 
SME7), when in fact safety nets should be used as a warning only—i.e., warning that 
some predefined threshold conditions have been exceeded. A third provider was 
reported to have claimed on its web site to have achieved a gain in traffic capacity 
after having installed safety nets, despite such a claim contradicted the intended 
purpose of safety nets, which is risk avoidance, and not production increase. 
It was reported that situations such as these were observed especially when safety 
nets were first introduced in the European Air Traffic Management system, in the 
early 90s. At that time, their role was only minimally defined by international 
standards, and this contributed to the relative uncertainty about their purpose and 
role (SME2; SME4; SME10). SMEs’ widespread conviction was that this situation 
began to improve in 2005, when EUROCONTROL established the SPIN network 
(already mentioned in § 6.2). 
4. Developing a correct understanding of safety nets. The SMEs supported the idea that 
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senior management understanding of safety nets role is important to ensure that 
resources are activated and directed towards the safety nets domain. In general, best 
in class implementers allocate an initial time period to explore and clarify the purpose 
of the safety net to be introduced. This implies conducting, as a minimum, activities 
such as gaining understanding of how these systems have been implemented 
elsewhere, specifying the requirements of the systems, and conducting a cost benefit 
analysis. One expert noted that some ANSPs—which went through this process and 
eventually come to the conclusion that the safety nets were not needed in their 
operational context—may have a clearer understanding of the purposes of safety nets 
than other ANSPs that have adopted these systems without familiarising first with 
them (SME2). 
7.2.1.1. Implications for OP1 
The initial definition of OP1 appeared to resonate with the professional experience of the 
SMEs involved in this study. This initial definition evoked, in fact, analogous professional 
situations the experts have experienced in the past, in which they have observed this 
precursor at play. The SMEs confirmed to have experienced (1) situations in which senior 
management committed to implement safety nets without looking into their intricacies; 
(2) situations in which the conceptual link between safety and safety nets was missing; 
and (3) situations in which safety nets were used for purposes other than the intended 
one. Also, they confirmed that (4) the development of a correct understanding of the role 
of safety nets is an important part in the introduction of these systems. In conclusion, the 
feedback collected in relation to OP1 tends to reinforce the confidence on the definition 
of this precursor, as formulated at the end of the previous chapter. Overall, this feedback 
adds corroboratory support to the idea that the way organisational personnel at the blunt 
end think about automation influences the way automation and the accompanying HAI 
issues are managed.  
Table 21. Evolution of OP1 as a result of Study 3: this category and its sub-items have remained unchanged.  
OP1: ORGANISATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS 
DRIVING AUTOMATION IMPLEMENTATION 
AND IMPROVEMENT (Study 2) 
 - Assumptions about the system’s 
role 
 - Assumptions about the HAI issue  
 
OP1: ORGANISATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS 
DRIVING AUTOMATION IMPLEMENTATION 
AND IMPROVEMENT (Study 3) 
 - Assumptions about the system’s 
role 
 - Assumptions about the HAI issue  
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7.2.2. SME feedback on OP2: Organisational capabilitY for handling HAI   
This theoretical category suggests that the handling of HAI issues requires the presence 
of a focused organisational capability—this capability including a specific process, the 
valuing of end-users ‘involvement, i.e., the controllers, the availability of supporting 
software tools and organisational roles (§ 6.4.2).  
Positive attitude towards air traffic controllers’ involvement 
The experts seemed supportive of the idea that valuing the involvement of the end-user—
the air traffic controller—is an important precursor to the correct implementation of 
safety nets. To support this point, they noted that best in class implementers do not limit 
end-user involvement to the pre-implementation phase of the safety net lifecycle, but 
extend it also to operation—the phase in which safety nets become available in the 
control room. In other words, the consideration given to the end-user perspective is 
reflected also in the way service providers establish mechanisms for collecting 
systematically air traffic controllers’ feedback related to operational safety nets after they 
enter operation.  
This should not be taken for granted, as some providers essentially may lack effective 
reporting arrangements. Experts, in particular, stated that organisational contexts can 
inhibit controllers’ reporting of known safety nets related problems. This may be due to 
one or a combination of the following conditions: 
1. Reports not triggering corrective actions. One expert (SME2) reported a service 
provider in which controllers were asked to provide a written report of each 
unwanted, missing or late safety net alert. However, such reports remained 
unaddressed by management, and after an initial period, the controllers eventually 
stopped reporting, as they began to view this activity as an additional and 
unnecessary activity. On the other hand, management interpreted the lack of 
reporting as a sign that the safety nets were successfully tuned, and that no 
improvement action was needed.  
2. Hierarchical command and control culture. Also, controllers’ reporting could also be 
inhibited by the hierarchical culture that might be found in some ANSPs. Such a 
culture may inhibit open discussions about safety nets issues without approval from 
the relevant leaders. This is especially true for people external to the organisation. 
This observation was made by a consultant with experience in safety net 
implementation in several countries. 
3. Blaming controllers for safety net problems. Finally, it was mentioned that senior 
management might interpret nuisance alerts as an indication of poor controller’s 
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performance, rather than as a sign of problems with safety nets (SME1; SME2; SME7). 
For instance: 
“We were asked to study the behavior of STCA in a centre. Indeed, 
some nuisance alerts were noticed. Not a real point, we thought, but 
we gave advices on how to improve the STCA tool. Afterwards we 
understood that the real point was that management thought that 
every STCA alarm was a mistake of the controller.” (SME1).  
Overall, these conditions may favour patterns of organisational inertia regarding safety 
nets: the hazards and problems with these systems may remain unaddressed in the 
organisation despite their (negative) impact on the activity of the sharp end practitioner. 
When compared to the early definition of the framework, these considerations are 
relevant because, on the one hand, they stress the confidence of the importance of the 
service provider valuing the end-user perspective; and on the other they suggest that this 
is important not just during the implementation phase, but also during the operational 
life of these systems. Valuing the controllers’ involvement seems important to ensure that 
emerging problems are identified and then addressed.  
Senior management support to the safety nets domain 
SMEs’ reactions to the initial definition of the framework suggested that while this 
captured adequately the importance of the availability of a parameterisation process, it 
seemed to emphasise this item too much compared to two important organisational 
conditions: the availability of senior management support, and the availability of a 
dedicated safety net team. In the SME’s views these were two important elements of 
what makes an organisational capability, which however were not adequately 
represented by the OP2 sub-category “Availability of supporting software tools and a 
structure roles”. The importance of senior management support, and the availability of a 
supporting dedicated team are addressed in the reminder of this section and the next 
section respectively. 
The experts considered it very important to have senior management committed to safety 
nets implementation and continuous improvement. Senior management commitment 
was defined as: 
 “...allocating the appropriate resources to the improvement of the 
overall operations of safety nets, [so that] safety nets are directly 
allocated under certain budget and manpower” (SME4).  
In particular, senior management commitment was considered important to: 
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1. Ensure a long term sustained organisational focus over the domain of safety nets and 
the accompanying problems. Implicit in the quote above is the conviction that 
continual senior management support is essential to ensure continuity in the quality 
of safety nets implementations.  
2. Promoting the development and retention of expertise. It takes time and effort to 
estabilish a more controlled and repeatable process: safety net introduction is not, in 
fact, a “one time exercise”; it is, instead, a continuous learning process in which the 
organisation learns over time to better control the problems associated with these 
systems (SME1, SME3, SME4, SME6). One expert reported that for his organisation it 
took considerable efforts to move from an initial, problematic, trial and error 
parameterisation to a more controlled one, i.e., one that delivered safety nets that 
were considered acceptable by controllers (SME9). To make this kind of incremental 
learning possible it is essential that senior management “nurture the expertise” in the 
safety nets domain in the long term. Commenting on expertise, it was noted that 
senior management long term support is important especially for ANSPs with a high 
staff mobility to ensure the retention of safety net expertise. Safety net expertise 
“needs to be retained also across different generations of developers, as an ANSP 
might encounter several safety net implementations [over time], so you do not want 
to lose the lesson learnt from the previous implementations” (SME4).  
3. Promoting awareness of safety nets’ role within the organisation. Senior management 
support was also considered essential to raise awareness of the purpose of safety nets 
across the different hierarchical levels and functional units of the organisation 
(SME4). As stated by an expert: 
“Senior management should spread awareness throughout the 
organisation, both vertically and horizontally, insist on the unique 
understanding of the purpose and the role of the safety nets within 
the company's ATM system and commitment of all the segments of 
the company to supporting this role.” (SME4).  
To illustrate this point, the case of one organisation was cited, in which the staff involved 
in the maintenance of a piece of equipment would regularly render a safety net 
unavailable. Not being directly involved in the provision of Air Traffic Services, the 
technical training part of the organisation was not aware of the role of the safety net in 
the overall system, and was pursuing their own internal needs and priorities. Eventually, 
it took the intervention of senior management to clarify the importance of safety nets 
across the different divisions of the organisation. In particular, it mandated the 
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development of a dedicated internal safety net policy. This was intended to make explicit 
what safety nets are and how they should be managed. In this particular instance, such a 
policy was instrumental in clarifying that safety nets performances should take priority 
over other operating constraints, and should be compromised only if justified by safety 
requirements (SME3).  
Safety nets team 
It was also noted that it is essential that senior management creates a permanent 
multidisciplinary team within the organisation, dedicated to the implementation, and 
continuous monitoring and improvement of safety nets. Such a team must include as a 
minimum one safety net engineer, an air traffic controllers’ representative, and should be 
led by a professional project manager (SME3; SME5; SME10). The presence of such a team 
is essential in order to ensure that the ANSP’s resources are appropriately coordinated in 
order to solve safety net problems. This was the lesson that the experts had learnt after 
they had experienced directly problematic implementations having poor internal 
coordination as a precursors, e.g.:  
“To make my point short: in this service provider, operational, 
technical and safety expertise did not work together to solve 
problems. It turns out that after our (EUROCONTROL) intervention 
and analysis, the organisation has learned that working together can 
solve problems… Introduction should be driven by a multidisciplinary 
team (operational, technical, safety expertise).” (SME1) 
“Fortunately we have learned from the past and new safety nets or 
controller assistance tools which were developed together with users 
(ATCOs), product management, requirements and software 
engineers… [Working] together it is always much easier, very often 
more successful and at least accepted by the users!” (SME3) 
It was noted that the absence of a multidisciplinary team dedicated to safety nets may be 
observed especially in small service providers: these may lack the resources and 
manpower to have staff permanently allocated to the safety net domain. One expert, for 
instance, witnessed a small ANSP in which one software engineer alone, not a team, was 
held responsible for the implementation of multiple safety nets (SME5). Similarly, another 
expert described the experience of a small provider in which an operationally active 
controller was also assigned, on a part-time basis, the project management of safety net 
implementations (SME10). Eventually this person was unable to follow the 
implementation. Neither situation points at limitations in the competence levels of the 
individual concerned, or of personnel of small service providers in general. Instead, they 
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emphasise the fact that managing the intricacies of safety nets implementation requires 
the integration of different areas of expertise.  
Safety nets specific performance framework  
Another item missing from the initial definition of the emerging framework of 
organisational precursors was the presence of a safety net specific performance 
measurement framework, i.e., a set of metrics or indicators specifically defined for 
monitoring the performances of the MSAW and other safety nets. Such a framework 
permits personnel to monitor areas of safety nets performance (also based on statistical 
data), and decide which area is in most in need of improvement (SME6; SME4). While this 
framework is essential to ensure continuous monitoring and improvement of safety nets. 
Lack of such a performance framework limits the ability of service providers to monitor 
how well they are managing nuisance alerts, as well as other safety nets related problems, 
e.g.,:  
“Several years ago, ***[name of the service provider omitted] did an 
assessment of their safety nets. They noted that they had 3000 alerts 
in a week—and concluded that the performance was ‘OK’. This is a 
self-assessment with no reference or comparison to anyone else’s 
system.” (SME5)  
The performance framework needs to be specifically designed for safety nets to be 
effective. In support of this point, one expert noted that currently service providers have 
to comply with a global target safety level (TSL), which is expressed as the tolerable 
number of separation loss per year. However, while this indicator provides an aggregated 
measure of the overall level of safety achieved by the organisation, it only provides an 
indirect measure of safety net performances, as there are in fact several additional areas 
of operation that might contribute to the TSL, rather than safety nets alone. As a result, 
while focusing on this global indicator, senior managers might fail to see all the intricacies 
involved in ensuring safety nets operational fit (SME4). 
7.2.2.1. Implications for OP2 
While connecting to the experiences of the participating SMEs and triggering supportive 
feedback, the presentation of the second precursor of the emerging framework, OP2: 
“Organisational capability for handling HAI issues”, also triggered some constructive 
criticism. This was directed towards the first sub-category of OP2, “Internal 
parameterisation”, suggesting this sub-category was reasonably represented in the initial 
definition of the framework—at least represented in a way that does not trigger negative 
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reactions. It was the second and the third sub-categories of OP2—“Valuing of air traffic 
controllers involvement” and “The availability of supporting software tools and safety 
nets specific structure of roles”—that attracted the majority of the SMEs’ comments. 
Regarding the former, it was suggested that the proper consideration of the end-user is 
not limited to the implementation phase, but extends to the proper reporting of safety 
nets issues. Having an environment that does not promote the reporting of safety nets 
promotes in fact patterns of inertia over the improvement of these systems. Regarding 
the second item, experts’ feedback emphasised the role of senior management support 
and the availability of an internal multidisciplinary team permanently dedicated to safety 
net implementations. These elements were deemed to be important components of a 
safety net capability that should stand alone. Finally, still commenting on the third item 
of the framework, it was noted that another important element is the availability of a 
safety net specific performance framework—a set of metrics specifically defined to 
capture issues with the safety nets. To summarize, one item of OP2 was confirmed as is, 
some were refined and expanded, and another element was suggested as an addition. 
Overall, this feedback allows for the definition of a more expanded and sounder version 
of OP2, as reported below in Table 22.   
Table 22. Initial (left box) and updated version (right box) of OP2 as resulting from Study 3. 
OP2: ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES 
FOR HANDLING HAI ISSUES (Study 2) 
 -Parameterisation  process 
 -Positive attitude towards air 
 traffic  controllers 
 involvement  
 -Availability of supporting 
 software  tools  and a 
 structure  of  roles 
 
OP2: ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES FOR 
HANDLING HAI ISSUES (Study 3) 
-Parameterisation process 
-Positive attitude towards air traffic 
controllers’ involvement 
-Senior management support  
-Supporting tools 
-Safety nets team 
-Safety nets specific performance 
framework 
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7.2.3. SME feedback on OP3: Control over implementation quality at the 
boundary between the service provider and the software 
manufacturer 
This precursor captures the fact that the interaction between the ANSP and the software 
manufacturer supplying and installing the MSAW can have a bearing on the 
implementation of the system: on the one hand the service provider may have the 
knowledge to specify the requirements of the system it is purchasing, on the other hand, 
the organisation may inadvertently “transfer” control over the quality of the purchased 
system to the manufacturer, thus risking being provided with a suboptimal system (§ 
6.4.3). The following categories capture the reactions of the participating SMEs to OP3: 
1. Pattern common to other less-successful implementation contexts. The experts 
confirmed that they had experienced different situations in Europe in which the 
service provider purchased the MSAW and other safety nets without specifying the 
requirements of these systems. Similarly to the situation described for the Deltasky 
case, the service provider was then provided with safety nets which were not fit for 
purpose, as they were not specifically parameterized for the specific operational 
environment, e.g.,: 
 “Some ANSPs have enough knowledge to work closely with the 
manufacturer…However, in very many cases, the manufacturer 
delivers a system “as is”, with no input from the ANSP. Many ANSPs 
leave it to the system supplier to set up the parameters.” (SME5).  
This expert reported to having observed this dynamic in at least three ANSPs and in one 
military control centre. There, the implemented MSAW and STCA turned out to be poorly 
suited to the specific operational context of the client organisations. Specifically to the 
MSAW, this expert noted that the manufacturer spent insufficient time on setting up an 
MSAW terrain data base (SME5). The same incident was witnessed by two other experts 
(SME2, SME7), who added that the organisations in question did not consider the issue of 
parameterisation before buying their safety nets. One expert (SME7) confirmed that this 
“is not [the best strategy] to obtain the best service from the manufacturer. There is the 
risk that the manufacturer will try to obtain the maximum result with the minimum effort.” 
(SME7). All of the three organisations, eventually, appreciated the significance of the 
problem of nuisance alerts only when the system went operational.  This suggests that 
the dynamic observed in Deltasky was not limited to that service provider, others may be 
affected. 
2. Problem affecting also large ANSPs. In particular, although the Deltasky case might 
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suggest that this problem is limited to small service providers, it was noted that this 
is not the case. The risk has been reported to occur also in the case of large service 
providers that regularly purchase their systems—not just safety nets—from their 
national software manufacturer (SME7, SME8). In these cases, it was observed that 
the software manufacturer operates in a near monopolistic market, which may favour 
more the commercial interest of software manufacturer versus the operational needs 
of ANSP, e.g., “I think monopoly is the main problem. With monopoly, [***name of 
the ANSP omitted] operates any system that [***name of the software manufacturer 
omitted] will pass. Nothing can change at the level of the Human Machine Interface 
unless [the ANSP] can purchase its systems from other software manufacturers” 
(SME8). This comment was made by an expert commenting on the poor safety net 
HMI of a large South European service provider which regularly purchases its system 
from its national software manufacturer.  
3. Working closely with the manufacturer to avoid the concerned problem. When 
reflecting on how to avoid situations such as the one experienced by Deltasky, two 
considerations have emerged. First, the obvious solution to the problem would be to 
specify formal safety nets requirements at the beginning of a project, so that these 
can be included in the purchasing contract—with this contract clearly defining the 
responsibilities that the manufacturer will have over the system during the 
operational life of the system (SME6).  
At the same time it was acknowledged that—and this leads to the second consideration—
it might be very difficult for a service provider to define upfront safety nets requirements 
when facing its first implementation—that is, when no previous experience with the 
development and tuning of the safety nets is available within the organisation, e.g.,: 
 “To say the truth, it's difficult for an ANSP to develop a clear and 
elaborate concept of operation in a vacuum of experience.” (SME4).  
Essentially, at the time of their first implementation, safety nets, like any other system, 
are seen as an innovation, i.e., as something that requires a period of familiarisation and 
trial and error before the organisation possesses the knowledge to specify an elaborate a 
concept of operation (SME8). In the absence of such knowledge, it was suggested that the 
purchase and implementation of safety nets should be framed in the context of a 
“continuous partnership [between the manufacturer and the ANSP] to allow for safety 
nets operations to evolve in [the] specific operational environment.” (SME4.) Such a 
continuous partnership could be initiated by ensuring appropriate expertise overlap 
between the ANSP and the safety nets manufacturer, e.g.:  
“If you have to buy a novel safety net, or you want to upgrade your 
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system, it is better to choose the supplier that tells you: “I will spend 
a period in your control center and will teach your experts how to 
parameterize the system.” (SME7) 
This expert also stressed the importance of establishing an initial collaboration phase 
between the ANSP and the manufacturer during which requirements are jointly explored 
and defined. Essentially, the point is that during the first implementation of safety nets, 
the so-called “black box approach”—the classic outsourcing approach in which system 
requirements are specified right at the outset—does not work, because both the service 
provider and the manufacturer need to have mutual access to their expertise in order to 
develop the system. The ANSP brings knowledge of its unique operational context, and 
this knowledge is necessary for the fine tuning of the safety nets; the software 
manufacturer provides software knowledge, which is necessary to build the system.  
7.2.3.1. Implications for OP3 
The feedback collected for the third category of the emerging framework—OP3 Control 
over implementation quality at the service provider-software manufacturer boundary—
essentially confirmed the role of this precursor in explaining the quality of human machine 
interaction as found in the operational automated system. In particular, three 
corroboratory categories have emerged. Categories 1 and 2 indicated that the problems 
involved in the trust based control observed in the Deltasky case were not limited to this 
organisation, but were also observed in other service providers—both small and large 
ones. Finally, the last category of feedback, in addition to further confirming the accuracy 
OP3, also expanded this category, for it highlighted the fact that the actual control over 
implementation depends on the prior knowledge of the service provider. Without such a 
knowledge, it is important to frame the relationship with the software manufacturer as a 
long term partnership. Overall, this feedback seems to confirm the influence of OP3 in the 
handling of HAI issues within safety critical service provider organisations.  
Table 23. Evolution of OP1 as a result of Study 3: this category has remained unchanged. 
OP3: CONTROL OVER IMPLEMENTATION 
QUALITY AT THE SERVICE PROVIDER 
MANUFACTURER BOUNDARY (Study 2) 
OP3: CONTROL OVER IMPLEMENTATION 
QUALITY AT THE SERVICE PROVIDER 
MANUFACTURER BOUNDARY (Study 3) 
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 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
The aim of this study was to explore the plausibility of the organisational patterns of the 
initial version of the OPHAII framework resulting from Studies 1 and 2. By means of a focus 
group discussion combined with a qualitative questionnaire, this study obtained 
corroboratory feedback from a group of 11 safety net experts. These experts were invited 
to comment on the definitions of the identified organisational precursors of the 
framework, based on knowledge coming from their direct and indirect professional 
experience.  
The evidence collected in this study took the form of a total of 11 corroboratory 
categories: four categories identified for OP1; four, for OP2; and three, for OP3. It can be 
noted that some differences can be observed regarding the relative depth of these 
categories. The corroboratory categories identified for OP1 and OP3 are organised on one 
hierarchical level; those identified for OP2, on the other hand, are organized on two 
hierarchical levels. In other words, the corroboratory categories identified for OP2 enjoy 
a deeper structure than OP1 and OP3. This difference reflects the fact the experts had 
different types of reactions to OP1 and OP3 on the one hand, and OP2 on the other. OP1 
and OP3 received essentially supporting feedback, where the experts’ response to the 
definitions of these categories of organisational precursors mainly suggests that they 
were witnessed by the experts participating in the study (as concluded under § 7.2.1.1 
and § 7.2.3.1). So, this expert’s response added confidence without proposing a 
refinement. Somehow, this suggests that the earlier definition of OP1 and OP3 was 
perceived as trustworthy.  
The earlier definition of OP2, on the contrary, was perceived as being too narrow in scope. 
The definition of organisational capability for handling HAI issues, in fact, was perceived 
as underrepresenting important components, namely the role of senior management, the 
existence of a safety net team, the existence of a dedicated safety net performance 
framework (as concluded under § 7.2.2.1 ). According to the experts, these elements 
needed to be more visible in the framework, and therefore an update and more 
trustworthy version of OP2 had to include them.  
Having elaborated on how the collected evidence evolved the OPHAII framework, it 
becomes important to elaborate on the implications of the same evidence on: 
 OPHAII’s interpretive validity7, i.e., the extent to which the identified categories 
of organisational precursors capture organisational dynamics that appeared 
plausible according to the viewpoints and experiences of the interviewed experts;  
                                                          
7 See also § 4.3.4 for a definition of interpretive validity. 
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 OPHAII’s generalisability, the extent to which the framework can be applied to 
other organisational contexts besides those of Alphasky and Deltasky. 
Regarding interpretive validity, it can be said that the study has allowed to collect 
corroboratory evidence which appeared to improve the initial OPHAII’s version (as 
delivered by Studies 1 and 2). In particular, the study has identified a total of 11 
corroboratory categories, which capture relevant experts’ opinions, experiences, and 
suggestions for improvement about the framework. This evidence suggests that the 
OPHAII’s categories of organisational precursors have been witnessed by the participating 
experts in real life situations, i.e., situations related to the implementation and 
improvement of the MSAW and other safety nets occurred in European ANSPs. The fact 
that these patterns resonate with the knowledge of the selected experts is an important 
indicator of the study’s interpretive validity. Two reasons support this position. In 
qualitative research member checking is usually accepted as one of the most important 
validity check (Morgan, 1997) (§ 4.3.4). Furthermore, the importance of member checking 
is especially important in the case of social and organisational phenomena that, as for the 
phenomenon under study in this research, cannot be directly observed, or measured by 
objective and independent quantitative data collection means. In this case recurring to 
the opinions of experts become a necessary means to draw conclusions. 
Regarding generalisability of the framework—i.e., the extent to which the results can be 
applied, at least, to other service providers—it can be noted that the expert professional 
experience was also based on contexts other than Alphasky and Deltasky. This invites 
some scepticism about the idea that the identified categories of precursors are the 
products of the unique organisational contexts of Alphasky and Deltasky. Rather, it seems 
reasonable to expect that the same precursors may occur also in other ANSPs, at least 
European ones. In addition to the collected experts’ view, one further consideration can 
support this point. In particular, European ANSPs operate in a common competitive and 
institutional environment, i.e., the European air traffic management system, which 
dictates common European-wide modernization roadmaps, and common rules, standards 
and policies for the conduct of commercial practices and safety. Arguably, these 
conditions expose European ANSPs to similar common pressures for modernization, cost-
reduction, and productivity.  
Of course these considerations do not address the question of whether the framework 
can be generalised to other contexts other than European ANSPs. This important question 
will be addressed in the next chapter, together with a reflection on the broader 
theoretical implications of the framework for the understanding of HAI issues in in safety-
critical domains.   
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 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
This study reported on the third and final empirical study of the thesis. The study aimed 
to corroborate and refine the initial version of OPHAII delivered by Studies 1 and 2. The 
study consisted of an SME study based on a sample of 11 safety net experts. The evidence 
collected further confirmed the first and the third organisational precursors of the 
framework, while the second precursor had to be refined in order to better reflect the 
experiences of the experts. This evidence led to a refined version of the framework, which 
is reported below. At this point, what remains to be discussed at this point are the broader 
implications of the framework for the understanding of HAI issues in complex, high 
consequence organisations, and what are the practical implications of the framework. 
These questions will be addressed in the following chapter. 
Table 24. The revised and expanded version of OPHAII, as resulting from Study 3. While OP1 and OP3 have 
been confirmed, OP2’s subcategories have been refined and expanded. 
OP1: ORGANISATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS DRIVING AUTOMATION 
IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPROVEMENT 
 - Assumptions about the system’s role 
 - Assumptions about the HAI issue  
OP2: ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITY FOR HANDLING HAI ISSUES 
 - Parameterisation process 
 - Positive attitude towards air traffic controllers’ involvement  
 - Senior management support 
- Supporting tools 
 - Safety net team 
 - Safety net specific performance framework 
OP3: CONTROL OVER IMPLEMENTATION QUALITY AT THE BOUNDARY 
BETWEEN THE SERVICE PROVIDER AND THE SOFTWARE MANUFACTURER  
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 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
To recap: the main aim of this thesis was to inquire into the organisational precursors to 
human automation interaction (HAI) issues that can be found in safety-critical domains. 
The theoretical motivation behind this inquiry was to explore the theoretical landscape 
lying at the boundaries of the current main perspectives on the problem, namely the 
human computer interaction (HCI) and system lifecycle ones (chapter 2), and the enlarged 
organisational safety (OS) perspective (chapter 3). As a result of this effort, the thesis has 
delivered the organisational precursors to human automation interaction issues (OPHAII) 
framework. This framework is empirically grounded, because it was developed in a 
bottom-up fashion based on evidences collected from three qualitative empirical studies: 
two retrospective, qualitative case studies, and a third subject matter expert study. The 
first study (chapter 5) identified the framework’s first component, OP1, based on an 
analysis of the NTSB-issued safety recommendation letters and the safety 
recommendations that addressed the MSAW, and the relevant correspondence 
exchanged between the NTSB and the FAA. Informed by the organisational experiences 
of both a successful and a less successful MSAW implementer, the second study (chapter 
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6) identified the second and the third main categories of organisational precursors to HAI 
issues, OP2 and OP3; and provided additional support to OP1. The third study (chapter 7) 
expanded and refined the OPHAII framework. It collected additional corroboratory 
evidences in support of OP1 and OP3, and delivered a more refined version of OP2. Table 
25 summarises the contribution of the three empirical studies to OPHAII’s development. 
Table 26 in the next page provides the generalised version of the framework.  
Table 25. Contribution made by the empirical studies to the OPHAII framework’s development. 
OPHAII’s 
compone
nts 
Study 1 
(chapter 5) 
Study 2 
(chapter 6) 
Study 3 
(chapter 7) 
OP1 Identified OP1 
(§5.4) 
Collected supporting 
evidence for OP1 
(§6.4.1) 
Collected supporting 
evidence for OP1 
(§7.2.1) 
OP2  Identified OP2 (§6.4.2) Collected refining 
evidence for OP2 
(§7.2.2) 
OP3  Identified OP3 (§6.4.3) Collected supporting 
evidence for OP3 
(§7.2.3) 
 
The reminder of this chapter is organised as follows: 
 Sections 8.2 and 8.3 compare the framework with the relevant literature 
reviewed in chapters 2 and 3; 
 Section 8.4 describes the potential practical uses of the OPHAII framework. In 
order to highlight the framework’s distinctive features, this section also includes 
a comparison with relevant comparable models, i.e., models that either address 
HAI issues or consider organisational precursors to failure;  
 Section 8.5 addresses the generalisability of OPHAII; 
 Section 8.6 addresses the limitations of the research and opportunities for future 
research; 
 Section 8.7 concludes by summarising the contribution to knowledge the thesis 
has made. 
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Table 26. Generalised version of the OPHAII framework. 
OP1: ORGANISATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS DRIVING AUTOMATION IMPLEMENTATION AND 
IMPROVEMENT. The assumptions held by management and developers during management and 
implementation. Two types of assumptions can be distinguished:  
 - Assumptions about the system’s role, i.e., how and for which purpose the system 
 should be used by the end-user, and for which purpose, and how it will benefit the 
 organisation;  
 - Assumptions about the HAI issue(s). Assumptions of developers and management 
 about the nature and severity of the HAI issues that may emerge during the use of the 
 automation.  
OP2: ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITY FOR HANDLING HAI ISSUES. The set of (interrelated) 
organisational routines that allow the organisation to reliably handle HAI issues. The components 
of such an organisational capability include: 
 - Parameterisation process. The process needed to parameterise the automation in 
 order to adapt it to the specific context in which it will be used. This process is repeated 
 whenever the organisation implements the automation at a new site; 
 - Attitude towards end-user involvement. The attitude towards the continuous 
 systematic involvement of end-users in the implementation and improvement of the 
 automation, and the positive consideration of the HAI issues end-users may 
 report;  
 - Senior management support. The continuous support of senior management to the 
 automation domain, as manifested in the automation policies, and the resources 
 allocated to automation management and its continuous improvement; 
 - Automation team. The team of staff members permanently allocated to the 
 management of automation and its continuous improvement;  
- Supporting tools. The set of software tools (e.g. demonstrators, recording tools, etc.) 
developed in the organisation to monitor and improve the quality of the automation; 
 - Automation specific performance framework. The framework of HAI issues specific 
 performance indicators. 
OP3: CONTROL OVER IMPLEMENTATION QUALITY AT THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE 
SERVICE PROVIDER AND THE SOFTWARE MANUFACTURER. The type of control 
mechanism(s) established to ensure that the manufacturer will act in the service provider’s best 
interest—i.e. ensuring that the automated system purchased is actually suitable for the operational 
context of the service provider.  
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 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
8.2.1. Comparisons with the HCI perspective 
An important area of study that has dealt with the problem of HAI issues is the Human 
Computer Interaction (HCI) perspective (§ 2.2). Notably, this perspective unites scholars 
that have elected as their object of study the unit composed of (i) the human (i.e., the 
user(s) of the technology), (ii) the automated system, and (iii) the unfolding interaction 
between (i) and (ii). The conceptualisation of HAI issues is viewed as arising from the 
analysis of these elements (although from very different research traditions, such as 
human information processing (§ 2.2.1), distributed cognition (§ 2.2.2), activity theory (§ 
2.2.3), computer supported collaborative work (§ 2.2.4), and cognitive system engineering 
(§2.2.5)). Notably, HCI models provide a set of concepts extremely useful for designers, 
human factors and safety practitioners and researchers to diagnose HAI issues related to 
a given automated system. In turn, this provides the foundations for further formal and 
informal evaluations, and corrective design changes (§ 2.2.6). In comparison, OPHAII 
points out a set of organisational precursors to HAI issues. Such precursors are exogenous 
to the unit of analysis as defined by the HCI models. In fact, these precursors are not 
visible from the perspective of the user of the technology, as they are located at 
organisational levels higher than the level of operations. Yet, they are important to 
consider if one, in addition to identify HAI issues, also wants to know how a given service 
provider may (inadvertently) have left such issues unaddressed in the operational system 
or it has succeed in managing them. In other words, OPHAII’s precursors are important to 
consider if one wants to better understand the organisational realities involved in the 
management of safety-critical automation.  
In addition to this, another consideration arises from the comparison of OPHAII and the 
HCI perspective. In fact, a basic idea found in this perspective is that the introduction of 
novel automation introduces new task demands for the front-end operators of complex 
systems (e.g., Woods, Dekker, Cook, Johannesen, & Sarter, 2010; Sarter, Woods, & 
Billings, 1997; Woods & Sarter, 2000). OPHAII resonates with this idea, in that its 
dimensions suggest that novel automation brings new demands not only for the 
automation’s end-user, as usually discussed in the HCI perspective, but also for the 
organisation that has to implement and manage the automation. In fact, OPHAII suggests 
that the organisation needs to direct resources to the development of adequate 
assumptions about the system’s operational role and the nature and significance of the 
accompanying HAI issues. This is because such assumptions appear to influence the kind 
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of organisational responses directed towards the handling of HAI issues (§ 5.4.2, § 6.4.1, 
and § 7.2.1). In addition, the organisation needs to establish adequate organisational 
capabilities for handling HAI issues, capabilities that include the availability of a 
parameterisation process; adequate involvement of the end-user; continuous support 
from senior management; the availability of a permanent team dedicated to the 
management and improvement of automatio; and the availability of an automation-
specific performance framework (§ 6.4.2 and § 7.2.2). Finally, the organisation needs to 
establish adequate control mechanisms in order to ensure control over the quality of the 
system supplied by the software manufacturer (§ 6.4.3 & 7.2.3). Overall, these 
organisational conditions warn policy makers, regulators, managers and developers of 
safety critical service providers that the introduction and operation of novel automation 
is not a sole technical or engineering effort. Automation comes with organisational 
demands that need to be addressed in order to control the HAI issues accompanying it.  
Furthermore, these demands are not limited to the implementation phase of the 
automation, but extend across its operational life. This point is best supported by OP2, 
because the availability of a dedicated organisational capability for handling HAI issues 
(found in the successful case in Study 2, and later refined and expanded in the Study 3) 
reflects organisational conditions that are permanently established in the organisation in 
order to ensure the continuous monitoring and improvement of the automation. These 
considerations are relevant because, although stakeholders at the blunt end usually 
acknowledge the very intense effort needed to put a new technology into use (e.g., 
Humphreys et al., 2006), they do not necessarily see the resource demands that are 
needed past the “O-date” to sustain the new technology (Campbell, Sittig, Ash, 
Guappone, & Dykstra, 2006).  
8.2.2. Comparison with system lifecycle perspectives 
The value of the OPHAII framework can also be understood by comparing it with the 
system lifecycle models (§ 2.3)—such as user centred design (UCD) (ISO, 2010), human 
factors integration (HFI) (HFI DTC, 2007), and system safety (e.g. Roland & Moriarty, 
1990). The framework highlights, in facts, some organisational dimensions that are not 
considered by these models. For instance, UCD prescribes user requirements 
identification, by means of methods such as ethnographic studies and usability 
evaluations in order to achieve increased system usability. HFI promotes various human 
factors analysis along the system development lifecycle, in order to make sure that human 
factors aspects are systematically captured and addressed during the engineering lifecycle 
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of a system. System safety pursues similar objectives in order to ensure that safety 
hazards and requirements are appropriately identified and addressed during the 
engineering lifecycle of a system. In maintaining this focus, these approaches provide 
useful process models which can explain the quality of human automation interaction 
found in safety-critical organisations mainly in terms of adherence to or deviations from 
a predefined set of process guidance. However, these models do not consider the 
organisational factors at the blunt end, highlighted by OPHAII, which may affect the way 
HAI issues are addressed. These models neglect these factors because their focus is mostly 
on the process aspects.  
8.2.3. Comparison with the OS perspective 
The primary distinctive trait of the OPHAII framework presented here is that of 
highlighting some of the organisational dimensions involved in the handling of 
technology’s side effects, i.e., HAI issues. Essentially, the framework’s categories support 
the idea that HAI issues can be seen as the symptom of deeper organisational 
phenomena, i.e., they can be traced back to specific organisational dynamics and 
conditions at the blunt end of the organisation. In general, this orientation receives 
support from models in the OS area (reviewed in chapter 2), as these models also trace 
the potential for success and failure in organisational (safety) performances to dynamics 
and conditions found at the blunt end of the organisation.  
In particular, existing OS models primarily support the first category of organisational 
precursor (OP1), which asserts that the handling of HAI issues in safety-critical domains 
stems from the organisational assumptions driving the implementation and improvement 
of automation. Scholars from the OS area (as well as from classic management) have long 
stressed the role of shared organisational interpretive frames in driving organisational 
responses: it is the interpretation of the world, i.e., the shared cognitive frames of 
organisational actors that drive organisational responses to signs of danger and 
ambiguous anomalies (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2011; Vaughan, 2009; Edmondson et al., 2005; 
Milliken, Theresa, & Bridewell-Mitchell, 2005; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997; Demchak, 1991). 
When this interpretation of the world and risk is inconsistent with the way the words 
really is, the potential for organisational failure increases as the organisation accepts 
more and more risk than it can actually manage. While these considerations highlight the 
link between organisational frames at the blunt end and safety performances, this 
research suggests that a similar link exists with regard to the handling of the undesired 
effects of automation technology.  
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However, OPHAII highlights two theoretical constructs, OP2 and OP3, that are not usually 
discussed in models from OS area, which appear however to be relevant to understanding 
the handling of HAI issues in safety-critical industries. In particular, the idea that handling 
HAI issues requires the availability of a dedicated organisational capability (OP2) coheres 
with models in the innovation and business performance literature (Leinwand & Mainardi, 
2010; Leonard-Barton, 1998; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). These models emphasise that 
specific organisational performances reflect the unique combinations of tools, skills, 
processes, values, supporting roles, and leadership that are available in organisations. It 
is the availability and combinations of these factors—i.e., the element of an organisational 
capability—that allows an organisation to achieve and sustain certain organisational 
outcomes over time. In this research, the notion of organisational capability provided a 
comprehensive construct with which to characterise the distinctive elements, or 
practices, activated in the organisation to handle the HAI issue in question. 
Analogous considerations apply to OP3. The idea that the problematic handling of HAI 
issues can be traced back to the relationship between a safety-critical service provider 
organisation and the software manufacturer receives support from the IT outsourcing 
literature (Tiwana, 2004; Willcocks & Sauer, 2000). This literature acknowledges that one 
important challenge organisations face in outsourcing software is to ensure that the 
software manufacturer delivers as expected (Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003; Kirsch et al., 
2002; Kern & Willcocks, 2001). While this view was developed based on the analysis of 
non-safety critical applications, this research also stresses the importance of control at 
the organisational boundary between software manufacturers and safety critical service 
providers.  
 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In addition to the theoretical considerations outlined above, two important 
methodological considerations can be made. One highlights the originality of the data 
used in Study 1; the second, the value of the notion of “anomaly trajectory in the 
organisation”, which was used in Studies 1 and 2. Note that these considerations arise 
from a comparison with the models developed in the OS area. This is because the research 
design adopted in this study is essentially derived from the single case study approach, 
which is frequently used in the OS area (§ 4.3).  
8.3.1. Considerations on the data used in Study 1 
Study 1 (chapter 5) made use of original data sources, namely the safety 
recommendations of the US official accident investigation agency (the NTSB), the letters 
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justifying and conveying these recommendations, and the response letters by the 
recipient organisation (the FAA) (see § 4.4.1.1 for the description of these sources). Prior 
to this research, only Tasca (1990) was found to use this type of data, although for a 
different purpose: inquiring into the broader organisational precursors to human error in 
the maritime domain. This study’s insights suggest that the same type of data could be 
used for a comparable research objective, namely investigating the organisational 
precursors to HAI issues. This did prove to be the case as the type of data in question 
made possible to identify the first category of organisational precursor of the OPHAII 
framework. This consideration is important because further studies can exploit the same 
type of data to investigate the organisational trajectory of types of HAI issues other than 
the one investigated in this study. Furthermore, the same data can be used to investigate 
the organisational trajectory of other safety issues—not necessarily automation related—
to explore the ways in which these have been (mis) handled by the organisation.  
In suggesting the possibility of using safety recommendations, safety recommendation 
letters, and ensuing correspondence letters it is important to elaborate on the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of these data sources. Their primary advantage is their 
availability in the public domain. In other words, this data do not require the negotiation 
of organisational access. These sources can be retrieved from the relevant on-line 
database(s). This advantage is not negligible, considering that in OS research the 
negotiation of organisational access is usually considered a “major hindrance” (Bourrier, 
2011). Thus, this kind of data can be an addition to the range of publicly available data 
sources commonly used in the OS area—i.e., official accident and incident investigation 
reports. 
However, two disadvantages of using these sources can be mentioned. Firstly, using 
original data may entail a relatively long familiarisation stage. In Study 1, nearly two years 
elapsed before the researcher was able to identify a plausible data analysis strategy. (As 
described in chapter 3, it was only after the familiarisation stage that it became clear that 
the body of data included three sub-sets of data.) It must be noted that this difficulty 
results not from the novelty of the type of data considered, but also from the exploratory 
nature of the research.  
The second disadvantage concerns data representativeness. Safety recommendations, 
safety recommendation letters, and the ensuring written exchange represent essentially 
the official view of the organisation with regard to specific safety problems and HAI issues. 
Therefore, this should be coupled with interviews of organisation insiders to deepen the 
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rationales and perspectives that have led to the development of such a view. In this 
research, this limitation of Study 1 was addressed by including in the two subsequent 
studies interviews with relevant personnel and experts. Prospective researchers 
interested in using similar data for organisational research will have to consider this 
limitation, and the need to mitigate it by either complementation or triangulation with 
other data sources.  
8.3.2. Considerations on the value of the organisational trajectory of an 
HAI issue 
The second most distinctive trait of the case studies used in this research (Studies 1 and 
2) was their focus on the organisational trajectory of an HAI issue related to a specific 
technology, the MSAW. The case studies focused on the history, or lifecycle, of one type 
of anomaly, an HAI issue, faced by the organisation. This analytical focus was inspired by 
Vaughan’s seminal investigation of the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster (Vaughan, 2009, 
2004, 1997). In that work, Vaughan traced the historical trajectory of an anomaly within 
NASA—namely, the O-ring erosion problem—with the intention of understanding how 
deviations from accepted and safe norms were gradually accepted by NASA’s 
management until the disaster unfolded.  
Regarding the value of an analytical focus on the anomaly trajectory in organisations, this 
research provides two key insights in addition to those provided by Vaughan’s work. 
Firstly, the case study approach used here extends the range of applicability of the 
concept of anomaly from general anomalies to those that are specifically concerned with 
human automation interaction. In other words, the focus on the historical trajectory 
seems a viable lens for producing constructive insights into the management of 
automation side effects. 
Secondly, in Vaughan’s work the anomaly trajectory was primarily exploited in order to 
understand how deviations from an accepted norm become increasingly routinised. In 
this research, the same focus shed light not only on the dynamics of the interpretation 
and framing of technology and its side effects, but also on the essential traits of successful 
and less successful organisational responses to such issues (framework components OP2 
and OP3). In other words, while the use of the anomaly trajectory in Vaughan’s original 
work was instrumental especially in illuminating processes of drift into failure, in this work 
the same concept was instrumental in understanding other areas of organisations that, 
as earlier anticipated, seem to be more relevant to the management of technology-
Chapter 8. Discussion and conclusion 
147 
related anomalies, i.e., HAI issues. 
These methodological considerations are important for future researchers interested in 
understanding the organisational contributors to HAI issues; especially those HAI issues 
that can be directly involved in the occurrence of accidents.  
As introduced earlier (§ 4.3.1), the official investigation of automation failure in safety-
critical domains is not an institutionalised practice—at least not to the same extent as 
accident investigations are. In fact, there are no specific agencies with a government 
mandate to investigate the causal factors leading to the deployment and use of poor 
automation—i.e., automation that does not deliver the intended benefit, automation that 
has to be removed from operation, or automation that introduces new types of errors. 
This is of course not to say that automation is not addressed in official investigations of 
transportation accidents: indeed, it is, but mainly as a contributory condition to the 
overall accident, and not as an issue in itself. However, due to the increasing 
pervasiveness of automation in safety-critical systems, it is desirable to expect that the 
importance of this type of investigations will increase in future. The more automation 
becomes an essential component of these systems, the higher the expectation of the 
educated public to have adequate governance structures in place to control it. 
 PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS 
The OPHAII categories can be turned into a checklist and/or questionnaire items for 
auditing purposes, so as to aid decision makers in safety-critical service providers in 
evaluating the adequacy of their organisational context to manage the HAI issues 
accompanying a given automated system. In particular, OPHAII can be helpful for: 
1. Periodic reviews of existing automation implementations. The framework can be 
used as an aid in periodic reviews, to check how well the organisation is managing the 
automation side effects of an implemented system. For instance, if the automation 
comes to exhibits a poor fit with the intended users, i.e., if things start to get wrong, 
the framework can be used to explain what is going wrong and how—in particular, 
how automation unintended consequences are (mis) managed, and what corrective 
actions can be taken. For instance, during a periodic review, it may emerge that 
personnel hold ambiguous or conflicting views about a new system’s operational role, 
or that they have a poor understanding of the system’s HAI issues. Hence, senior 
management, once made aware of the problem, can be invited to direct more effort 
towards the understanding of the system’s actual role, and the definition of internal 
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policies that clarify it. In summary, by checking the framework’s components against 
the situation at hand, safety and human factors specialists can support project 
managers and programme leaders in formulating hypotheses about why and how the 
organisation is unable to manage HAI issues. This use of the framework is functional 
to ensure the monitoring of automation implementation quality past the O-date. 
2. Retrospective reviews of past (failed) automation implementations. The framework 
can also support reviews of past (failed or successful) implementation projects. 
Analogously to periodic review of current automation implementations, the 
framework can stimulate project managers and programme leaders to consider the 
adequacy of the organisational conditions and managerial arrangements in place 
during the implementation of the programme in question.  
3. Comparative/benchmarking studies. The framework can be used by policy makers, 
standardisation bodies, and regulators for collecting data about and compare the 
potential for controlling HAI issues across different service provider organisations. As 
the comparison between Alphasky and Deltasky suggests, different organisations may 
develop their potential to control automation’s side effect at different points in time. 
(While at the time of data collection Alphasky was considered to be a successful case, 
Deltasky was found to be struggling with MSAW implementation.) Therefore, the 
framework could be functional to monitor the existence of potential asymmetries in 
the implementation quality of the same system across different service providers. 
Such asymmetries, if found to be relevant, can inform remedial interventions such as 
technology transfer programmes, to ensure that the knowledge necessary to control 
certain HAI issues is effectively transferred from best practice providers to less 
successful ones. 
4. Enhancement of (safety) reporting schemes. The framework can be used to enhance 
existing (safety) reporting frameworks, such as the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting 
System database, to enable these to capture also organisational factors that are 
relevant to the management of HAI issues. These frameworks do not necessarily 
consider organisational precursors to HAI issues. The OPHAII framework can enhance 
these kinds of frameworks as its categories can provide a consistent format for 
collecting narrative reports about organisational precursors specific to HAI issues. The 
use of a consistent data format would permit organisations to store, communicate, 
aggregate and compare these reports in order to identify organisational weaknesses 
and deficiencies in the management and oversight of safety-critical automation. 
Subsequently, guidance for safety-critical automation improvement at local and 
Chapter 8. Discussion and conclusion 
149 
international level can be developed. Note that the identification of such 
organisational precursors would be mainly based on qualitative narratives, as these 
precursors, indeed, do not lend themselves to quantification, automatic reporting, 
and statistical comparison as for more operation near types of safety occurrences—
i.e., CFITs, mid-air collisions, Loss of Control in Flight, as well as the immediate 
precursors conditions to these occurrences. However, the capture of the OPHAII’s 
organisational precursors in the context of a broader reporting scheme is justified by 
the fact that, although not quantifiable, these precursors can lead to HAI issues that 
can be themselves a precursor to incidents and disasters. Hence, it is reasonable to 
track these precursors in order to promote the understanding of organisational 
weaknesses in the management of automation. 
These uses of the framework are consistent with current standard risk management 
approaches, such as the ICAO’s Safety Management System (SMS) (ICAO, 2013) and the 
ISO 31000 (ISO, 2009). These standard approaches provide guidance to organisations on 
how to establish formal frameworks for managing risk proactively. They include measures 
aimed at promoting the systematic and proactive identification and reporting of hazards 
and risks; continuous risk monitoring; process improvement; and timely mitigation of 
reported issues. However, both standards have a general purpose orientation in that they 
have been devised to manage different types of risks. Moreover, the ISO 31000 applies to 
different types of industries, not necessarily safety critical. Thus, the OPHAII’s uses 
highlighted above can benefit those safety critical service provider organisations that 
want to include the handling of automation side effects in the scope of their ICAO SMS or 
ISO 31000. OPHAII can add to the current measures included under the two approaches 
as an additional supporting measure specifically tailored for the handling of HAI issues.  
Having outlined the potential uses of OPHAII, it is important to identify what are the 
distinctive aspects of the framework that support these uses. These aspects are 
determined by means of a comparison with other pragmatic approaches found in the 
literature that were developed to address the same problem, i.e., HAI issues, or that 
include the consideration of organisational factors in their scope, although for different 
purposes, namely safety occurrence investigation and healthcare technology analysis.  
8.4.1. Comparison with frameworks for handling HAI issues 
The direct relevance of OPHAII to the handling of HAI issues call for a comparison with 
approaches that have been developed to address the same problem. Bligård (2012) has 
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proposed a predictive framework for identifying the HAI issues accompanying the 
introduction of novel technology. While being useful in its own right to identify (and 
anticipate) possible HAI issues, such as error inducing conditions in the interface design, 
Bligård’s framework focuses on the HAI level only; therefore, it does not consider the 
organisational precursors to HAI issues that are addressed, instead, by OPHAII. 
Similar considerations apply in relation to the Interactive Socio-Technical Analysis (ISTA) 
(Harrison, Koppel, & Bar-Lev, 2007). Developed in the healthcare domain and included as 
a recommended method in the RAND’s Guide to Reducing Unintended Consequences of 
Electronic Health Records (Jones et al., 2011), this framework provides a structured 
approach for investigating the root causes of adverse medical events induced by medical 
devices. More specifically, the approach advocates the construction of a timeline of the 
sequence of events that culminated with the undesirable event—e.g., a device 
administering an excessive dosage of a drug and consequential harm to patient. From 
here, the analyst can identify root causes that promoted the reconstructed event 
sequence. Such causes lie in the interaction of the medical device with the user and the 
surrounding work environment, and they may include factors such as workload increase 
following the introduction of the device, placement of the device in busy areas exposed 
to many potential distractions, or lack of a policy that mandates double-checks for risky 
medications (Jones et al., 2011).  
In promoting the identification of these kinds of root causes, ISTA has the merit of 
avoiding reducing explanations of adverse medical events to medication error. However, 
the framework stops the investigation at the level of the sharp end; it does not generate 
questions about the broader organisational precursors at the blunt end that may have 
initially led to the deployment and operation of problematic automations in the first 
place. This is the level of analysis of direct concern to OPHAII. 
Other relevant frameworks against which to compare OPHAII include safety occurrence 
investigation methods and automation implementation frameworks that incorporate 
predefined sets of organisational factors. These are addressed in the following two 
sections.  
8.4.2. Comparison with comparable safety investigation methods 
Two notable example of safety investigation methods are the Safety Occurrence Analysis 
Methodology (SOAM) (Licu, Cioran, Hayward, & Lowe, 2007), which was developed for 
the investigation of safety occurrences in the air traffic management domain; and the 
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human factors framework for the investigation of adverse medical events, developed by 
Henriksen et al. for the healthcare domain (Henriksen, Dayton, Keyes, Carayon, & Hughes, 
2008). Both models are based on Reason’s Swiss Cheese model of accident causation 
(Reason, 1997). Therefore, although variations in their respective classification schemes 
exist, they both prescribe the considerations of (1) factors proximal to the event, e.g., 
barriers and human involvement; (2) contextual factors, e.g., the physical and 
technological aspects of the work environment that predisposed the conditions for the 
accident to unfold; and (3) latent conditions, e.g., organisational and management 
factors. The focus on these factors results in a comprehensive picture of the precursors 
to the safety occurrence under investigation. These occurrences may be a CFIT or a loss 
of separation incident for SOAM; or a medication or diagnosis mishap for the Henriksen 
et al.’s model. The precursors considered also include automation’s contribution to the 
adverse event in question. However, although the two models identify automation’s role 
in accident development, neither SOAM nor Henriksen et al.’s framework has technology 
or automation side effects as their main foci. Thus, the organisational factors they 
consider are essentially relevant to explain the (erroneous) behaviour of practitioners at 
the organisation sharp end. They do not identify possible organisational roots of HAI 
issues as OPHAII does. 
8.4.3. Comparison with socio-technical frameworks of healthcare IT 
implementation 
Socio-technical frameworks of healthcare IT (HIT) implementation consist of 
multidimensional models intended to provide a systemic view of the multiple factors and 
interactions that must be considered when introducing IT in healthcare settings. Two 
notable examples of these models include Sittig and Singh’s eight-dimensional socio-
technical framework for studying the effectiveness and safety of HIT implementations 
(Sittig & Singh, 2010); and Cullen et al.’s Contextual Implementation Model (CIM)(Callen, 
Braithwaite, & Westbrook, 2008). These models promote the identification of problems 
that may arise when introducing such technology, which can then be addressed in order 
to increase the safety and efficiency—i.e., the success—of implementation. Two points 
distinguish OPHAII from these models.  
The first point concerns the use of the same term—“organisational factor”— to denote a 
different kind of factors than those addressed by OPHAII. This remark applies mostly to 
Sittig and Singh’s framework (2010). The framework includes the following dimensions: 
(1) hardware and software computing infrastructure; (2) clinical content; (3) human 
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computer interface; (4) people; (5) workflow and communication; (5) internal 
organisational policies, procedures and culture; (6) external rules, regulations and 
pressures; (8) system measurement and monitoring. The dimension which incorporates 
organisational factors is (5), internal organisational policies, procedures and culture. An 
example of the sub items of this dimension is provided by Meek et al., who used Sittig and 
Singh’s framework to understand electronic health record implementations found in 12 
UK National Health Care hospitals (Meeks, Takian, Sittig, Singh, & Barber, 2014). The study 
was based on secondary analysis of interview data previously collected. In addition to 
capturing a genuine organisational precursor, namely the availability of an adequate IT 
budget to support ongoing IT requirements, other organisational factors identified 
included data confidentiality issues and the increased risk of incorrect selection posed by 
having multiple record numbers per patient. However, from an OPHAII perspective, this 
kind of issues represent the outcome of specific organisational processes and conditions, 
rather than organisational factors per se, as OPHAII focuses on organisational factors at 
the blunt end.  
The second point that distinguishes these models from OPHAII is the absence of a 
category of organisational precursors related to the interaction between the service 
provider organisation and the software manufacturer. In OPHAII, this interaction is 
addressed by OP3. Both Sittig and Singh’s framework and CIM do not consider this kind 
of interaction, as they focus on either (i) organisational factors internal to the 
organisation, such the organisational context and the local unit context (CIM), or the 
internal policies, procedures and culture (Sittig & Singh’s framework); or on (ii) factors 
external to the organisation, i.e., factors that pertain to the broader institutional and 
economic environment in which the organisation operates. However, while maintaining 
this focus they do not address inter-organisational factors that occur at the organisational 
boundaries of the organisation.  
 GENERALISABILITY 
OPHAII was developed in a very specific context: the organisational implementation and 
improvement of an automated system from the air traffic management domain, the 
MSAW, and the management of a specific MSAW-related HAI, the nuisance alert problem. 
Study 3 concluded that the framework seems to be relevant to the management of safety 
nets in general, rather than to the MSAW only. This focus calls into question the 
framework’s generalisability to other contexts. Upon elaborating on this question, it 
should be noted that even a restricted applicability of the framework to the contexts of 
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safety nets and MSAW implementations is valuable from a societal perspective. These 
systems are key safety defences of the current ATM system; therefore, developing 
measures that can improve their management means contributing to improve public 
safety.  
That said, it is reasonable to believe that OPHAII may be relevant for safety and human 
factors practitioners and programme managers involved in the definition and 
management of automated systems in safety-critical service provider organisations. In 
these organisations, there are at least two dynamics that may affect sensitivity to HAI 
issues. The first is the constant exposure to the indeterminacy of the technologies these 
organisations deploy. The intricacies of actual technology usage and the situated 
meanings that sharp end operators can project over the technology in use are not 
immediately visible or understandable for those decision makers and stakeholders at the 
blunt end, as the latter lack proximity to the operational environment. In safety-critical 
service provider organisations there is a constant gap between the views of the 
technology-in-use versus the view of the technology-as-imagined8. For stakeholders at the 
blunt end, the complexity of the technology in use will never be as apparent as it is for 
sharp end practitioners. Unless adequate resources are dedicated to address this 
problem, stakeholders at the blunt end will almost always run the risk of developing overly 
simplistic assumptions about the technology and the accompanying HAIs. 
This is especially the case considering that safety-critical service providers are technology-
intensive organisations. The continual demands for cost-effectiveness and safety, 
combined with the belief that technology is the answer to most operational problems, 
result in the constant deployment of novel automated tools in the operational 
environment. This increases the number of the coupling and interactions between 
components. As a result, new layers of technology-related complexity build on each other, 
and it remains difficult for decision makers and stakeholders outside to the operation 
room to keep track of how new technologies are actually used. 
The second dynamic that may affect sensitivity to HAI issues is the fact that, in safety-
critical industries, human-centred development does not enjoy the same importance as 
non-safety-critical industries, such as consumer electronics (Boy, 2012). For consumer 
                                                          
8 The notions of technology-as-imagined and technology-as-used discussed here are an 
extension of the known notions of work-as-imagined and work-as-done, which have been 
highlighted in the OS area  (Hollnagel, 2012a; Nemeth, 2008; Dekker, 2007). 
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electronics manufacturers the ability to understand in detail the end-user’s experience is 
a key factor for achieving and sustaining their competitive advantage. In other words, 
investments in user experience research usually generate a return in the form of increased 
sales. This is not necessarily the case for software manufacturers developing technology 
for safety-critical domains. In these domains automation development is known to be 
driven by technology centred, not human centred, development processes (Boy, 2012). 
For safety-critical service providers the development of human-centred technology is not 
necessarily at the core of the organisational mission. Automation is not an end in itself, 
but a means of improving the quality, safety, and efficiency of the safety-critical services 
they provide—e.g., the provision of air traffic control services to airline company; the 
provision of air, maritime, and railways transportation to passengers; the provision of 
healthcare services to the population (e.g., Blumenthal, 2009). It is around the provision 
of such services that the organisation has developed its main structure of roles and 
responsibilities.  
Therefore, in this context, the importance of human centred design is subsumed to other 
organisational and business performance areas which are more directly linked to the core 
activities of the organisation—the activities that are more financially relevant for the 
organisation. These activities are not the development of technology, but the delivery of 
a safety-critical service, usually to the public, under conditions of scarcity. Even when the 
organisation dedicates resources to novel technology development, these resources must 
be relatively limited. The majority of them is normally directed towards the administrative 
and operational activities necessary to sustain the services that generate (the majority of) 
company revenues. Thus, despite the continuous drive for the modernization of 
equipment and infrastructure, the integration of human centred design processes is not 
important here as it is for other industries. 
Essentially, the conditions mentioned above, i.e., the indeterminacy of technology 
combined with the devaluing of human centred automation principles, entail the constant 
risk for safety-critical service providers of downplaying the complexity intrinsic in the use 
and operation of automation. 
 LIMITATIONS & FUTURE WORK 
The research managed to consider the perspectives of various stakeholders involved in 
the implementation and improvement of the MSAW. However, one limitation was the 
limited consideration of manufacturer representatives and senior management. Future 
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studies could collect more data from manufacturers, so as to provide deeper insights into 
the third category of the framework, which addresses the relationships between the 
service provider and the manufacturer. In particular, it would be useful to clarify the range 
of strategies that safety-critical service provider can exploit to ensure that the supplied 
system fits the specific operational environment. The limited involvement of senior 
management was mitigated in the present research by using documentary sources. 
Future studies can increase the focus on this stakeholder group in order to shed further 
light into the actual rationales behind the introduction and use of technology.  
Furthermore, future studies may give further consideration to the perspectives of 
stakeholders external to the service provider organisation. Regarding such stakeholder 
group, this research considered the perspectives of the accident investigation body (Study 
1), and those of a standard developer’s agency (Studies 2 and 3). Future studies may 
further include the views of national and international regulators. Because they had a 
limited involvement in the setup of the studied alarm system, their views were minimally 
considered in this study (one EASA regulator was considered in study 2 and 3). However, 
it is likely that their involvement in the management of automation will increase as 
insights and lessons learned into the management of automation in safety-critical service 
providers, such as those provided by this study, become more available, and policies and 
regulations can be developed. 
The research detailed here is centred on the MSAW and the problem of nuisance alerts. 
Although an argument has been put forward to justify the relevance of the OPHAII 
framework also to other contexts, future research may investigate the management of 
other HAI issues, such as problems of automation surprises, expertise degradation, data 
overload, related to other kinds of automated systems, e.g., information displays and 
decision support systems. Future studies may also consider automated systems 
implemented and managed by safety-critical service provider organisations other than 
ANSPs, such healthcare providers, airline operators, railways operators etc. Applying the 
framework in different contexts would provide a further point of triangulation to refine 
and increase the framework’s generalisability. 
Also, it can be noted that while the framework lists a set of conditions that are relevant 
to handling HAI issues, it provides limited insight into how these conditions can be 
successfully established over time and maintained in safety-critical service providers. 
Therefore, it is important to investigate further (i) how safety-critical service providers 
organisations actually develop (or fail to develop) appropriate assumptions about the 
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usage of their automated systems and the accompanying HAI issues; (ii) how they develop 
appropriate HAI issues handling capabilities; and (iii) how they establish control over 
implementation at the service provider software provider boundary.  
Finally, future work may also investigate OPHAII’s actual usefulness. As discussed earlier 
(§ 8.4), the framework has a range of potential pragmatic applications. Future work could 
actually develop these pragmatic applications and evaluate the added value that they may 
bring to specific organisations. At a minimum, this value can be investigated both 
retrospectively and comparatively. A retrospective analysis would look at the novel 
insights that the framework could produce in a case of a past situation where a specific 
set of HAI issues was poorly handled. A comparative analysis would require implementing 
the framework in a defined automation implementation and improvement context, in 
order to see, in this context, what insights into the organisational precursors to HAI issues 
such an application can deliver in comparison to a baseline context—i.e., a comparable 
context in which the framework is not used. 
In concluding this section, it is important to remind that dedicated strategies have been 
implemented both at the level of the overall research (§ 4.3.4) and the individual studies 
(§ 4.6) in order to minimise the sources of bias and improve the validity of the study. 
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 CONCLUSIONS 
The main contributions to knowledge delivered by this research are theoretical, 
pragmatic, and methodological. These are described in the following three sections. 
8.7.1. Theoretical contribution 
The OPHAII framework contributes to addressing the research gap between current 
theoretical perspectives on HAI issues, the HCI (§ 2.2) and the system lifecycle (§ 2.3) 
perspectives, and the “enlarged” OS perspective (chapter 3), by identifying three classes 
of organisational precursors to HAI issues that can be found in the context of 
implementation and use of automation. Such precursors include: the organisational 
assumptions driving automation adoption and improvement; the availability of dedicated 
organisational capability for handling HAI issues; and the control over implementation 
quality established at the service provider software manufacturer boundary. The 
identification of these organisational precursors, which is supported by the findings of the 
research’s three empirical studies (chapters 5, 6, and 7), first, advances knowledge of how 
organisations operating in safety-critical domains actually manage the HAI issues 
accompanying the automated systems these organisations deploy and operate. Second, 
it supports the view of HAI issues as a symptom of deeper organisational problems, rather 
than solely as a problem of poor human machine interface design, or poor human factors 
and safety assurance. 
8.7.2. Pragmatic contribution 
OPHAII framework’s pragmatic value lies in the fact that its categories identify traits of an 
organisational context that can be monitored in order to assess the adequacy of such a 
context to handle HAI issues. As discussed earlier (§ 8.4), the framework can be translated 
into a checklist or auditing tool that safety-critical service provider organisations can use 
for periodic or retrospective assessment of the adequacy of their organisational context 
to handle HAI issues. In addition, the framework can be used by policy makers, regulators 
or standard developers to carry out comparative assessments of the potential for handling 
HAI issues across different safety-critical service providers found in the same industry. A 
final possible use is the enhancement of existing reporting schemes, so as to allow the 
systematic capture of organisational weaknesses in the handling of automation. These 
pragmatic uses of the framework are important as they promote the identification of 
corrective actions that are targeted at the organisational level, and that are 
complementary to those identified by the HCI and the system lifecycle perspectives.  
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Another pragmatic contribution can be identified. The first two studies of the research 
represent a contribution in their own right, as they provide deep insights into the 
organisational experiences and conditions relevant to the implementation and 
improvement of the MSAW system and the accompanying main HAI issue. The ability of 
practitioners to act in a pragmatic area, such as system safety and human factors, depends 
on their knowledge of a repertoire of relevant cases (Johansson, 2003). The cases 
presented in Studies 1 and 2 can be considered as contribution as they contribute to the 
development of a repertoire of case studies regarding the management of safety-critical 
automation. 
8.7.3. Methodological contribution 
This work makes three methodological contributions: 
 The first methodological contribution lies in the use of an original unit of analysis: 
the organisational trajectory of an HAI issue. While building on foundational work 
from the OS area (§ 4.3.2), the present research has shown, by means of Studies 
1 and 2, the insights that such a unit can provide, thus evincing the value this unit 
can deliver when used to inquire into the organisational and managerial sources 
of automation side effects in safety-critical domains (§ 8.3.2).  
 The second methodological contribution lies in having shown the theoretical 
insights that can be gained by using a type of data not normally used in the study 
of technology or in the OS area. The present research shows the valuable insights 
this type of data can offer to studies with an interest in the management of 
technology and safety (§ 8.3.1).  
 The third methodological contribution lies in the definition and use of an overall 
qualitative research strategy that, although based on the single qualitative case 
study approach, which is frequently found in the OS area, also departed from this 
basic approach (as described under § 4.3) in order to overcome its main 
limitations. 
These methodological aspects of the work can be classified as contributions because they 
provide examples of methodological strategies and choices that have worked in this 
research and can therefore be replicated in future research on the interaction between 
technology and safety-critical organisations.
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 REVIEW OF RELEVANT OS METHODOLOGIES 
This appendix reviews research methodologies found in the organisational safety (OS) 
literature, and draws conclusions about their potential for supporting the present 
research. The reviewed methodologies belong to two classes: 
1. Normative methodologies. Normative methodologies are mainly intended 
for safety practitioners for carrying out retrospective or perspective analysis 
of organisational accidents and extracting practical recommendations for 
safety improvement. These methodologies are based on the application of a 
theoretical model of organisational drift, which orients data collection and 
modelling.  
2. Interpretive methodologies. Interpretive methodologies have been crafted 
and used by scholars with an interest in producing a theory of the 
organisational causes of disaster, rather than just extracting safety 
recommendations. As in classic sociological qualitative research, the 
emphasis of interpretive methodologies is on working bottom-up for 
developing a model that account for the data that has been collected—
rather than modelling a situation in a top down fashion. 
A summary of the reviewed methodologies is reported in the Table 27. 
Table 27. Summary table of relevant OS methodologies available in the OS. 
NORMATIVE METHODOLOGIES INTERPRETIVE METHODOLOGIES 
 Management Oversight Risk 
Tree (MORT); 
 ACCIMAP; 
 Systemic Theoretic Process 
Analysis (STPA) 
 System Failure Method (SFM). 
 Grounded Theory 
Methodology (GTM); 
 Historical Ethnography; 
 Causal Mapping; 
 Analysis of the Vocabulary of 
Safety; 
 HRO cases; 
 Disciplined Imagination. 
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NORMATIVE APPROACHES 
Management Oversight Risk Tree (MORT) 
Arguably, the Management Oversight Risk Tree, or MORT, represents the earliest attempt 
to include managerial and organisational factors in safety analysis (Leveson, 2011, p. 31). 
MORT has been developed by Johnson in the mid 1970ies at the US Energy Research and 
Development Administration (ERDA, formerly AEC) (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992, p. 208). It 
has been developed following a review of best safety practices, found across a variety of 
industries, aimed at articulating general reference principles that could guide the 
assessment of safety management and safety assurance practices within organisations 
(Le Coze, 2008). In particular at the root of the analysis is a checklist that supports the 
systematic questioning about the state of the organisational activities intended to support 
the barriers and controls of hazardous work processes (Le Coze, 2008, p. 142). 
A typical MORT analysis consists of reconstructing the chain of events leading to an 
accident, of identifying the contributing (first level) factors and the intervening (second 
level) factors located at the sharp end, and of identifying the systemic managerial (third 
level) factors located at the system blunt end (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992, p. 208). For each 
event, the analysis needs to look up in the organisation for “management and design 
decisions about people, equipment, processes and procedures that are relevant to the 
accident” (NRI, 2009, p. x). The MORT checklist supports this process by providing 
questions about the quality and adequacy of risk analysis processes, of maintenance 
plans, of specified responsibilities and task assignments, of levels of supervision, of 
adopted procedures and training, and so forth (see e.g., NRI, 2009). 
Leveson notes that MORT is ultimately a usable method that can be applied for auditing 
purposes across a variety of industries. However, she also notes that “such generalisability 
also limits its usefulness” (Leveson, 2011, p. 31). Le Coze (2008) supports this view, and 
adds that MORT checklist does not allow to probe into the organisational conditions that 
produced a given managerial behaviour. Organisational factors were not extensively 
theorised at the time MORT was developed; hence they are not included in the method. 
Furthermore, MORT’s output consists on an explanation of how and to which extent a 
situation differs from best known safety practices—as embedded in the checklist—, and 
which of these best practices could have prevented an accident from happening (Le Coze, 
2008). Certainly, this makes the method appropriate for assessing the adequacy of safety 
management practices found in an organisation (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992, p. 208), but 
not for interpreting and explaining a specific accident or failure situation. The method 
does not support in fact the reconstruction of those conceptual links between the 
Appendix A 
173 
organisation, its history and context (Le Coze, 2008) which are of relevance in order to 
appreciate the processes of organisational drift into failure or adaptation. 
ACCIMAP 
ACCIMAP is a risk management technique developed by Jens Rasmussen and Inge 
Svedung for the Swedish Rescue Service Agency. It aims at characterising the systemic 
precursors to accidents located at various levels of society (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000). 
The approach is rooted on Rasmussen’s socio-technical control model of risk 
management. Within this model, the socio-technical control system includes those actors 
at the blunt end that might influence the way a hazardous process is managed at the sharp 
end of the system. Such actors can be found at six distinct levels: government, regulators, 
branch association, company, management and staff (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000, p. 68; 
Leveson, 2011, p. 31). Accidents arise from the unintended and undesirable combination 
of the side effects resulting from the stream of normal decisions of organisational actors 
located at these levels. Such side effects can create the landscape through which ‘an 
accidental flow of events might evolve’ (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000, p. 24).  
As in traditional accident analysis, ACCIMAP analysis starts with the reconstruction of the 
chain of events at the work process level (sharp end) to explain how the accident has 
evolved over time. However, this is just a point of departure. The analyst has to search for 
links between failures found at the level of the work process and the (biased) decisions 
taken by different actors at the various levels of the socio-technical system at different 
point in time prior to the accident. The last step of the analysis consists of characterising 
the local information environments within which these actors operated. The selection and 
presentation of information has in fact implications regarding ‘what people will see as the 
problem to be solved, and what aspects of that problem are relevant and which are not’ 
(Dekker, 2011a, p. 112). The objective is not to search for managerial errors, but for those 
normal decisions, taken at different points in time by organisationally ‘disconnected’ 
actors, which might have induced unsafe conditions in the work system. Ultimately, such 
analysis is able to report systemic sources of bias in organisational decision-making. 
For instance, in the analysis of the loss of the Brazilian space programme’s launch vehicle 
in 2003, Johnson and de Almeida (2008) identified systemic bias at government level 
(absence of legislation on complex system development and analysis, delays and 
retention in resources allocation due to resources control by Finance Ministry); company 
level (conflicting priorities and problems in collecting feedback about system anomalies); 
and staff level (absence of a risk management team). 
Ultimately, ACCIMAP provides practitioners and accident investigators with a powerful 
unit of analysis including all of the societal levels involved in risk management. In 
Appendix A 
174 
particular, the approach demands an appreciation of the vertical integration among socio-
technical levels and its link to operational safety. This is original as usually different levels 
of such system are the subjects of independent disciplines.  
However, it can be observed that the approach has not been developed for theorizing 
purposes. ACCIMAP is unable to support the analysis of those softer cultural and sense 
making dimensions of organisational failure—such as those embedded in the models of 
Turner, Vaughan and Weick (see §3.2.4)—that can explain why a group of organisational 
actors behaved in a certain way. For instance, the Waterson and Jenkis’s ACCIMAP 
analysis of an infection outbreak occurred at an NHS trust in the UK between 2004 and 
2006 (Waterson & Jenkis, 2010), ultimately had to import the theoretical concepts of 
Vaughan’ s normalisation of deviance to explain the managerial inability to act despite the 
presence of a known risk, and Weick’s culture of entrapment to explain why the behaviour 
of clinicians and other healthcare professionals become trapped into a particular 
(ineffective) line of action. 
Systemic Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) 
The systemic-theoretic process analysis (STPA) (Leveson, 2011) is a hazard analysis 
methodology developed by Leveson at MIT, which is based on the system theoretic model 
of accident (STAMP). STAMP (§ 3.2.2) sees systems as composed of interrelated 
components kept in a state of dynamic equilibrium. Safety is an emergent property that 
is achieved when system’s and components’ behaviours are kept within predefined safety 
constraints. On the other hand, failure is explained in terms of what safety constraints 
have been violated and why controls have been inadequate in enforcing those 
constraints. The categories of control flaws include (i) inadequate enforcement of 
constraints (control actions); (ii) inadequate enforcement of control action; and (iii) 
inadequate or missing feedback. 
STPA can be applied for identifying sources of hazards related to the human, hardware 
and software components of the operational system (sharp end). Furthermore, similarly 
to ACCIMAP, it can identify sources of hazards related to the socio-technical control 
structure (blunt end), i.e. managerial and organisational flaws.  
When applied to the identification of such flaws, STPA provides to system stakeholders a 
structured method to identify where relevant constraints at various hierarchical levels can 
be lost. From here, the approach promotes the identification of the information and 
documentation to make sure that safety constraints are enforced in system design 
(Leveson, 2011). The analysis has two main steps: (i) identify the potential for inadequate 
control of the system that could lead to a hazardous state; and (ii) determine how each 
potentially hazardous control action identified in the first step could occur.  
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Leveson used STPA to carry out a programmatic and organisational risk analysis related to 
a NASA control function, the NASA Independent Technical Authority (ITA). This 
organisational function was created to reduce the lack of independence of the Safety 
Program from the Space Shuttle program manager, as this condition was fund to 
contribute to the loss of Columbia (Leveson, 2011, p. 231). Leveson analysed the 
requirements that were not being enforced in the ITA organisational structure; as well as 
basic risks and coordination risks. (These latter usually arise when multiple actors control 
the same process.) Eventually, STPA was helpful to identify potential changes to the safety 
control structure that could eliminate or mitigate identified risks. In particular, the 
methodology allowed to identify about 150% more hazards than a separate expert 
analysis of the same function carried out by NASA.  
STPA provides a structured approach to identify systemic hazards in the safety control 
structure and devise appropriate remedies accordingly. The identified hazards can be in 
fact quickly fixed by adding additional safety constraints. Also, the methodology has the 
merit of expanding the scope of traditional hazard analysis approaches, such as HAZOP, 
event tree analysis and fault tree analysis. STAMP includes types of hazards that exceed 
the scope of these models. When used for theoretical purposes, the approach seems to 
suffer from the same limitation as ACCIMAP. The approach has not been designed to 
account for and explain those softer organisational and social processes involved in drift 
into failure—such as the development of beliefs dysfunctional to safety goals. For 
instance, while the approach is helpful to spot missing, poorly implemented or 
uncoordinated safety constraints, it reduces explanations of failure to flaws in the control 
structure, i.e., it does not allow understanding why such flaws come into place. 
Table 28. Control flaws leading to hazard (Leveson, 2002) 
1. Inadequate Enforcement of Constraints (control actions) 
1.1. Unidentified hazards 
1.2. Inappropriate, ineffective, or missing control actions for identified 
hazards 
1.2.1. Design of control algorithm (process) does not enforce 
constraints 
 Flaws in creation process 
 Process change without appropriate change in control algorithm 
(asynchronous evolution) 
 Incorrect modification or adaptation 
1.2.2. Process models inconsistent, incomplete or incorrect 
 Flaws in creation process; 
 Flaws in updating process (asynchronous evolution) 
 Time Lag and measurement inaccuracies not accounted for 
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1.2.3. Inadequate coordination between controllers and decision 
makers 
2. Inadequate execution of control actions 
2.1. Communication flow 
2.2. Inadequate actuator operation 
2.3. Time Lag 
3. Inadequate or missing feedback 
3.1. Not provided in system design 
3.2. Communication flow 
3.3. Time lag 
3.4. Inadequate sensor operation (incorrect or no information provided) 
 
System Failure Method (SFM) 
Developed by Fortune and Peters at Open University, the System Failure Method (SFM) 
draws extensively on system concepts in order to produce a systemic interpretation of 
accidents and disasters (Fortune & Peters, 1995). SFM belongs to the class of interpretive 
system approaches to management, such as Soft System Analysis (Checkland, 1999); 
hence it put great emphasis on the understanding of the multiple subjective viewpoints 
and perspectives that are involved in the development of failure. However, in comparison 
to other interpretive system approaches, the SFM focuses more on learning from cases of 
accidents and disasters, rather than managerial optimization. To Peters and Fortune, the 
production of case studies on failure is part of an organisational analogical learning 
process by which organisations can learn by comparing their own activities, processes or 
performances with failed safety practices occurring in their and other industries (Fortune 
& Peters, 1995, p. 8). 
In short, SFM consists of a structured approach that allows the researcher to move from 
the real world failure to an abstracted representation of it. From here, system thinking, 
qualitative modelling, and comparison provide insights into the sources of failure, so that 
it is possible to derive lessons learnt and recommendations for improvement. Throughout 
the analysis, the SFM can accommodate a variety of qualitative system modelling 
techniques to capture the multiple interconnected and salient features of a situation. To 
Fortune and Peters, such flexibility is one of the distinctive traits over others, more rigid, 
investigative techniques.  
In practice, an SFM analysis entails a sequence of stages, namely pre-analysis, system 
modelling, and comparison. During the pre-analysis stage, the objective is to gather and 
organize the information related to the situation under analysis, and produce a focused 
definition of failure. SFM acknowledges in fact that although a situation has been labelled 
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as a failure, it is necessary to devise a more specific definition as the focus of the analysis 
(Fortune & Peters, 1995, p. 100). For instance, the authors suggest that a major accident, 
such as the fire at Manchester Airport in 1999, might comprise several failures, each of 
which can be chosen as the exclusive object of analysis. The choice of which failure to 
consider for analysis depends on the purpose, viewpoints and perspectives involved. For 
instance, in relation to the Manchester Airport’s fire, SFM’s authors noted that a firm that 
manufacturers smoke-hoods might have had an interest on commissioning a study so that 
its findings could be used “to support the case that the Civil Aviation Authority should 
require carriers to provide all passengers with smoke-hoods. For such a study the 
perspectives and viewpoints of the clients, passengers and carriers would be of primary 
importance. However, if the Civil Aviation Authority itself commissioned a system failures 
study of the accident with a view to examining the adequacy of existing British Civil 
Airworthiness Requirements, then many more viewpoints and perspectives would have 
to be taken into account” (Fortune & Peters, 1995, p. 93).  
During the second stage, system modelling, the analyst will translate the insights gained 
from the earlier pre-analysis phase into a qualitative systemic representation. Within 
SFM, failure is in fact conceived as an “output, or lack of outputs, of transformations 
processes carried out by a system” (Fortune & Peters, 1995, p. 101). Consequently the 
understanding of failure requires the representation of the broader systems within which 
such transformations have occurred.  
To note that both the pre-analysis and the system modelling phases can benefit from the 
use of a variety of qualitative systemic modelling techniques, such as a (i) spray maps, (ii) 
rich picture, (iii) relationship diagrams, and (iv) multiple cause diagrams, for the pre-
analysis, and (i) input-output diagrams, (ii) system maps, and (iii) influence diagrams, for 
the analysis. According to the authors, such flexibility allows the collection of depth 
insights into the interconnected features of a situation. 
The subsequent stage, comparison, consists of comparing the model of the actual 
situation with existing “models of how a situation should be operated and managed if it 
is to be operated without failure” (Fortune & Peters, 1995, p. 110). This phase is at the 
core of the model since here insights about the potential sources of failure are identified. 
The first comparison is carried out at system level against an idealized model of a robust 
system. Such representation, called the Formal System Model (FSM), embeds different 
components, interactions and system boundaries that are supposed to denote the 
conditions under which a system produces the intended output. By comparing this 
idealized model with the model of the actual situation under analysis it is possible to 
identify discrepancies in the latter. Such discrepancies might pertain specific parts, and 
can be investigated through subsequent focused comparisons with models of good 
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practices, related to aspects of communication, control, and human factors at the 
individual, group and organisational levels. For instance, concerning the analysis of 
organisational factors, the SFM suggests the model of planning of Hall (1982) as a basis 
for comparison. This model explains failures based on interactions among a triangle of 
actors, namely bureaucrats, politicians, and the public.  
IN addition to this model, SFM comes with an array of theoretical models available in the 
literature which can be used in the comparative stage of the process. Such models are 
those that have been found most useful through several applications of the model. 
However, this base is only suggested, and the authors maintain that future uses of the 
SFM can include more models.  
INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES 
Grounded Theory Methodology  
The Grounded Theory Methodology (GTM) (Glaser & Strauss, 2009) lies at the core of the 
seminal work of Barry Turner, who is usually referred to as the first scientist who has 
adopted an organisational perspective on the study of accidents (Catino, 2013; Dekker, 
2012). His research on safety-critical systems—initiated in the mid-seventies—has been 
arguably the main theoretical precursor to the contemporary safety debate on 
organisational safety that developed since the early 90s (Catino, 2002). Up to then, if we 
omit the Perrow’s NAT and the High Reliability Organisations (HRO), accidents were 
conceptualised mainly as a sequence of technical failures and human errors— but the 
societal components of disaster were left mainly unexplored.  
Turner’s Man Made Disaster theory has resulted from a GTM analysis of eighty-four 
accident reports published by the UK government over the period 1965–1975. The reports 
were compared in order to extract common underlying themes across different accidents 
(Fortune & Peters, 1995, p. 48). To Turner, relevant themes consisted of organisational 
behaviours that hampered the organisation ability to control risk. These included for 
instance poor handling of critical information, incorrect assumptions, lack of compliance 
to regulations, reluctance to accept danger. These themes emerged after an initial 
analytical step centred on the comparative analysis of three accident reports only. 
Subsequently, Turner explored if and how the identified themes applied to the other 
accidents. 
By following this approach, Turner was able to produce a six-stage longitudinal model of 
accident disaster development, where the protracted incubation period was the most 
important phase. In fact, by characterising this process, he has been able to show for the 
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first time that accidents are preceded by a history of anomalies and hazards being 
downplayed. 
Turner wrote extensively on the GTM data handling procedures he used (Turner, 1981, 
1983). GTM is a structured approach to social inquiry to generating theories of social 
interaction from qualitative data. It has emerged in the 60ies from the seminal work of 
Glaser & Strauss (2009) as an alternative to the mainstream quantitative positivistic 
sociology, which emphasised hypothetic deductive testing of existing grand theories of 
society, while relegating the role of qualitative and explorative research to the margins of 
social research.  
The development of GTM proceeds by developing systematic conceptualisations: the 
researcher seeks to construct a theory by extracting concepts from incidents and events 
found across the data, and establishing conceptual connections between them until a 
single theoretical explanation is achieved (Tarozzi, 2008; Richards & Morse, 2007; 
Cicognani, 2002). Operationally, this happens through a set of systematic steps through 
which data is dissected, conceptualised and reassembled in new explanatory ways (Flick, 
2009). Initially, different data segments are coded for individual conceptual categories 
which are very close to the data, and do not clearly relate nor to each other, nor to any 
existing theoretical framework—under GTM the researcher seeks to avoid imposing 
existing theories or ideas. As the research progresses, while some of the generated 
categories have to be dropped, links between other categories may become clearer, until 
the data can be reduced to a few conceptual categories—more abstract and general 
compared to those generated in the earlier phase—that provide a theoretical explanation 
of what the data stands for.  
Two strategic trademarks of this analytic process are the constant comparative method 
and the theoretical sampling (Partington, 2002). The constant comparative method 
consists of comparing continuously along the research process events, properties and 
dimensions found across incidents. For instance the researcher can compare evidences 
about incidents with evidences from other incidents previously collected and grouped 
under a concept that stand for those data. The comparison will generate insights about 
whether the new incident can be allocated under the existing concept, about whether the 
concept has to be refined in order to account for the new incident, or if a new concept 
will have to be provided. Such a comparison is fundamental for the analysis as it allows 
the researcher to differentiate between categories and find dimensions and properties 
peculiar to the specific category.  
Theoretical sampling is the process by which the researcher maintains control over the 
emergent theory. Through theoretical sampling it is possible to plan the next phases of 
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data collection in order to minimise or maximise differences between cases. This 
approach differs from statistical sampling in that the focus in not on generalisation (i.e., 
collecting cases which abide to the law of statistical inference), but on extending or 
refining the developing theory. An aspect of theoretical sampling directly borrowed from 
Bacon’s inductive method is the exploration of cases found in the data that seems to 
contradict the emergent theory. The analysis of negative cases is intended to strengthen 
the final emergent theory. 
Historical Ethnography 
The work of the American sociologist Diane Vaughan brought interpretive sociological 
analysis to the realm of safety. Her analysis of the Challenger and Columbia disasters 
departed from Turner’s observation that accidents are usually preceded by history of 
signals about anomalies being downplayed. However, with respect to Turner, Vaughan 
has drawn on extensive micro data about key decisions preceding launch as well as macro 
data about institutional and organisational dynamics. This is original since Turner did not 
have macro level data to explain decision-making (Vaughan, 1997), but mainly accident 
reports. 
Also, Vaughan’s work has important precursors in the work of Star and Gerson (1987), 
who studied how unexpected anomalies are responded to in scientific work. These 
scholars have found that anomalies’ definition, negotiation and control are influenced by 
the institutional context and by the controls that have been put in place to deal with them. 
To Star and Gerson, the response to deviant or discrepant events and the consequential 
“trajectory” of these anomalies does not happen in isolation but is a reflection of the 
organisational system within which it is embedded.  
Vaughan’ approached her investigation of the NASA disasters of Challenger and Columbia 
historically. She departed from the accident to reconstructs the “trajectories” of the O-
ring and the debris tiles anomalies within NASA prior to the disasters, and from the 
rationale of the insiders. In fact, anomalies prior a disaster might or might not be 
interpreted as a safety threat within the organisation, might be clear or ambiguous, might 
be perceived as imminent danger or not (Edmondson et al., 2005). 
The American sociologist concluded that prior to the event, personnel operated according 
to the rationale embedded in the document and NASA organisational culture, thus the 
disaster was not a case of negligence as firstly stated in the official presidential report; 
rather it was a case of organisational-systemic failures—namely the failure to learn, the 
failure to aggregate relevant information, the regulatory failure to overseeing safety-
critical processes (Vaughan, 1989, 1990, 1996). Eventually, she has been able to explain 
accident causation as consequential to three organisational patterns—normalisation of 
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deviance, structural secrecy, and conflicting institutional objectives—which 
systematically can lead organisations to downplay risk while pursuing economic targets 
(Vaughan, 2005). Ultimately, the explanations generated by her approach are structural 
in that it explains actions of the past as constructed, formed, or organized by major 
institutional forces, rather than unconstrained individual choices (Parsons, 2007).  
She qualified her approach as an historical ethnography, i.e., a way to elicit structure and 
culture from documents created prior to an event in order to understand how people in 
another time and place made sense of things” (Vaughan, 2004). Vaughan based her 
conclusions on the collection of a wide amount of interviews with NASA engineers, 
contractors and managers and official documentary data over a period of nearly a decade. 
This material was scrutinised in order to understand how individual sense making, cultural 
understandings, and actions prior the accident were shaped by historical institutional, 
ideological, economic, political, and organisational forces (Vaughan, 2004). 
Also, Vaughan provided a discussion about the process of theorizing from empirical data. 
She states that researchers should theorise by comparing analogous events, activities, or 
incidents found in different social settings, of various complexities, sizes, and functions. 
She legitimates the use of this process, that she calls analogical theorising, by observing 
that it is commonly found in many classic sociological works (she mentions Blau, 1964; 
Goffman, 1961; Hirschamn, 1970; Hughes, 1984). To her, only Stinchcombe (1978) refers 
openly the search for analogies and differences across cases, but for similar social units 
only (e.g., all nation states). But a second and more important aspect in analogical 
theorising is perhaps the idea of linking patterns found in the data to known theories or 
concepts as the research progresses. The rationale being that there are always concepts, 
models, and theories influencing researcher interpretations. Making them explicit makes 
possible to reject, conceptualise, and/or working toward more generable explanations.  
Causal Mapping 
In the book Friendly Fire, Snook (2002) produced a revisionist account of the accidental 
shutdown of two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters by a U.S F-15 fighter jet in Northern Iraq in 
1999. In the same book, the American author provides a succinct three pages description 
of his analytical strategy.  
Snook could draw on a large evidentiary base including both primary and secondary data. 
Time-stamped audio, video and data tapes were coupled with in-depth interviews with 
multiple subjects located at various positions in the army ranks. These interviews helped 
to understand “what information was available to whom and when in the build up to the 
accident.”(Snook, 2002, p. 18) 
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Drawing on this data, he worked through a five steps process in order to construct a causal 
map of the tragedy. Step one consisted of constructing a precise multileveled timeline of 
the events proximal to the tragedy. The timeline showed interactions across the crews 
involved (the two Black Hawks, the two F-15, and an AWACS) prior to the shutdown. Step 
two coupled this map was with the practical accounts emerged by the in-depth interviews 
he collected from multiple informants. So, while step one provided a pure factual 
description of the events, e.g., “At approximately 1030, the lead pilot fired an AMRAAM 
missile at the trail helicopter”, step two added various institutional and more general 
explanations, e.g., “The accident resulted from a failure to integrate helicopter operations 
into OPC flight operations.”(Snook, 2002, p. 18). Step three consisted of systematically 
subjecting this early version of the causal map to a series of questions, in order to add 
details, sharpen temporal and causal dependencies between the events, and developing 
a theoretically oriented explanation. During this step, Snook reported to have drawn on 
“a rich set of data, a working knowledge of military organisations, and broad reading of 
behavioural science literature” (Snook, 2002, p. 20). Also, he has made references to the 
methodological concepts and procedures of ‘disciplined imagination’, ‘theoretical 
sensitivity’, ‘open’ and ‘axial’ coding, mentioned by other OS scholars; although a clear 
description about these and the way they were used in his research is not provided. In 
Step four, the different parts of the map were subsequently subjected to counterfactual 
(“what if”) interrogation, in order to challenge the causal significance of each major event. 
This process allowed to assess whether the events involved were actually significant to 
the development of the history as it happened, or not (in this latter case they were 
removed from the map). The final steps consisted of developing a single story line that 
could stand for the events and causal links embedded in the map, and validating the final 
story against the data. 
Overall, Snook’s methodological account appears to be very pragmatic. Further, his 
constant concerns with systematic questioning and counterfactual analysis seem to 
strengthen the confidence on his results. It is however difficult to understand fully how 
he abstracted the first description of events (Step 1) into a broader multileveled 
conceptual explanation (Step 3). Although he made references to various methodological 
concepts, such references were only indicative: arguably more information would have 
been beneficial to understand how such concepts have been implemented. Such a lack of 
information can be understood considering that his methodological account was part of 
a book intended for a broader audience including practitioners, and not just academics. 
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Analysis of Vocabulary of Safety  
William Ocasio, a Professor in management and organisation at the Kellogg University, 
examined the role of safety culture in the production of the Columbia Accident (Ocasio, 
2005). His work departed from CAIB key conclusion that safety culture was a key factor in 
the development of that disaster. Through a in depth linguistic analysis, he came to 
confute the CAIB conclusion. 
Ocasio’s methodological approach builds on a theoretical view of language in organisation 
according to which specialized domain of organisational practices are articulated by 
systems of specific and interrelated vocabularies (Ocasio, 2005; Loewenstein & Ocasio, 
2004, p. 4). For instance, within organisations it is possible to find vocabularies of business 
strategy (e.g., strategic planning, strengths-weaknesses-opportunities, sustainable 
competitive advantage, core competence, experience curve), of corporate human 
resources (e.g., workout, vitality curve, Six Sigma), and safety and risk (e.g., disaster, risk 
management, acceptable risk, system anomaly). Each of such vocabularies is composed 
by a set of interrelated words or group of words for articulating specific areas of 
organisational practice (Loewenstein & Ocasio, 2004, p. 5). Vocabulary of organising might 
include references to “formal structure, to organisational roles, processes, systems and 
techniques employed in the formulation and implementation of organisational practices” 
(Loewenstein & Ocasio, 2004, p. 5).  
An important precursor to this view of language is the classic work of March and Simon 
(1958), according to which organisation’s vocabularies and classification schemes embeds 
the concepts that frame the way a given issue will be interpreted and discussed. Issues 
that fit within such system of concept are communicated promptly within the 
organisation; issues or problems that do not fit, are communicated with difficulty. The 
system of concept reflected in the organisation vocabulary influences the way in which 
organisational members perceive and interpret the world.  
One implication of these considerations is that while verbal expressions and their linkages 
are indicative of the culture of an organisation, the examination of vocabularies ‘provides 
an opening to understand what organisations think (Douglas, 1986, p. 102). For instance, 
an analysts can trace the meaning of specific works of a given vocabulary, to observe how 
this varies over time and across different organisational members. 
In his analysis of the Columbia accident, Ocasio used archival and historical sources to 
reconstruct as accurately as possible the phenomenological experience of organisational 
members in the NASA space shuttle program (Ocasio, 2005). By phenomenological 
experience, Ocasio appears to refer to the viewpoints, perceptions and interpretations 
held by NASA personnel prior to the tragedy. Ocasio analysis proceeded exploratively by 
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retrieving all documents containing key terms such as safety, risk, disaster, acceptable 
risk, safety of flight (Ocasio, 2005, p. 106 ). He then explored the meaning attached to 
these vocabularies, if and how they evolved over time, how meanings influence the 
categorization of anomalies, if and how existing organisation schemes were able to 
accommodate for uncertainty and ambiguity. 
As anticipated earlier, Ocasio’s findings contradict the findings of CAIB on one important 
point. To Ocasio, Columbia did not have a breach in safety culture, i.e., normalisation of 
deviance, as a main root cause. He found that although the foam debris anomaly was a 
known issue within NASA prior to the disaster, it was not anticipated that such event could 
damage the ultra-resistant carbon panels located in the left wing leading edge of 
Columbia. None of the risk and safety documents he analysed identified the impact of the 
foam debris on the reinforced carbon panels as a relevant safety issue. From his analysis, 
it appeared that the underlying assumption was that although the foam debris could have 
damaged the thermal tiles covering the Shuttle structure, it would not have breached the 
underlying carbon panels; and this explains why NASA considered the risk of foam debris 
as an ‘acceptable risk’. Thus, Ocasio concluded it was the failure to establish a conceptual 
link between the foam debris and their impact the carbon panel as the cause of the 
accident. In his view, this was a case of failure of imagination, but certainly not a case of 
normalisation of deviance (§ 3.2.3), as the risk in question was not known. 
Thus, Ocasio concluded that it is the loose coupling between two conditions the cause of 
the disaster. He noted that this idea seems to contradict Perrow’s NAT theory (see § 
3.2.5), which maintains that the potential for accident is created by high interactive 
complexity and tight coupling. However, the contradiction is only apparent because NAT 
refers to the coupling existing in the actual software, hardware and human components 
of the operational system; while the coupling eloquently documented by Ocasio refers to 
the conceptual view over coupling between two events as maintained by NASA 
participants. 
Ocasio’s methodology has the merit of bringing organisational cultural analysis to the 
realm of organisational safety analysis. His work seems to develop along the line of 
Vaughan historical ethnography (described earlier in this Appendix). Both appear to 
maintain purposefully an historical focus over the evolution of anomalies in organisations. 
However, compared to Vaughan, Ocasio embeds a more articulated epistemic foundation 
of language, that ultimately provide the researcher with a more empirically tractable unit 
of analysis, i.e., specific words and expressions as embedded in a given vocabulary of 
safety. 
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HRO Cases 
While the methodologies reviewed in the previous sections deal with after-the-fact 
investigation of failure, this section reports on the work of the High Reliability 
Organisation (HRO) scholars, which notably have investigated how high-risk organisations 
maintain safety (§ 3.3). HRO scholars have maintained an exclusive interest on 
understanding those organisational traits—such as structural patterns, type of 
management and operational practices, organisational culture—involved in ensuring and 
maintaining error free operations in safety critical domains. Their work was motivated by 
the absence in the literature of a theory which could explain how some kind of high risk 
organisation can actually operate nearly error free. Consequently, their focus was on the 
understanding of normal day-to-day operations in an attempt “to draw lessons from cases 
where operations have gone mostly according to plan, in contrast to studies that review 
past accidents to determine what went wrong” (Bourrier, 2002). 
In particular, HRO scholar’s empirical work focused on studying such normal operations 
within three organisations: the US Federal Aviation Administration’s Air Traffic Control 
System; Electric Operations and Power Generations Departments; the peacetime flight 
operations of two U.S. Navy aircraft carriers. These organisations were selected as case 
studies given their impressive safety records. They were analysed through in-depth case 
studies, each case centred on a single organisation and aimed at getting insights into the 
specific organisational processes and strategies at play.  
Despite their influence on the safety literature, it has been noted that HRO scholars have 
somehow underreported their methodological approaches (Bourrier, 2011). In 
comparison to most of the work reviewed in this chapter, they did not seem concerned 
with providing in-depth accounts about their methods in dedicated publications. Their 
rare methodological accounts cover only a limited part of the methodology. 
Rochlin has provided a short general overview of the methodological orientation of her 
and his HRO’s colleagues, reporting that their research program “evolved from 
straightforward interview and survey work to a more complex blend of organisational 
analysis, studies of organisational culture and ethnographic observations at all levels of 
the organisations” (Rochlin, 1996, p. 55). More recently, he has added that HRO field-work 
was “as intimate as that characterising participant observations”, although participation 
was not possible due to the nature of the risk involved in the observed practice (Rochlin, 
2011). It transpires from these observations a methodological concern with depth of the 
inquiry, as, arguably, the viewpoints and perspectives of practitioners were deemed to be 
relevant by HRO to understand how a particular organisation achieved safety.  
Roberts (1990), in her investigation of peacetime aircraft carrier operations, reported on 
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the logistic aspects of data collection. She reported that researcher collected data by 
going to sea “intermittently for periods of five to ten days, making observations and 
learning jobs done aboard the ships” (Roberts, 1990, p. 164). During these periods, 
researchers entered field notes “into computers every few hours when the pace of the 
ship’s activity permitted”, and different researchers had a different background and were 
assigned to different observation location in the ship to avoid individual research bias 
(Roberts, 1990, p. 164). So, implicit in this note, is a HRO methodological concern with 
maintaining objectivity by ensuring the cross-checking of data among researchers. 
Roe and Schulman (2008) have indulged into one of the longest and most detailed 
methodological description found in the HRO literature. In their monograph, High 
Reliability Management: Operating on the Edge, which investigated the intricate 
operations of California Independent System Operator (CAISO), they provided a two pages 
description of their methodology. First, they approached key CAISO officials in order to 
get permission to interview key participants. These were selected using the snowballing 
technique, in which new key participants for interviews were identified based on 
suggestions from previous interviewees. This went on until the research reached a point 
at which new participants mentioned very similar sort of issues as previously stated by 
previous participants (Roe & Schulman, 2008, p. 225). In general, interviews were 
reported to last about one hour or more, and were supported by a structured 
questionnaire allowing for open-ended answers. Ultimately, Roe and Schulman reported 
to interview about a hundred operators, and have spent an equal number of hours doing 
fields observations of control room operations. Unfortunately, not much is said about the 
qualitative data analysis techniques deployed in their study. 
Overall, these rare methodological accounts provided by HRO authors appear to cover 
mainly the type of data and the data collection approaches used in their case studies. In 
particular they seem to have prioritized the collection of ethnographic notes and 
observations, and individual and group interviews with participants in order to maximise 
insights into the specific processes under study. Because of this, Bourrier has observed 
that HRO cases are essentially ethnographic in nature, and also that they have the merit 
of having brought the ethnographic approach to the study of high-risk organisations 
(Bourrier, 2011, p. 14).  
Perrow has objected that the excessive proximity to the organisational practice under 
study intrinsic in the HRO research might have compromised the objectivity of HRO 
findings. However, this observation seems to ignore that secondary data reporting on how 
safety is achieved during normal operations was not available within the organisations 
HRO investigated. Usually, such a reporting activity is not a standard practice as it is the 
production of official reports of major accidents and disasters—the kind of secondary data 
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used by Perrow and other scholars. Consequently, HRO scholars had no choice but to gain 
access and collect primary data about practitioners’ activities and viewpoints in order to 
investigate safety enhancing organisational processes. Furthermore, to further mitigate 
Perrow’s criticism, they strived for objectivity by ensuring constant cross checking of 
findings. 
Note however that HRO scholars seem to have remained silent about data analysis. Not 
account or reference has been found about the theorizing process. A notable exception 
to this trend is provided by Karl Weick, an eminent organisational scientist who has often 
been associated to the HRO group, and who has reported extensively on the theory 
building process in the context of organisation research. His approach, disciplined 
imagination, is discussed next. 
Disciplined Imagination  
Weick’s methodological contribution departs from the observation that theory 
construction has often been described as a linear problem solving process (Weick, 1989). 
However, this view misses the essence of the thinking involved: theory building is 
characterised by simultaneous parallel thinking rather than sequential, and most 
importantly it has at its core the imaginative exploration of metaphors and images (Weick, 
1989). 
To Weick, theory building is essentially a sense-making process (Weick, 2005). The need 
for a theory arises from a gap between available concepts and the observed reality. The 
scientist is called to make sense of a reality that cannot be explained using available 
theories. Such a conceptual gap can be filled by relying on systematic analogical 
reasoning: i.e., understanding new uncertain situations by projecting meaning from 
analogous more familiar ones. While such an analogical and sense-making process is 
usually intuitive and unconscious, Weick made it explicit in order to present it as a 
legitimate and structured approach to theory building. 
Such approach, called disciplined imagination (Weick, 1989), relies on the design and 
conduct of imaginary experiments, where a researcher, confronted with its data, 
tentatively explores the plausibility of different metaphors in representing and expressing 
the complex organisational phenomena embedded in that data. Such imaginary 
experiments stimulate the production of various metaphorical images, which in turn are 
selected through careful judgment, and possibly retained for further theorizing. 
For example, a notable Weick’s writing elaborated a view of organisational improvisation 
as jazz (Weick, 1998). Here, organisational improvisation is viewed as “performative in 
nature, guided by technical structures and minimal social structures and involving 
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simultaneous reflection and action, simultaneous rule creation and following, continuous 
mixing of the expected with the novel” (Cornelissen, 2006, p. 15). In order to get to such 
a unifying perspective over organisational improvisation, Cornelissen has suggested that 
several tough trials were carried out by Weick, as a result of which many alternative 
metaphors were discarded (2006, p. 35).  
The same analytical process was behind the generation of a theoretical view of 
organisational behaviour as a collective mind. Weick exploited this metaphor to produce 
an organisational explanation of an accident occurred in 1949, in which thirteen 
smokejumpers perished during the firefighting operations in the valley of the Mann Gulch, 
Montana (Weick, 1993). While early explanations attributed the disaster to the presence 
of extraordinary environmental factors, Weick explanation identified the collapse of sense 
making in the firefighting team as the sociological cause of the disaster. It was the 
dissolution of the system of roles, a loose leadership, inefficient communications, and 
biased assessment of the fire dimension that ultimately created a desegregated 
organisation system unable to make collective and shared sense of an emergency 
situation (Catino, 2002, p. 86).  
Both Weick’s analyses have exploited an underlying metaphor to produce vocabularies 
and theoretical representations that have provided a fresh and insightful perspective over 
the organisational phenomena under analysis. Furthermore, such vocabularies and 
languages have also been referred to, debated and tested by other works (Cornelissen, 
2006, p. 17). For instance, Weick himself exploited the metaphor of the organisational 
processes as a collective mind to explain the collective behaviour of pilots during flight 
deck operations (Weick & Roberts, 1993), and how HRO organisations organize around 
failure in a way that promotes a an ongoing state of mindfulness (Weick et al., 2008). 
It must be noted that in the organisational and management science another notable 
scientist has raised the explicit and systematic use of metaphor to the status of to that of 
a legitimate research method. Similarly to Weick, Garreth Morgan’s seminal books Images 
of Organisations (Morgan, 2006) discussed the use of metaphors as devices for the 
interpretive reading of complex organisational realities. He proposed that organisations 
could be seen as machines, as organisms, as brains, as cultures, and as political systems. 
The choice of which metaphor to use to make sense of a given situation influences the 
nature of the meaning that will be projected on it. Morgan’s book enhances Weick’ 
disciplined imagination in two important ways. First, it suggests that the reading of a 
situation might require more than the selection of a single overarching metaphor: the 
insights of other supporting metaphors might be considered to enhance the analytical 
process and the ensuing explanation.  
Appendix A 
189 
Also, Morgan appears to be more concerned about providing guidance about the overall 
research process. To Morgan, as in classic ethnographic research, a researcher needs first 
to get inside the organisation to understand a situation as far as possible on its own terms. 
He or she should adopt the role of the learner rather than that of an expert, in order to 
purposefully suspend judgment, avoid premature closure and leave room for new insights 
to arise. Along the process the researcher has to document the (i) events in question, (ii) 
what is being said by study participants about these events, and (iii) the researcher own 
interpretations about the ‘reading’ of the situation. These measures are helpful to 
avoiding the risk of premature closure. 
SUMMARY 
This appendix has reviewed investigative methodologies useful for the investigation of 
organisational drift into failure. The reviewed methodologies belong to two classes: 
normative and descriptive methodologies. Normative methodologies provide a 
structured top down approach to the identification of safety-criticalities that did not work 
in a given situation. Methodologies belonging to this class mandate that data should fit 
the model.  
Normative approaches are appropriate when the priority is on extracting 
recommendations for safety improvement. This is the case of safety practitioners which 
are moved by very practical aims as they are interested in gaining useful knowledge in the 
shape of a model which can generate understanding into (organisational) sources of risks. 
In these cases the focus in more on what safety remedies can be obtained for a given 
situation. Ultimately, these situations value primarily safety practical achievements above 
theoretical developments. As in classic engineering science, the relevant question behind 
normal methodologies is “Does this specific model of organisational risk work?”. More 
specifically, “How good is this particular model at providing effective countermeasures?” 
when applied to the analysis of a particular situation. 
Also interpretive methodologies have served the purpose of increasing our ability to 
understand and control risk. However, compared to normative methods, these 
methodologies seems to commit to a view according to which the production of 
knowledge is a legitimate goal in its own terms. In our review, this reflexive orientation 
has been highlighted explicitly by La Porte, an eminent HRO scholar, by Bourrier in her 
review of HRO scholars, and by Laporte, and Vaughan, who has suggested that 
organisations should open to ongoing ethnographic analysis giving regular feedback. 
It is possible to note that the majority of the reviewed approaches, both normative and 
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formative, can be considered as belonging to the class of case study research. Case study 
research is usually defined as a research strategy allowing a researcher to concentrate on 
a specific situation, bounded in time and space, which is selected for intense investigation 
in its naturalistic settings because it contains some elements worth discovering. It aims at 
providing a detailed multidimensional picture of the situation that is being studied. To 
Banbasat: “Case study examines a phenomenon in its natural setting, employing multiple 
methods of data collection to gather information from one or a few entities (people, 
groups or organisations). The boundaries of the phenomenon are not clearly evident at 
the outset of the research and no experimental control or manipulation is used” 
(Benbasat, 1987, p.370). It can be noted that all of the defining traits of case study 
research, in depth examination of a phenomenon in its naturalistic context, absence of 
experimental control conditions, flexibility in data collection, equally apply to the 
investigative methods reviewed in this section—both normative and descriptive.  
It can be noted however that most of the reviewed methodologies can be classified as 
Failure Cases, as they have been used for retrospective or perspective investigations of 
organisational accidents, HRO can be referred to as Normal Operation Cases, as they have 
focused on how organisations achieve error free operations during everyday operations. 
In the cases of Normal Operation Cases there is no need for the researcher to separate 
between the rational held before and after the event. 
Noteworthy, an exception to the use of case study research is offered by Turner’s 
comparative analysis of 84 industrial accidents occurred in the UK. Turner analysis was 
based on the GTM, and at its core had the systematic comparison of official accident 
reports with the purpose of extracting common themes among them, which in turn 
became the building blocks of his ensuing Man Made Disaster Theory. GTM is well versed 
for such kind of analysis: it provides a structured and systematic approach to comparative 
analysis of large samples, such as that of Turner, supporting the progressive and 
controlled reduction of data to mid-level theories able to stand for that data. In the case 
of Turner, GTM provided a very reliable theory, considering the success that its theory has 
enjoyed for many years.  
GTM is very data demanding, it requires cases of incidents that can be compared. In the 
investigation of drift, each case of incident is represented by the specific case of failure in 
a particular organisation. Hence the production of an incident requires an investigation 
first. GTM, applied to study of drift, requires the availability of cases of incidents.  
It can be noted that the reviewed investigative approaches have focused on the 
understanding of disasters and accidents and not HAI issues. This was expected, 
considering that the phenomenon of drift has been conceptualised in relation to disasters 
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and accidents, and not to other types of failure. The only exception to this trend is 
represented by the Fortune and Peter’s SFM method, which has been used to investigate 
information system failure. The method however, belonging to the class of pragmatic 
approaches, does not seem appropriate for the exploratory purposes of this study. 
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 PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
It has been acknowledged that safety science in general, and not just organisational safety 
(OS), lacks an explicit reflection about its philosophical foundations (Le Coze, Reiman, & 
Pettersen, 2012). Such a gap has been attributed to the relative novelty of the area, which 
does not enjoy a long tradition compared to more classic disciplines such as physics and 
sociology. Furthermore, its practice-oriented nature tends to favour theoretical debates 
about models of failure and related remedies rather than about the ontological, 
epistemological foundations upon which to base research and the development of these 
models and remedies.  
Thus, in order to define the philosophical orientation of the present thesis it is useful to 
consider the classic division between positivistic and interpretivist research which applies 
to general organisational, management and sociological research. This section will 
present these two approaches and then will explain why an interpretive approach appears 
to provide a better context for the investigation of the organisational precursors to HAI 
issues. Positivism and interpretivism will be necessarily presented in a succinct form, as it 
is impossible to do justice in a few pages to the long tradition that both positions enjoy in 
the history of science. 
POSITIVISM 
Positivism is the paradigm most often associated to the scientific research in Western 
society. Burrel and Morgan define it as an epistemology that attempts to explaining and 
predicting “what happens in the social world by searching for regularities and causal 
relationships between its constituent elements” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). The purpose is 
to produce knowledge in the form of laws like statements about regularities and causal 
relationships (Hirschheim, 1985, p. 83). Such laws are regarded as general, in that they 
apply to a wide range of situations, and universal in that they are valid across time and 
space (Blaikie, 2007, p. 111). 
Positivism embeds a strong realist and mechanistic view of the universe. It assumes the 
existence of an external universe existing independently of human consciousness. Such a 
universe is composed of distinct elements, whose behaviour can be explained through 
the laws of movement (Capra, 1997). The purpose of the scientist is to discover these 
laws, and this is possible through (i) reductionism, i.e., by considering that the aggregated 
behaviour of the whole could be reduced to those of the constituent parts, and (ii) 
isolationism, i.e., by considering that the behaviours of these constituent parts could be 
studied independently of each other’s and of the whole (Capra, 1997; Biggiero, 2011, p. 
8). These assumptions are also at the root of classic approaches to safety and have been 
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fiercely criticized by safety theorists as they inhibit opportunities for safety learning (e.g., 
Dekker, 2011; Hollnagel, 2014).  
Objectivism is another important positivistic assumption. According to it, objects have 
meaning in themselves. In other words, objectivism sees meaning and truth as 
immediately accessible through observation. Such a position has originated in classic 
Greek philosophy, has been absorbed by Scholastic realism throughout the Middle Ages, 
and has achieved its maximum expression in the age of Enlightenment (Crotty, 1998, p. 
42). Applied to OS, objectivism suggests that direct and objective observation of relevant 
organisational and social facts is possible. 
Viewed from a positivistic stance, the research process consists of positing a set of beliefs 
about regularities or causal relationships and then subjecting it to empirical testing 
(Hirschheim, 1985, p. 83). Implicit in this view is Popper’s logic of science, based on the 
systematic proposition of new theories, tentatively formulated as solutions to research 
problems, which are then subjected to rigorous and systematic experimental testing 
before being accepted as valid (Blaikie, 2007). So, the experiment is regarded as the most 
rigorous research method, given its emphasis on the controlled manipulation of the 
relevant variables, and the separation between the researcher and the studied people 
(Corbetta, 2003).  
Ultimately, positivism renders a linear and quantitative image of science, bolstered by the 
tenets of operationalization of variables, their quantification and generalization 
(Corbetta, 2003). As noted by Hirschheim, this positivistic view of science permeates so 
intensely our society “that knowledge claims not grounded in positivistic thought are 
simply dismissed as unscientific and therefore invalid” (Hirschheim, 1985, p. 83). 
INTERPRETIVISM 
Interpretivism is a research paradigm having at its core the idea that the understanding 
of reality requires interpretation, not just observation as for positivistivism (Corbetta, 
2003). From this perspective, social science cannot be studied in a similar manner to the 
natural sciences. In particular, the study of social reality requires the consideration of 
interpretive processes, i.e., sense making and meaning construction, since the social world 
that can be known is the world of the meanings attributed by organisational members 
that live that world (Blaikie, 2007). Such interpretations and perspectives vary depending 
on the interpretive and cultural frames held by each particular observer. Thus, 
interpretivism does not assume a single absolute social reality equal to all people. 
Interpretivism has been developed in relation to sociology and organisation theory for at 
least three reasons. First, sociological and organisational phenomena entail a complexion 
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of many factors that may simultaneously apply, overlap, and cannot be directly observed. 
Second, the selection of relevant variables is a much more subjective assessment than in 
the case of the physical sciences (Dennis, 2005). Third, and most importantly, it is human 
purpose that determines courses of action. Organisations are in fact intentional systems, 
i.e., system whose behaviour is governed by human motivations and purpose rather than 
by the laws of physics, as it is for instance in the case of engineered technical systems 
(e.g., Naikar, 2013; Checkland, 1999). So, although behavioural patterns might be 
empirically documented, understanding and prediction are weak without first 
understanding human motivation and values related to those involved in the situation 
under study.  
Viewed from an interpretivist perspective, the research process requires the researcher 
to get immersed first within the social reality under study, for empathizing with study 
participants and understanding their motivations from the inside out—and not from the 
outside in as positivist researchers would do. The development of a theory requires the 
understanding “of the social world that people have constructed and live in” (Blaikie, 
2007, p. 124) and not the imposition of categories imported from the outside. These are 
inevitably only poorly representative of the specific social reality under investigation.  
Because of this focus on knowing the social reality in depth, ethnography, grounded 
theory, and case study are the favoured research methodologies for interpretive work in 
the social sciences. These methodologies promote the development of emerging theories 
based on an in depth understanding of “actors’ language, meanings, and accounts in the 
context of everyday activities” (Blaikie, 2007, p. 89). The resulting, emerging theory 
consists of an interpretive account provided by the researcher, which aim at developing 
ideal types, i.e., abstracted models that have been constructed by the researcher to make 
sense of the particular complex social reality.  
Interpretive research is much more cautious about the status of research outcomes than 
positivism. It acknowledges that the regularities contained by the resulting model do not 
enjoy the status of universal, generalisable laws as for positivism (Corbetta, 2003) . Rather 
they consist of statement of likelihood in the form of, if A occurs, then most of the time 
also B will occur. Furthermore they might be restricted to the specific case under 
investigation.  
RATIONALE FOR THE CHOSEN PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION 
In choosing between positivism and interpretivism as the philosophical foundation better 
suited for the present research, the following two considerations apply: 
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1. First, positivist research would become manifest by means of a classic quantitative 
method, such as controlled laboratory experiment, survey, or simulation. However, 
none of these methods seems feasible in the present case. These methods require in 
fact the availability of variables that are clearly defined and measurable. This is clearly 
not the case in the present research. Furthermore, the “gold standard” quantitative 
method, the controlled laboratory experiment, would encounter serious issues of 
feasibility. Laboratory experiments consist of studying intensely a small set of 
variables in laboratory simulated settings in order to be able to draw generalisable 
statement applicable to real life situations. While appropriate when investigating 
individual or team behaviour, experiments become more problematic as the unit of 
observation—individual, team, department, organisation, etc.—grows. Specifically to 
investigating organisational drift into failure, it is not clear how normal organisation 
and administrative behaviour could be reproduced in a controlled laboratory 
environment without resorting to extreme oversimplification and isolation from most 
of the variables that exist in real life. Experiments require in fact to deliberately 
divorce the phenomenon of interest from its context, in order to study a few variables 
in a controlled environment (Yin, 2009, p. 18).  
2. Second, interpretivism seems particularly appropriate as it considers the insiders 
viewpoints and perspectives of organisational members, i.e., important precursors to 
organisational failure and success. As discussed earlier, objectivism is one of the main 
epistemological assumption associated with positivism. Objectivism asserts that 
meaning and truth are immediately accessible by means of observations. This 
assumption seems particularly problematic for the present research as it does not 
consider the multiple interpretations that guide action and decision making in 
organisations. As discussed in section 3.2, the precursors to organisational failure and 
successful safety performances include the (multiple) organisational perspectives and 
frames and viewpoints that develop inside the organisation. This calls for a research 
paradigm that considers intensely such views, as reflected in organisational members’ 
intentions, language and meaning. As discussed earlier, this is clearly what 
interpretivism does. Applied to OS, this paradigm has at its core the comprehension 
of how organisational members experience and explain the safety-critical systems 
they are operating or managing (Pettersen, 2008, p. 94). In interpretive research, the 
researcher has to wear the learner hat in fact, so to sympathize with the 
interpretations and rationales (behind given courses of action) as constructed by 
those organisational members proximal to the decisions and events relevant for the 
study. 
In conclusion, the above considerations have led to rejecting positivism and choosing 
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interpretivism as a more favourable philosophical perspective for investigating the 
organisational precursors to HAI issues.  
Note that the selected paradigm, interpretivism, embeds a social constructionist 
assumption according to which the findings of organisational analysis of failure consist of 
interpretive constructions. Hence, with the choice of an interpretive paradigm it is easy 
to enter the realist vs constructionist debate, which notably put in opposition those 
assuming the objective existence of a reality ‘out there’ against those assuming that 
organisational reality is a product of social and cultural processes.  
An article by Le Coze and Pettersen (Le Coze & Pettersen, 2008) has the merit of having 
presented this debate in a safety science attire. More precisely the author focused on the 
appropriate foundations for the area of resilience engineering (Hollnagel, Woods, & 
Leveson, 2006), which is a sub-area of safety science. In the article, on the one hand 
Pettersen suggests that critical realist ontology is appropriate given the layered 
conception of reality it embeds. Critical realism (Bhaskar, 1979) is one form of realism 
according to which observable regularities in the world can be explained by referring to 
the hidden mechanisms and structures that have caused them. This view integrates well 
with resilience engineering orientation “to shifts focus from actual events [observable at 
the system sharp end] to the underlying [organisational] facts and mechanisms…that are 
driving the functioning of socio-technical systems” (Le Coze & Pettersen, 2008). On the 
other hand, Le Coze reflects on the benefit that a social constructionist position can offer 
to resilience engineering. He warns that the validity of a model produced by a practitioner, 
should be assessed not in absolute terms but in relation to the viability of the model in 
the specific situation at hand. In this light, emerging theoretical models should be 
assessed against the experiences and background of those organisational members for 
which the model has been produced, and not by using some external seemingly objective 
criterion.  
While both Le Coze and Petterson positions seem well grounded, they do not solve the 
dialectical tension between realism and social constructionism. It is possible to draw on 
Crotty to  do so (Crotty, 1998). Crotty, has suggested that conflicts such as these stem 
from the tendency to equate realism to objectivism; however, the two are clearly distinct 
concepts: (i) the former is an ontological position assuming there is an external objective 
reality existing independently of the human mind; (ii) objectivism is instead an 
epistemological position asserting that meaning exists in objects independently of any 
human consciousness (Crotty, 1998). It follows from this that it is objectivism that should 
be opposed to constructionism, and not realism. In fact, stating that an external world 
exists independently of any human consciousness of it (realist assumption), does not rule 
out the possibility that meaning emerges out of the interaction between human 
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consciousness and the external world (constructionist assumption). In short, 
constructionism in epistemology can sit comfortably with realism in ontology (Crotty, 
1998). It can be noted that the coexistence of realism (and his more articulated 
derivatives, such as critical realism described above) and constructionism is an accepted 
position within the area of sociology of risk (Beck, 2000, p. 212; Flynn, 2006, p. 86). 
Therefore, while these considerations downplay the importance of the realist vs 
constructivist debate, they also further reinforce the confidence on interpretivism as a 
plausible research paradigm for the present research. 
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 EXAMPLE OF AN NTSB SAFETY RECOMENDATION  
  LETTER 
This appendix reports NTSB safety recommendation letter A-84-82 through -84. The 
safety recommendations conveyed can be found on the last two pages of the letter, i.e. 
pages seven and eight. 
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 STUDY 1 DATA SET 
 
Table 29. Complete data retrieved from the NTSB and FAA databases during the initial phase of the study (see 
§ 4.4.1.1). 
Safety 
Recommendat
ion Letter 
Safety 
Recommendatio
n 
Date Issued Follow up exchange letters 
(identified by date) 
FAA Letters NTSB Letters 
A-81-132 
through -138 
(2) 
A-81-134 - Oct 6, 81 - Dec 21, 81 
- Sept 1, 82 
- July 8, 82 
- March 8, 83 
 A-81-135 - Oct 6, 81 - Dec 21, 81 
- Sept 1, 82 
- July 8, 82 
- March 8, 83 
A-83-27 
through -30 
(4) 
A-83-30 - Mar 24, 
83 
 
- Jul 5, 83  
- Dec 21, 83 
- Nov 21, 83 
- Feb 11, 85 
A-84-82 
through -84 
(8) 
A-84-83 - Aug 13, 84 - Jan 18, 85 
- Aug 26, 85 
- July 1, 85 
- Jan 24, 86 
 A-84-84 - Aug 13, 84 - Jan 18, 85 
- Aug 26, 85 
- July 1, 85 
- Jan 24, 86 
A-87-46 
through -51 
(4) 
A-87-49 - May 22, 
87 
- Aug 25, 87 
- Jul 12, 88 
- Jan 22, 88 
- Feb 21, 89 
A-89-110 
through -120 
(12) 
A-89-110 - Dec 5, 89 - Feb 23, 90 
- May 4, 92 
- Sept 26, 90 
- Aug 31, 92  
 A-89-111 - Dec 5, 89 - Feb 23, 90 - Sept 26, 90 
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- May 4, 92 - Aug 8, 92 
A-90-124 
through 132 
(5) 
A-90-130 - Sept 28, 
90 
- Dec 18, 90 
- Oct 6, 93 
- July 11, 91 
- Jan 28, 94 
A-90-16- 
through -163 
(8) 
A-90-161 - Oct 29, 90 - Jan 18, 91 
- Dec 28, 92 
- May 20, 91 
- Apr 16, 93 
 A-90-162 - Oct 29, 90 - Jan 18, 91 
- Dec 28, 92 
- Feb 3, 95 
- Dec 15, 95 
- May 20, 91 
- Apr 16, 93 
- Jun 20, 95 
- Mar 21, 96 
 A-90-163 - Oct 29, 90 - Jan 18, 91 
- Feb 3, 95 
- Dec 15, 95 
- May 20, 91 
- Jun 20, 95 
- Mar 21, 96 
A-94-186 
through -188 
(4) 
A-94-186 - Nov 21, 94 - Jan 24, 95 
- March 20, 95 
- Sept 27, 95 
- Apr 27, 95 
- May 25, 95 
- Nov 11, 95 
 A-94-187 - Nov 21, 94 - Jan 24, 95 
- Sept 27, 95 
- Jan 26, 96 
- Apr 27, 95 
- May 25, 95 
- Nov 20, 95 
- Apr 8, 96 
A-95-120 
(3) 
A-95-120 - Nov 30, 95 - Feb 21, 96 
- Jun 19,96 
- Jul 31, 97 
- May 14, 98 
- Apr 16, 96 
- Jul 15, 96 
- Dec 30, 97 
- Oct 19, 98 
Appendix D  
208 
- Dec 13, 99 - Feb 3, 00 
A-97-22 
through -27 
(5) 
A-97-22 - Apr 16, 97 - Jul 1, 97 - Feb 27, 98 
 A-97-23 - Apr 16, 97 - Jul 1, 97 - Feb 27, 98 
 A-97-24 - Apr 16, 97 - Jul 1, 97 
- Sept 25, 98 
- Feb 27, 98 
- Jan 14, 99 
 A-97-25 - Apr 16, 97 - Jul 1, 97 
- Sept 25, 98 
- Aug 13, 99 
- Mar 14, 00 
- Feb 27, 98 
- Jan 14, 99 
- Nov 3, 99 
- Jul 14, 00 
 A-97-26 - Apr 16, 97 - Jul 1, 97 
- Sept 25, 98 
- Feb 27, 98 
- Jan 14, 99 
 A-97-27 - Apr 16, 97 - Jul 1, 97 
- Sept 25, 98 
- Feb 27, 98 
- Jan 14, 99 
A-06-44 
through -47 
(13) 
A-06-44 - Jul 12, 06 - Oct 6, 06 - Sept 4, 07 
 A-06-45 - Jul 12, 06 - Oct 6, 06 
- Dec 29, 10 
- Sept 4, 07 
- March 14, 11 
 A-06-46 - Jul 12, 06 - Oct 6, 06 - Sept 4, 07 
 A-06-47 - Jul 12, 06 - Oct 6, 06 - Sept 4, 07 
Totals 
11 25 - 54 56 
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 STUDY 2 INTERVIEW GUIDE 
This appendix includes the interview guide used during Study 2 of the research (presented 
in chapter 6). The interviews are supposed to start from a general discussion on MSAW 
development and the questions are intended to support the interviewer in following that 
discussion—rather than being presented in a pure sequential and mechanical way.  
Organisational 
Level 
Questions 
Blunt end roles 
(Senior/Middle 
Management/eng
ineers/controllers 
involved in 
implementation) 
- Have you been involved in the MSAW implementation 
project? If yes, how? 
- Could you please give us a chronological overview of 
safety nets deployment in your organisation, with specific 
reference to the MSAW? 
- What was the rationale for adopting the MSAW? 
- What was/is the involvement of regulators in the 
introduction/management of the MSAW? 
- What have been/are the roles involved in MSAW 
development and management, how do they work, and 
how coordination between groups, and between groups 
and line management is established? 
- What lessons learned do you have for another ANPS about 
to enter the MSAW implementation process? 
- What is the policy to keep controllers in the loop? 
...any final comment you wish to make? 
Thank you for answering these questions. 
 
 
 
Appendix E 
210 
Operational 
controllers 
A. Tool Overview 
Could you please provide me with an overview of the tool? 
How does the tool help you in maintaining safety? 
B. Alert 
How do you realise there has been a tool alert? 
On average, how often does the alert goes off (e.g., 
once/twice per day/week…)?                                                               
Considering the situations when the tool goes off, how 
many of these situations (indicate estimated percentage): 
you are already in control of the situation:          
___________              
you predict the alert to go off:                             ___________ 
the tool is indicating an imminent risk:                ___________ 
Are there situations in which you would expect the tool to 
go off but it does not? (if yes please explain when and why) 
Could you inhibit the tool? (If yes please explain when and 
why?) 
C. Response Decision to Alert 
Could you describe me how do you decide how to respond 
to an alert? 
Are there situations in which you do not deliver the safety 
alert to the crew? 
How do you distinguish a relevant alert – i.e., an alert that 
correspond to a situation of real risk – from one which is 
not? 
C. Usefulness 
When is the tool most useful? 
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When is the tool least useful? 
C. Training 
What training did you receive for operating this tool 
(duration)? 
What aspects do you feel were not covered by the training? 
 
F. Confidence (Trust) on the tool 
What are the positive characteristics of the tool that 
increase your confidence on it? 
What are the negative characteristics of the tool that 
reduce your confidence on it? 
What does not work so well, areas of improvement? 
...any final comment you wish to make? 
 
Thank you for answering these questions. 
  
Appendix F 
212 
 STUDY 3 QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
QUESTIONAIRE 
 The Organisational Side of Safety Net Implementations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 With this short questionnaire, we would like to collect your expert feedback over 
some organisational and managerial conditions that appear to influence the 
quality of the implementation and operation of safety nets. These conditions have 
been identified during a study sponsored by EUROCONTROL, and your expert 
opinion on them is needed to verify their validity and completeness. 
 Each section of the questionnaire will present you a short definition of the 
identified conditions followed by two open questions that you are kindly invited 
to respond. There we invite you to describe examples from your professional 
experience whenever you feel it appropriate—we deeply value this kind of 
feedback. 
 Please note that no name of people, company, airport or nation will appear on 
our reports. Confidentiality will be preserved.  
 Upon completion, the questionnaire must be returned to: 
simone.rozzi@gmail.com 
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PERSONAL INFO 
 
 
Name and Surname: 
 
 
 
E-mail: 
 
 
 
Organisation: 
 
 
 
Safety Nets Implemented in 
Your Organisations: 
 
 
 
1.  What are you job title and your primary work task in your organisation? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Could you broadly describe your involvement in the domain of safety 
 net? 
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CONDITION  A: MANAGERIAL ASSUMPTIONS DRIVING ADOPTION AND  
   IMPROVEMENT 
Definition: At the time of adoption, senior management might have over optimistic 
assumptions about the challenges related to the implementation of safety nets, about the 
ability of the manufacturer to implement these alarms, about the impact of safety nets 
on air traffic controllers’ operational tasks, about the required expertise and air traffic 
controllers’ involvement, about the implementation schedule.  
A.1 Please comment the description above based on your direct or indirect 
experience (comments, reflections, examples from both your direct and 
indirect professional experience would be greatly appreciated).   
 
 
A.2 Considering the condition we have just discussed, what recommendations 
would you give to senior managers willing to introduce safety nets in their 
ANSPs. 
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CONDITION B:   ORGANISATIONAL HANGLING CAPABILITIES 
Definition: The successful introduction of safety nets into the operation goes 
beyond their physical installation into the existing software infrastructure. It is also 
a learning process, where the ANSP develops focused capabilities to address the 
level of nuisance alerts and other challenges accompanying their introduction. 
Ultimately, the introduction of safety nets needs to be matched by appropriate 
support from senior management, availability of leadership, expertise, manpower, 
and supporting tools dedicated to the continuous improvement of safety nets. 
B.1 Please comment the description above based on your direct or indirect 
experience (comments, reflections, examples from both your direct and 
indirect professional experience would be greatly appreciated).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.2 What recommendations would you suggest to ANPS new to safety nets 
that wish to develop appropriate organisational capabilities in the domain 
of safety nets? 
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CONDICTION C: CONTROL OVER IMPLEMENTATION QUALITY AT THE BOUNDARY 
BETWEEN THE SERVICE PROVIDER AND THE SOFTWARE MANUFACTURER 
Definition: When purchasing safety nets as built-in components of a larger ATM 
system purchase, the implementation of safety nets may be left entirely to the 
manufacturer. When this occurs, if requirements are not specified before 
purchasing the system, control over quality of the implementation and the tuning 
process can shift entirely to the manufacturer. This brings the risk that ultimately 
the final implementation reflects more the manufacturer viewpoint than that of the 
ANSP, potentially resulting in a less than optimal implementation. Equally, by 
adopting an approach that allows little or no specific expertise and skills about 
safety nets to be absorbed from the manufacturer, the ANSP has little opportunity 
to subsequently optimise the safety nets itself.   
C.1 Please comment the description above based on your direct or indirect 
experience (comments, reflections, examples from both your direct and 
indirect professional experience would be greatly appreciated).   
 
 
 
C2. What recommendations would you provide to ANPS new to the safety net 
domain in order to avoid the problem described above? 
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CONCLUSION 
 
D1.  Please describe here any relevant organisational and managerial  
 condition  important for the success of safety net implementation that 
 has not been mentioned here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D2. Please feel free to express here any comment you may have about this 
 questionnaire.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
>>We sincerely thank you for having completed this questionnaire.  
Please return it to: simone.rozzi@gmail.com<< 
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